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  III 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the extensive puzzle of various influences on the diffusion of military 
power, meaning the spread of certain innovations, through the international system and the 
implications for international politics and the NATO alliance. Building on recent contributions 
to the studies of diffusion of military innovations, this thesis explores how and why certain 
innovations spread at a faster rate than others, through theoretical accounts of revolution in 
military affairs and adoption capacity theory, not only for discussing how military power 
diffuses through the international system as a whole, but also in relation to the case of sea power 
and modern warship innovations. According to previous literature, military technologies should 
spread fairly quickly because of structural pressures to emulate and the possibility to free-ride 
on research and development investments made by other states. Conversely, history offers 
numerous examples in which major military innovations spread neither quickly nor extensively. 
In order to explain this puzzle, the study intends to provide useful insights on states’ financial 
and organizational capacity to adopt and implement new military innovations, and what this 
imply for the NATO alliance. Through a comparative historical analysis, the mechanisms at 
play will be mapped out by applying process tracing and historical accounts, and moreover, 
empirically tested against the theoretical and analytical framework. 
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1.   Introduction                                                                                  
 
War is a harsh teacher 
(Thucydides, 1972) 
For the prevalent military power of certain states in the contemporary world, the historical 
development of their capacities for innovation, meaning patterns of how they have been able to 
transform their military organizations, is crucial for understanding the conduct of warfare through 
time and the security environment in which international politics has been wielded. Yet, there are 
certain parts of social life where some perspectives of international relations find it difficult to 
explain, such as internal dynamics within individual states. Since states function and act in different 
ways, it is important to explore how they work internally, not merely externally. Related to how 
military power spread through the international system, it is therefore unfeasible to understand 
structures of power without investigating and comparing states’ internal dynamics as to how they 
manage to stay relevant on the international arena.       
 As such, the military as an organization is crucial to concepts of the state, as it in a historical 
sense has been considered as an upholding pillar in states’ societies.1 How the military is organized 
and equipped influences how this pillar could be utilized for political means. For example, universal 
conscription has been used as a mechanism for integration in heterogenous states, like France, and 
as part of the societal contract where conscription and other military arrangements provide political 
rights for individuals or certain groups, such as farmers in Norway, shipowners in Denmark-Norway 
and the aristocracy in the feudal Europe (Ralston 1996). This example is relevant, because if 
technology changes in such a way that the part of the population carrying arms also changes, it 
would have immense political effect. The introduction of artillery, for instance, made it easier to 
authorize and arm large masses, thereby leaving the aristocracy (which was built upon military 
specialization) declined. Accordingly, current patterns of the move-away from conscription could 
cause weakened state integration, which combined with states’ loss of information control, could 
have repercussions for relations between the state and its citizens.2 Additionally, weapon industries 
in several states have served as an economic and technological engine, pulling forward other 
fragments of the industry. Choices of weapon systems could hence be heavily influenced by 
industrial politics. Innovations in the production, deployment and application of military power are 
                                                 
1 This relates to the Weberian definition of the states, where he views the state “as a human community that successfully claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert (2016, 1467). This has gained 
footing across various disciplines such as sociology, political science, international law and international relations. decades later, his 
definition of the state still seems to be considered as common ground for most literature on contemporary state-building and 
transformations of state organizations. 
2 Stated by Ståle Ulriksen, teaching professor at the Royal Naval Academy, in a telephone conversation 10th of June 2018. 
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thus important to both comparative and international politics.   
 Regrettably however, most assessments of the international security environment rarely 
contain the relevance of military innovations or the importance of their spread. An illustrating 
example is the French Navy, which in a period of thirty years – from 1850 to 1880 – came to be the 
first in developing shell guns and to deploy a steam-powered warship, an ironclad warship, a 
mechanically powered submarine, and a steel-hulled warship (Horowitz 2010, 1). Such progresses 
should have facilitated the French in attaining domination over its British adversary, but they did 
not (Krepinevich 1994). Shortly after the introduction of the steel-hulled warship during the 1870s, 
French naval theorists claimed that future naval power followed emerging technologies such as 
torpedo boats and submarines rather than battleships, making the French seemingly ahead of the 
game once again. Despite these foreseeing considerations, most scholars do not think of France as 
an eminent naval innovator of this period. How could this be, and which advantages did it gain from 
pioneering several useful technologies into naval warfare?      
 As some argue, the French Navy did not achieve any real advantages.3 In contrast to the US 
Navy, who mastered the technological and organizational practices accompanying carrier warfare 
(which brought it a viable upper hand in naval power during the second half of the twentieth 
century), the French proved unable to institutionalize their own advantage: while they surpassed 
rivals at inventing new technologies, organizational disagreements hindered the French in 
integrating them into naval strategy (Horowitz 2010). Put differently, even though France was the 
technological first mover in several occasions, it failed to channel its improvements into tangible 
war-fighting innovation that could amplify the country’s relative naval power.    
 The introduction and spread of so-called major military innovations (MMIs), meaning new 
means of generating military power, have been crucial throughout history in shaping the global 
balance of power along with changes in the security environment and the character of warfare. 
During the Middle Ages, the notorious Mongol armies expanded their empire and defeated societies 
from China to those of the Eastern part of Europe by mastering the composite bow and new tactics 
of cavalry strikes, and in this way leaping in technology and strategy (Hildinger 2001). Centuries 
later, blitzkrieg warfare was introduced at the outbreak of the World War II by the Germans, which 
enabled them to overpower the French forces and thus establish control over Western Europe 
(Hobson 2010). Regardless of the magnitude of them inducing change in international politics, the 
processes and mechanisms steering the spread of innovations and their impacts are long from being 
fully comprehended by scholars of international relations.      
 Hence, there are numerous questions that still need to be answered. Is it more beneficial to 
                                                 
3 For further reading on influential assessments of the French Navy, see works of Herbert C. Fyfe (1902) and Theodore Ropp (1987).   
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be the first mover and being the first to discover how new forms of military power could be 
employed successfully, as Germany demonstrated with blitzkrieg?4 Or is it more advantageous to 
follow the first mover and learning from it, attempting to expand and improve innovative ideas, like 
the Germans did with their all-big-gun battleships in responding to British innovations? How do this 
encompass with the spread of military power within the NATO alliance? And in what way do smaller 
states fit into this story – what influences their decisions on whether new innovations should be 
adopted in accordance to how they use force? This thesis addresses the extensive puzzle of different 
impacts on the spread of certain military innovations which shape international politics – through 
theoretical accounts of revolution in military affairs and adoption capacity theory – not only for 
discussing how military power diffuses through the international system as a whole, but also in 
relation to the case of sea power.5 
1.1 Why Study the Spread of Military Power? 
The failing French Navy during the nineteenth century regarding how to make use of its 
technological discoveries in sea power generates two essential lessons for a broader understanding 
of military power and international relations. Firstly, neither inventing technologies nor being the 
first to use them will certify advantages in the international security environment. Introducing 
technologies to the battlefield differs greatly from integrating them fully into national strategies.6 It 
is really the difference between these two processes that usually governs success or failure of states 
in international politics. Therefore, military organizations employing the technologies, instead of 
the technologies themselves, often matter the most.      
 And secondly, deviating from the majority of previous literature on military innovation, 
which has tended to center on who innovates and why, it is the diffusion of military innovation that 
primarily rules its impact on international politics (Goldman and Eliason 2003a). Revising military 
power is inadequate without a coherent theoretical framework of how states are responding to MMIs, 
and in what way their responses contribute to thrust the rise and decline of states in addition to 
templates of warfare. By using a theoretical framework inspired by recent studies on diffusion of 
military power that could bring together empirical topics like contemporary warship innovations 
and sea power, could be valuable in the sense of outlining certain mechanisms of diffusion patterns 
                                                 
4 An important note on the case of the blitzkrieg, is that it really was the British who were the first movers in relation to the technology, 
while the Germans launched the mature innovation. 
5 Being a broad component of states’ national power, sea power is often conceptually ambiguous. Although coining the term “sea 
power”, the great admiral and historian Alfred Mahan failed to define it concisely in his principal works. For the purposes of this 
thesis, sea power will, in accordance with the definition of Kevin Falk (2000, 15) comprise a collection of military and other means 
that facilitate in defining political, military and economic relations among states at sea. This definition is necessarily broad because 
the modern components of sea power vary from naval military vessels to cargo ships, from actual firepower weapons to computing 
technology and communication systems, and further from aircraft production to deep-sea mining technology.  
6 This includes both warfare and coercive diplomacy (Horowitz 2010). 
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in not only the international system as a whole but also in selected states as well – and Norway in 
particular – which has not yet been under such scrutiny.       
 As military power as the measure of how states employ organized violence on the battlefield 
or otherwise coerce adversaries is decisive to international relations and the global balance of power, 
the diffusion of military power is imperative for the security of states and driven by their perceptions 
of threats (Posen 1984; Sloan 2002; 2008). For nation states, security is essential in protecting 
national and political-strategic interests. This is carefully connected to the need for a well-structured 
and innovative military organization, precisely for preserving such vital national interests. Though, 
what constitutes states’ national interests differ significantly, and perceptions of threats will thus 
comprise great variations across the international system. Consequently, variations in states’ 
military organizational practices, ranging from core policies relating to modernization patterns, 
training and educational regimes, command structures and information management, are key to how 
and why states adopt new military technologies (Talmadge 2016, 111).    
 Military strategies and responses to military inventions is thus meticulously related to the 
state through security aspects and threat perceptions in an ever-changing security environment. With 
heavy influence in the scholarly field of political science and international relations, Michael 
Howard has elegantly connected the relevance of military history and the state, moreover the ideas 
of state. By using criteria of width, depth and context, he infers that studying military history enables 
an understanding of the nature of war and its impact on society (Howard 1961). Furthermore, 
Howard argues that this directly improves soldiers’ abilities to understand and fulfil their function. 
This is not to say, however, that the sole foundation of this thesis is military history, along with an 
emphasis security politics and international relations. Rather, military history is crucial for 
approaching a more comprehensive understanding of technological and military-strategic 
developments through time and is therefore not only important for future studies on the diffusion of 
military power, but it also demonstrates the linkages between security, defense and technology, and 
the state. As Howard validates with his perspectives on military history, analyses of the spread of 
military innovation improve our academic understanding of the function and role of military 
organizations within the broad field of political science and international relations.  
 
1.2 Research Question and Research Design 
The aim of this thesis is to explore patterns of diffusion of military innovations and consequences 
for NATO and accordingly international politics. It will focus on mechanisms influencing such 
patterns, and how these encompass with explanations in previous literature. Through a comparative 
historical analysis, the mechanisms at play will be mapped out by applying process tracing and 
historical accounts, and moreover, empirically tested against the adoption capacity theory of 
  5 
Horowitz by using the concept of revolution of military affairs as context. Paralleled with previous 
research, this thesis provides an in-depth approach on the case of sea power and modern warship 
innovations after the Cold War. This will increase the explanatory value due to process tracing 
through history, and because of applying adoption capacity theory for explaining causal mechanisms 
affecting diffusion processes of military innovations in NATO. The discussions above generate the 
following research question:  
 
In a military-strategic perspective, how are states’ financial and organizational capacity for 
innovation influenced, and what are the implications of adopting new military innovations for the 
NATO alliance? What will the effect of adopting certain naval innovations of warships imply for the 
role of a small state navy, such as the Norwegian Navy, in the NATO alliance?  
 
By assessing membership in and collaboration with the NATO alliance, as well as certain 
political, organizational and economic factors, the main task of this thesis is to provide useful 
insights in what way states’ capacity for military innovation are affected, and to explain key 
implications of adopting new military innovations for the Alliance, thus the conduct of warfare and 
the distribution of power in the international system. These insights are acutely valuable at a time of 
rapid technological, strategic, and organizational change such as we are living through today and 
have abrupt implications for international politics (Goldman and Andres 1999; Goldman 2006).
 Efforts are made for combining various important aspects of previous studies into an 
inclusive explanation for the diffusion of military power – not just in general but in relation to sea 
power as well. Accordingly, by answering alternative critiques, several elements of them will often 
overlap with adoption capacity theory, although some diverge as well. Sometimes, the analysis will 
look at alternatives from the literature, although it might not address the same questions. This is a 
crucial notice, yet, drawing from preexisting theories indicates an importance of deriving 
conventional and exclusive versions of alternative accounts than anything else.7 
 
1.3 Importance for the Post-Cold War Security Environment 
While previous studies of diffusion have tended to focus on military innovations from the past, 
meaning not necessarily from this century (or at least from the last decade), looking at innovations 
in the more contemporary period could be fruitful for demonstrating both the significance of this 
thesis’ theoretical framework and the relevance of its analysis regarding ongoing debates within 
                                                 
7 These alternatives from the existing literature in international relations regarding the diffusion of military power derive especially 
from three schools of thought: The first is more or less neo-realist, claiming that strategic competition governs diffusion processes. 
The second is based on domestic and international norms, and argues that diffusion of innovations mainly happens when states try to 
gains status or legitimize their existence (not as a strategic measure to enhance relative power). And the third asserts the importance 
of cultural similarity when trying to understand diffusion. 
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policy and security circles. Moreover, this study could help explain how future warfare will incite 
various responses different actors, in addition to how it will benefit or weaken different states. 
Portraying how implications for the current security environment depend on certain assumptions 
based on patterns through history might be useful in providing a framework for discussions in future 
studies of the spread of military power.        
 Recent years have seen dynamic debates across the world regarding what type of wars we 
are most likely to experience in the future. In Western security communities, the utility of network-
centric warfare (NCW) has been of great concern in which debates have included whether the US 
should concentrate its limited resources on institutionalizing counterinsurgency (COIN) lessons 
learned from the engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq or if it should reposition its military forces 
toward regular conventional warfare (Boot 2006a; McMaster 2008). For Biddle, it is apparent that 
existing empirical cases are not credible for capsizing the value of the “modern system” of warfare, 
meaning use of firepower, cover and concealment, to seize and hold territory in conventional land 
operations.8 As modern systems center on dangers allowing technology to decide force structure, he 
claims that they are a “orthodox” approach to war wherein scholars and policymakers should be 
wary before including more “heterodox” approaches (Biddle 2007b, 463-64).9   
 A problem related to such interpretations of conventional war versus counterinsurgency is 
that it overlooks how the information age already has shaped and will continue to shape future 
warfare. To clarify, this must not be understood as a revival of techno-centric “Revolution in 
Military Affairs” thinking (Horowitz 2011, 5). Assuming that the information age, and the 
innovations brought by it, will influence future warfare does not imply that the human element or 
skills on the battlefield should be excluded (Gray 2006). Rather, it suggests that we need to study 
how the information age – like the age of industrialization before it – could impact the ways states 
organize and use their military forces more thoroughly. For example, Frank Hoffman (2007) offers 
a credible perspective on how the future of warfare could be “hybrid”, by demonstrating aspects of 
both regular and irregular wars, yet in an operating environment embodied by the information age. 
As such, the strategic context in which the international security environment is shaped becomes 
increasingly indispensable for understanding this better.     
 Discussions about whether potential conflicts will be conventional land wars fought within 
Biddle’s “modern system” or insurgencies could at times muddle how the information age is able to 
produce shifts in financial and organizational requirements for warfare no matter what the future 
world will look like. For instance, there is a possibility that the types of wars most liable to occur 
                                                 
8 This refers to information age innovations and network-centric warfare. 
9 Biddle also makes the remark that several occurrences which are being perceived as counterinsurgency campaigns, such as Lebanon, 
really have involved principles of conventional modern systems (Biddle and Friedman 2008). 
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are irregular campaigns including land forces. However, there are also important contingencies 
encompassing potential heavy use of naval and air forces (Horowitz 2010; 2011). Impacts of the 
information age could differ on each of these, just as it could differ for states and nonstate actors.  
 Information age technologies, ranging from precision munitions to cyber-attack capabilities 
to unmanned vehicles and robotics, are likely to continue improving over the next years (Singer 
2010). It is possible that the potential tipping points for such technologies and the integration of 
them into military organizations could be immensely disruptive for the US military and its allies 
(Horowitz 2011). If advances in technologies like munitions or unmanned vehicles start making the 
expensive platforms currently used to launch precision munitions (which rest at the core of US 
military) irrelevant, it could potentially cause large-scale changes in the military power balances. 
Moreover, if a cargo plane or ship turns into being just as good for launching missiles as a B-2 
bomber or a littoral combat ship, it could be organizationally disruptive to the US but make those 
capabilities more financially conceivable to others. If unmanned vehicles become so sophisticated 
that they could replace manned fighters, militaries would also have to recruit differently and train 
people to manage different tasks since they would primarily be operating with joysticks from afar 
rather than engaging in actual battle spaces. For maintaining its technological lead, the US military 
have to be innovative in how to organize itself for best taking advantage of new developments. 
 Just as historical events have proved it foolish to think that the United States’ conventional 
military edge would make it successful in countering insurgency warfare, it is unwise to suggest that 
the US military has already mastered the information age (Goldman and Eliason 2003a). 
Additionally, although the US has a technological lead in the application of information technology 
to its military operations, these developments are not just relevant for major powers. Other states 
continue to advance their military capabilities as well, making them prominent in other technological 
areas than those of the US. Besides, it is possible that the information age will also continue to 
empower nonstate actors.10 However, these reflections are tentative. The information age might 
matter differently to various types of warfare. The point here is that discussions above should 
involve studying the variety of ways periods like the information age after the Cold War could shape 
different elements of warfare and the security environment related to it. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
This thesis opens in chapter 2 with a conceptual section which introduces important descriptions 
and classifications of the content of military innovation diffusion. These are imperative for grasping 
                                                 
10 Cheaper and more available information age technologies could reduce impediments for groups attempting to challenge state 
authority. Meaning, it will be easier for such groups to rise in virtual environments and to exchange information across state borders 
that could potentially hurt state actors in a very efficient way (Hammes 2004). 
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the concepts and foci of the ways military power spread and how states might respond to new major 
military innovations. It further connects with and lays the foundation for the theoretical and 
analytical framework in chapter 3, in which the main focus is on adoption capacity theory in the 
context of the current revolution in military affairs (RMA). This combination contributes to an 
understanding of states behavior in situations where state security and strategic assessments prevail 
actions and interactions of states. It will also contribute to comprehend the complexities involved in 
aligning state behavior with international obligations.       
 The methodological framework in chapter 4 is outlined with emphasis on a comparative 
historical analysis approach, combined with case study and process tracing. In this sense, historical 
explanation is utterly important for tracing the mechanisms which could explain how military power 
diffuses. Strengths and potential weaknesses in the methodology will further be pointed out. 
Deriving from this, in addition to discussing relevant debates within the Alliance and outlining 
certain aspects regarding military transformation in NATO, the case study of sea power and warship 
innovation is portrayed in chapter 5. And finally, chapter 6 analyzes the spread of military 
innovation, and the sea power case in particular, in the post-Cold War era in light of theoretical 
accounts by which the adoption capacity theory is tested.  
 
 
2. Concept and Context of the Diffusion of 
Military Innovations: A Literary Review 
 
Just as Thucydides tells us, war is a harsh teacher. Either we learn from those better at fighting than 
we are, or we die. Still, there are puzzles to why some states suffer in warfare even though they are 
stronger than their opponents. After World War I, France was aware of Germany being 
demographically and economically stronger than themselves. Information on emergence of 
blitzkrieg warfare in Germany was available. Nonetheless, the French army prepared during the 
1930s for the same kind of slow, methodical, defensive war it had learned from the World War I, 
although the logic of its alliance system called for it to go offensive against Germany when Poland 
was attacked by the German army (Owens 2000; Posen 1984). Why is this?  
 Further, in 1956, Egypt suffered a massive defeat against the Israelis, even though the Soviet 
Union provided it with an extensive amount of financial and technological support. It had every 
incentive to beat the Israelis at their own game, in addition to holding the material means to do so. 
For exactly the same reasons as for the French, it suffered another massive defeat in 1967. Again, 
why? Both France and Egypt should have learned from those who threatened them, but did not. This 
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study addresses the way states make strategic choices in response to major military innovations and 
how this affect the diffusion in military power in the international alliance system of NATO and 
international politics as a whole.          
 What follows outlines a new take on diffusion of military innovation, explaining adoption of 
capacities and strategies in comparison with certain existing theories, concepts and cases, to predict 
not only what determines states’ interest in innovations and innovative skills, but also state capacity 
to adopt innovations, other strategic choices for states facing innovations, and the consequences for 
small states in the NATO alliance, warfare and the balance of power that stems from shifts in 
adoption capacity requirements. 
 
2.1 The Spread of Military Power Matters 
Scholars fascinated with military power have offered significant thought to the puzzles of how states 
try to gain advantages over other states through creating new ways of generating military power, 
meaning military innovations. Most notably, the works of Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen have 
theorized about the terms in which militaries are most likely to innovate, although diverging on 
whether innovations happen as a consequence of pressure from actors outside military organizations, 
military mavericks within the system, or as a consequence of changing promotion patterns that give 
those with innovative ideas organizational power (Posen 1984; Rosen 1991). Theorizing about such 
changes in international politics relies on clear implicit ideas about the way military power 
diffuses.11 And by making those ideas explicit and testing them empirically to decide which more 
accurately portray international relations, this study will explain how certain changes in the 
international security environment occurs.         
 As Horowitz accentuates, the reason why innovations matter in the first place relates to their 
impact on world politics, that is what happens after the initial innovation occurs (2010, 18). The 
event of the blitzkrieg is exceedingly interesting in a historical sense, because Germany invaded 
France which proved unable to respond effectively (Hobson 2010, 626). The importance of, or 
absence thereof, the emergence of innovations for world politics lies in mechanisms governing the 
diffusion of military power, hence it rests on strategic choices states make in response to innovations. 
So, recent theorizing concerning features managing the diffusion of military power add up only in 
part because it explains why military power matters.   
                                                 
11 For further reading on strategic studies and military effectiveness, see Grissom (2006). Other key readings on military innovation 
studies, see Avant 1994; Evangelista 1988; Goldman and Eliason 2003a; 2003b; Kier 1997; Mahnken 2002; Pierce 2004; Posen 1984; 
Rosen 1991; Sapolsky 1972; Zarzecki 2002; Zisk 1993. 
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2.2 Explaining Diffusion 
The spread of military power functions through processes of the marvel known in many scholarly 
disciplines as diffusion. Most prominently, the defining works on diffusion research in the social 
sciences are done by Everett Rogers (2003, 11), which describes diffusion as “the process by which 
(1) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the 
members of a social system”. Moreover, crucial to diffusion research is the pattern by which 
successful innovations largely spread throughout a population. Notions of effective innovations 
construct the framework within which diffusion occur or does not occur, denoting the inevitable 
connection between innovation and diffusion.       
 The understanding in which normal innovations frequently diffuse in the shape of an S curve, 
is widely applicable across a range of disciplines and areas, such as consumer products, agriculture, 
public policy adoption and military technology (David 1986; Horowitz 2010).12 Essentially, there 
are three main stages of diffusion for “normal” products after a triggering event or debut. Diffusion 
is slow whilst risk-acceptant actors – or early adopters – implement the innovation during the first 
stage. In the second stage, once diffusion has reached a critical mass (similar to a tipping point in 
game theory literature), the rate of diffusion increases in speed and the set of actors with capability 
to implement the innovation will generally do so. These are called main adopters. Through the third 
stage, the late adopters, also called laggards, will implement the innovation. The entire number of 
adopters, meaning the percentage of adopters out of the group of potential adopters, is known as a 
cumulative adopter distribution.        
 Moreover, innovations often transform as they spread, and adopters adjust them to the lines 
of their actual situation. In the pattern of responses to Napoleonic warfare and Prussian tactics of 
open orders in the nineteenth century, Geoffrey Herrera and Thomas Mahnken (2003, 242) 
demonstrate how states tended to adopt certain key elements of innovation over others, and also 
adjusted the innovation depending on their requirements.      
 Studies of when the diffusion of ideas are more or less likely to happen have also matured 
over the recent decades. However, the notion of interactions between domestic organizations and 
developments abroad is well-known in the social sciences. A wide variety of scholars demonstrate 
important linkages between new practices abroad and decision-making at home. Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962) studied competition and industrial development, and the established works of 
Peter Gourevitch (1978) discussed how international politics stipulates domestic economic 
decisions. This research illustrates the significance of developing theories that consider the chance 
                                                 
12 Paul David’s work (1986) on diffusion within the field of economics has been of particular interest. Another important reading is 
also done more recently by Goldman and Mahnken (2004). 
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of diffusion as not always efficient. Some individual actors may not benefit from adoption, and not 
all innovations are relative advances.13          
 
2.3 Military Power and Major Military Innovations 
Military power is how states generate organized violence either for use on the battlefield or as part 
of coercive strategies (Horowitz 2010; Smith 2006). It embodies a combination of different 
technologies, called hardware, used in combat – for instance rifles, artillery and bombers – and 
organizational processes, called software, used to prepare the use of and in fact employ the 
hardware.14 It is too easy to assess the adoption and spread of military power as merely the spread 
of military technology, the tools and devices used to plan for or to fight armed conflicts.15 Most of 
the existing literature on diffusion of military power underlines the spread of technology, or at best, 
the aspiration for obtaining innovations (Elman 1999; Goldman and Eliason 2003b; Resende-Santos 
1997; Zarzecki 2002).16 This is the point of departure for most studies of arms races along with 
studies of arms imports and exports.17       
 Nevertheless, certain events from the business world show that considering technology alone 
is not enough to comprehend the essence of how innovations matter and what makes effective 
change more likely. For example, looking at the computer industry, Dell forged during the 1990s a 
model of production that depended on made-to-order computers, based on customer specifications. 
This lead to lower inventories and overhead costs compared to its major competitors. As a result of 
the different organizational structure, their ability to integrate external, or exogenous, alterations in 
personal computer technology, improved. When a technological change happens, such as the release 
of Intel’s new microprocessor, it was possible for Dell to integrate into its consumer production lines 
simply within a few days. For competitors to do the same, it could take weeks. This left Dell with a 
huge advantage in the ability to deliver first rate products to customers, which lead to increased sales 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, 30). Even if the new technology mattered, Dell’s ability to integrate it 
better and more efficient than its competitors was crucial in generating its market advantage. 
 Alternative explanations derive from survey data on business productivity, which emphasize 
the often synergistic nature of changes in technology and organizations. Results from a vast survey 
done by the McKinsey Corporation and the London School of Economics in 2001, revealed that 
                                                 
13 Many scholars have written about several topics ranging from the spread of decolonization movements, the spread of toxic pills in 
corporate businesses to student shantytown movements in divestment campaigns in South Africa. Further readings include Soule 
(1999), Strang (1991), Strang and Meyer (1993), and Strang and Soule (1998).  
14 With regard to military capabilities, this resembles to how Biddle define military effectiveness as ways of using forces that make 
winning a battle less difficult (Biddle 2004; 2007a). See also the work of Dupuy (190) for insight on capabilities based on lethality. 
15 This derives broadly from the definition of military technology by Zarzecki (2002, 74). 
16 The works by Farrell differ (Farrell 1998; 2002a; 2002b; 2005). 
17 Although there are several qualitative studies, the focus on quantitative measures regarding this research probably arises because 
arms such as tanks and rifles are easier to count than methods of recruiting and training. The literature on arms race may be based on 
even more questionable grounds because of the focus on military spending, instead of actual military equipment (Horowitz 2010).  
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businesses either implementing technological changes, changes in managerial practices or 
adjustments in both capacities, were undeniably influenced rarely by the combination of 
organizational and technological change. Businesses exclusively implementing technological 
changes faced a two percent increase in productivity, which faded compared to the nine percent 
increase spawned by exclusively managerial changes. Conversely, Dorgan and Dowdy (2004, 13-
15) showed that businesses adopting both managerial and technological change underwent twenty 
percent of increase in productivity, denoting almost a double of the total when adding together 
technological and managerial change.         
 A key point is that military organizations share some basic features with firms, including the 
need to compete with other actors, survival threats from unsuccessful efforts to compete efficiently, 
the development of bureaucracies to regulate and manage their operations, and the need to make 
strategic choices in response to adjustments or changes in external surroundings (Cronin and 
Crawford 1999). Following Waltz (1979), regardless of numerous differences between the corporate 
world and the military domain, the importance of analogies based on business and micro-economic 
accounts for the underlying nature of the international system verifies it as useful, although 
inadequate, when thinking about military power.  
 
2.3.1 Defining MMIs – Major Military Innovations 
This study demonstrates the importance of investigating military power in a broader sense instead 
of just military technologies. Hence, the focus is on the adoption and thereby spread of major 
military innovations (MMIs), as well as the current use of particular military capacities and possible 
implications of this usage. When production of military power changes, meaning that the nature of 
conducting warfare change in some assessable way, it is a military innovation (Horowitz 2010). The 
greater the change, the greater is the innovation. More specifically, MMIs are changes in the conduct 
of warfare that is significant to military organizations designed to increase the efficiency of 
converting capabilities to power.18          
 MMIs are often closely linked to technological changes used by military organizations. This 
indicates that MMIs could just as well be key capacities such as aircraft carriers, battleships and 
warships, and advances of fighter jets, as innovations in computer and information technology.19 A 
main purpose of this thesis is to explain new ways that military organizations, and the Norwegian 
Navy in particular, generate power and how it responds to innovations in the production of military 
                                                 
18 Scholars most often disagree on which shifts in military power that should be regarded as innovations. A crucial definitional 
distinction is made between the innovations designed to help states get advantages and the ones actually helping states get ahead 
(Gray 2002; Krepinevich 1994). 
19 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff also distinguish MMIs, or “change in the [organizational] goals, actual strategies, and/or structure 
of a military organization”, and minor military innovations, or “changes in operational means and methods (technologies and tactics) 
that have no implications for organizational strategy or structure” (2002, 5). 
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power – not just certain technological developments in itself.20    
 Given the possibility of misunderstandings concerning terminology that seem prevalent 
when discussing military power, the need for certain clarifications comes to mind. The “conduct of 
warfare that is significant to prominent military organizations” refers to the way major powers, 
meaning the dominant states in the world, organize their militaries and prepare to fight wars. The 
notion of transforming the nature of warfare speaks to the shift in core skills of military organizations 
or shifts in the duties that average soldiers perform.     
 Taking into account the efficiency with which military power is shaped in the definition, the 
idea that all innovations are neither the same nor successful is articulated. The objective of major 
military innovations is to produce massive increases in military capabilities, but whether that occurs 
is separate from the definition. This distinction is crucial, for avoiding a tautology in the definition 
and extent of the objective of interest, the military innovation and dependent variables like alliances, 
balance of power and war.21 
 
2.3.2 The Rise of MMIs 
In order to measure when diffusion can rationally begin, it is important to determine when major 
military innovations emerge. When looking at studies of the diffusion of consumer durables in the 
business world, we can find some similarities to the approach held in this section. They show that 
an incubation period often occurs between the entering of new products in the commercial market 
and when the product matures and sales launches. Meaning, in general there is a delay between when 
the technology enters the commercial market and when sales take off in the broader population. 
Information on the spread of color televisions and compact disc players stresses the disparity 
between development of a product and its launch in the population, also referred to as an incubation 
phase (Golder and Tellis 1993; 1997; Mahajan et al. 1990).      
 In a military context, the idea of an incubation period seems logic since specific technical 
capabilities that may represent the public “face” of a military innovation are frequently presented 
years – albeit decades – before the technologies develop to a point where they can be beneficial to 
militaries, and/or before militaries discover how to use them in producing differing military powers. 
Welch (1999, 122) shows the incubation period as the period between the first indications of a 
breakthrough in military power, such as the British use of the tank at the 1917 Battle of Cambrai, 
                                                 
20 This resembles to the work by Robert Gilpin (1981). From the perspective of the diffusion of innovations, the question of shifts in 
power also goes beyond the offense-defense paradigm. This seems logic since it is the relative balance of forces and beliefs about 
battles that have impact on behavior in militarized situations, and not something integral about certain technologies. Additionally, 
according to Lieber (2005), the role of politics in determining behavior is underplayed in the literature on offense-defense balance.    
21 It is debatable whether the definition actually is tautological, because all expansions of military effectiveness may represent 
innovations. Nevertheless, when documenting changes in doctrine, training, and education, in addition to resource allocations for 
measuring the way that organizational changes encompass generating new forms of military power, this understanding of MMIs 
escapes the issue of tautology. 
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and the introduction of a fully established innovation with new operational concepts like radios and 
air power, such as how the German military used the Blitzkrieg in World War II. During the 
intervening incubation period, Germans could decide how new technology would be best utilized 
and thus reform their operational concepts to employ combined arms warfare.22  
 When the incubation period is left from the takeoff period of an established innovation, the 
conceptual importance of determining the demonstration point for each major military innovation 
is brought to light. This critical stage called demonstration point for each MMI follows when the 
potential of its full capabilities is relatively recognized in the international system through a first 
mover action, rather than that the capability is solely the matter of internal maneuvers or debates. 
The demonstration point in itself is when the pressure on potential adoption by other states begins.23 
The existence of an MMI as a discontinuous change is partly based on the perspective of other states, 
and is not necessarily perceived as a discontinuous change for the first mover state.24  
 Different innovations have application for international politics in different time periods 
(Horowitz 2010). Consequently, each innovation has a unique cycle of life. Novelties in research 
could potentially trigger new MMIs in shorter time periods, which limits the time period of relevance 
for an innovation. At the onset of World War II, the mechanized battlefleet system that had 
superseded the sailing navy during the mid-19th and the early 20th century, was itself superseded by 
carrier warfare some decades later – even though the principles of warfare in the age of sail had 
changed fairly slowly over hundreds of years. Over a period of seventy-two years since 1945, 
nuclear weapons have continued to be an important part of global power, compared to blitzkrieg 
warfare which replaced modern trench warfare after just a few decades. Because innovation can 
serve a purpose in various capacities of warfare, like on land or at sea, in addition to the possibility 
for broad disparities in the time period of relevance for innovations, it adds up for studying 
innovations as units of analysis.  
 
                                                 
22 The well-known historian Ernest May is particularly fascinated by the German success compared to France’s failure. Accordingly, 
the French military organization is described as “sclerotic” and unable to take advantage of the numbers of troops and tanks on the 
western front in 1940, due to the Allies’ massive failures in intelligence (May 2000). His work also demonstrates that regular 
measurements of forces on the battlefield, such as troop counts or counts of specific technologies like tanks or planes, do not predict 
battlefield success at all times. The Germans had 76 division in first line and 26 second-line divisions in May 1940 at the outset of 
war, while the Allies had 96 first-line divisions and 30 ones in the second line. Furthermore, the Allies had deployed 3079 tanks, 
whereas the Germans had 2439 tanks deployed. However, it is important to understand how organizations employ force, in 
supplement to these measures. Although quantitative measures may be useful, the point here is to say that there is need for more 
sophisticated models and that how militaries use raw materials is necessary to incorporate.  
23 This separates the existence of diffusion processes from other simultaneous developments by numerous states. In theory, it is 
possible that more than one state could introduce the very same innovation at the same time. Thus, there could be more than one first 
mover. It is central to explain the existence of diffusion processes in the cases below in contrast to simultaneous developments. 
24 Mahnken draws an example to Germany; to many German officers, Blitzkrieg was viewed as the culmination of German military 
improvements in the 1920s and 1930s. However, it seemed rather discontinuous to most of the French and British military officers 
upon its debut (Mahnken 2003). 
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2.4 Outlining Potential Responses to MMIs 
Perspectives on the spread of military innovations or military technology has in a traditional sense 
perceived states’ strategic choices as a yes or no question, meaning either innovations are adopted 
or they are not. Yet in reality, states are able to pursue a much more comprehensive array of options 
– sometimes simultaneously – once military innovations begin. In general, states could presumably 
respond to innovations in ways that they think will maximize their foreign policy interests. Their 
decisions are influenced by several incentives and constraints that will form their final response 
strategy. One of the most important factors defining the extent of states interested in an innovation, 
is the geostrategic environment. Additionally, there are other factors as well that might influence 
interest in responding to an innovation, ranging from international norms to cultural openness to the 
interoperability with allies.25         
 One set of such potential responses includes external actions, implying changes a state can 
make regarding its foreign policy to manage latent effects of another state adopting a military 
innovation. Moreover, a state could determine that the consequences of an innovation no longer 
make the success of foreign policy goals viable, calling for a shift towards neutrality or possibly 
only reducing the general foreign policy decisiveness of the state. This could potentially lead to what 
Schroeder expresses as “transcending” or “hiding” in international politics, meaning pushing for 
international institutions or other ways to manage when a state no longer has the relative power to 
protect itself (Schroeder 1994, 117).        
 Also, another potential external response is trying to lower the costs of non-adoption by 
affiliating with a likely adopter (Schweller 1994; Walt 1987). One alternative is balancing, creating 
or joining an alliance against the state that initiates a military innovation with another state – or 
group of states – which have capacity to positively adopt or answer the innovation. Contrary to 
balancing is allying with the inventive state that pioneered the new military innovation, also called 
bandwagoning. Additionally, alliances could help a state gain access to necessary knowledge more 
quickly for implementing the innovation – either through providing the state time to build capacity 
to adopt or through direct assistance from the first mover (Goldman and Ross 2003c, 375-79). 
 States may also follow internal military shifts in response to new military innovations. Trying 
to adopt parts of or the whole innovation is one option. This means that the innovation diffuses from 
country A to country B. For instance, Resende-Santos (1996) claims states such as Brazil and 
Argentina lack capacity to fully adopt in the short term yet will adopt certain technological elements 
in responding to naval innovations in the early and mid-twentieth century, since that is all they can 
afford. Partial adoption embroils in general adopting technological or operational aspects of an 
                                                 
25 See for example Elman, Posen and Resende-Santos, as cited above. Figure 2.1 in Appendix B can demonstrate the scope of 
possible responses states may have. 
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innovation, because it is usually a lot less disruptive to adopt technologies than to modify the way 
organizations consider employing military force. Another possible reaction is that even though some 
states have financial means to adopt – and value the strategic purpose of adoption – they may be 
unable to because of organizational reasons. States could potentially view adoption as initiating 
domestic concerns and/or disrupt key military social hierarchies, in which military benefits from 
adopting are offset and effective implementation is difficult to achieve.26    
 In addition, there are certain states that have crude financial and organizational capacity to 
adopt an innovation, but they do not as the financial and non-financial (mostly domestic political) 
costs of adoption are viewed as higher than the costs of non-adoption. This is especially so when an 
external alliance strategy is viable. For example, during the mass mobilization warfare in the post-
Napoleonic period, the British Army had the capacity to adopt an innovation but chose not to. Army 
and political leaders believed the likelihood of massive British land engagements on the continent 
was adequately low that the domestic costs, such as public turmoil, from shifting to mass 
mobilization through recruitment overshadowed any benefits. Herrera and Mahnken (2003) 
accentuates that the presence of sustainable alliance strategy also made paying the costs of adoption 
less appealing to Great Britain.         
 Goldman and Eliason (2003a) depicts another internal response strategy, such as 
“countering” an innovation, referred to as “offsetting”. Countering in this sense is defined as an 
internal military response that ignores adopting innovations although ranging from trying to 
neutralize or counteract its impact with low-cost tactics drawn from standing forces and operational 
plans in the pursuit for additional new military innovation in dealing with the first military 
innovation. Camouflage tactics used by the Serbian forces in response to the air campaign led by 
the American military over Kosovo in 1999, is an example of countering through prevailing military 
means. Moreover, the development of trace italienne, the stubby and broad-angled bastion fortress, 
is an example of a countering strategy that was an innovation in its own right, mainly as response to 
aggregate cannon quality, making offensive armies able to hammer through the thin walls of many 
early-modern Europe fortresses (Parker 1996, 9-11).     
 Exposure of the developed innovation can generally trigger two simultaneous processes in 
an “ideal” type of responding state.27 Consequently, the military evaluates the requirements for 
adopting an innovation in relation to its current and latent capabilities (along with the likelihood of 
a countering strategy), while executives regulate the potential utility of the scope of external policy 
solutions such as alliances or shifts towards neutrality. In states where civilians rule the military, the 
                                                 
26 For a further account regarding this matter, see (Herrera and Mahnken 2003, 214-15). 
27 Ideal types are theoretical concepts of potential state behavior useful for identifying what many states might do however not meant 
to impersonate the exact state behavior (Weber 2002). 
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military must report back to executives, who evaluates relative costs and benefits on the advices 
from military leaders regarding different strategic possibilities. Thus, most likely choices of an 
average middle power holding an advanced industrial base and a medium-sized economy, are partial 
adoption of some technological components on the one hand, yet places a larger importance on 
alliance-based response on the other hand. The nature of alliance-based responses rests on the 
relationship between the responding state, the first mover and other potential adopters.28 Figure 2.2 
in Appendix B portrays an idealized model of this response process, given the international security 
environment we are currently facing. Because of these outlines, what are the factors that decide how 
military power spreads through the international system? This is some of what next chapters is about. 
 
 
3.  Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
 
The ways in which national militaries have pursued adaption and adjustments, particularly with 
regards to the post-Cold War era, now nearly three decades old, could be seen as dramatic when 
facing the environment of an ever-changing security landscape. Security, meaning the absence of 
threats to values, is not a concept that is assured alone by the use of military force (Sloan 2002; 
2008). For the most part, it only has a small role to play in this conception. But in many instances, 
this role is important, and precisely how militaries are sized, structured and equipped is thus crucial 
when dealing with potential threats. Combining primarily two interrelating theoretical assumptions, 
deriving from the preexisting literature on international relations and security policy, the revolution 
in military affairs (RMA) and adoption capacity theory (ACT) make the theoretical and analytical 
framework for examining and evaluating the diffusion of military power and security dilemmas of 
states, including small states – Norway in particular – in this thesis. While the former will function 
as a contextual basis in which states make strategic choices in response to contemporary major 
military innovations, the latter is meant to further address the diffusion in military power in 
international politics as a whole and the international alliance system of NATO – notably after the 
Cold War but also through history in general – by making predictions of how military power diffuses 
through different sets of variables. 
 
                                                 
28 For instance, bandwagoning is likely if the responding state is Canada and the first mover is the United States. However, if the first 
mover is China and the responding state is Japan, balancing is perhaps more likely (Horowitz 2010). 
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3.1 Understanding Current Military Innovation: The RMA 
Already before the end of the Cold War, scholars were theorizing about the effect of new military 
technologies on the nature and conduct of war, and vice versa (Cohen 1996). During the late 1970s 
and 1980s, Soviet authors debated the presence of a military technical revolution (MTR), which US 
Pentagon analysts further assessed in their discussions of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
during the 1990s, adding both doctrinal and organizational dimensions to the idea. After the turn of 
the century, terminology moved toward transformation, with similar meaning as the RMA. But then 
it has slowly but surely come to include a wider range of concerns which eventually made the 
concept, according to some, “a generic buzzword for ill-focused change” (Sloan 2008, vii).  
 The RMA field is broad and extensive with its content and terminologies, yet the notion that 
we are engaged in a revolution in military affairs is common knowledge among analysts in the 
security environment. Behind this consensus, however, lies significant debates concerning the nature 
of the RMA, its expected development, and implications for different states, the future of warfare 
and defense policy. Nonetheless, there are much agreement on information technology innovations 
as the driving forces steering the RMA into a transformation of the nature of modern warfare. New 
technologies are being adopted and integrated in new military doctrines and organizational concepts 
in such a scale that it could render the doctrines and concepts guiding great powers throughout the 
Cold War, obsolete (Raska 2016). Additionally, it is widely supported that it was the Gulf War in 
1991 that first presented a clear sign of the emerging revolution in military affairs.29  This encounter 
could be seen as the forerunner of a broader RMA that, whilst combining technological advances 
with the limitations of defense budgets and bureaucratic inactivity, could be discussed as 
culminating this present-day and in the foreseeable future (Futter and Collins 2015).  
Hence, the MTR, the RMA and military transformation are interconnected terminologies, 
emerging over the past decades to explain the continuing changes in Western militaries. It is 
impossible to fully understand this without placing it into some kind of historical perspective. There 
have been more than a few revolutions in military affairs over the course of history, and for grasping 
the substance of the current RMA, it is crucial to look at the terminologies shaping its origins and 
the current – as well as future – military transformations. Conceptual developments and arguments 
underlying the RMA debate have evolved into two parallel levels: theoretical and policy-oriented 
(Shimko 2010, 1-25). Following sections will portray the debate especially among defense and 
military analysts, on the perception that we are caught in a revolution in military affairs and whether 
the more rightful term should be military transformation, as proposed by Sloan. The relevance of 
                                                 
29 Yet, Soviet scholars had already observed this in the 1970s, which underscores a discrepancy; it might be more accurate to argue 
that the 1991 Gulf War confirmed what Soviet theoreticians had claimed was emerging. See discussion in section 3.1.1. 
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RMA is still important, also regarding military innovation in small states, and is meant to put further 
theorizing into the context of spreading power and new ways of conducting war. 
  
3.1.1 Origins of the Current RMA and the Geopolitical Context 
As noted above, technological elements of modern ideas on how militaries transform originate from 
improvements in military technologies through the late 1970s and 1980s in the United States. During 
most of the Cold War, dependency on an American strategic nuclear deterrent – in addition to the 
French and British nuclear weapons – was important for the US and its Western allies, in providing 
balance against the much greater conventional forces of the Soviet Union.30 This made grounds for 
the refusal of the NATO and the US to discard a nuclear “first strike” alternative, and has been part 
of their perpetual policy, even through the remarkable changes in especially the US conventional 
force capabilities since the 1980s (Sloan 2008, 2).  
 The change started with the offset strategy of the former US Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown (during the Jimmy Carter administration) for responding to the Soviet’s quantitative 
advantage using Western qualitative, technological advances, because it was impossible for NATO 
to field as many soldiers as the Soviet military (Owens 2000; Sloan 2008). Capabilities in computers 
and microelectronics were being pursued through the idea that existing platforms and personnel 
could get a crucial competitive advantage if new technology were being applied, instead of buying 
new and supplementary ships, tanks and aircrafts, or increasing Western military forces. Throughout 
the 1980s, the US military did considerable research and development (R&D) of cutting-edge 
military technologies, as well as experimenting with them in war games and simulated scenarios, 
until they were actually tested in battle during the 1991 Gulf War. The coalition forces’ success in 
the Gulf War happened because of essential innovative advancements in areas of command, control 
and communications, intelligence and surveillance sensors, precision-guided munitions, and the 
overpowering of the enemy’s air defense systems (Perry 1991).31 
 The military technological improvements following the Gulf War staggered both the US 
military and their allies, as well as the general public. Conversely, the US Cold War adversary was 
conceivably not as surprised, being more familiar with the capabilities of the US military advances 
(Perry 1991). Soviet observers started discussing an MTR in the late 1970s, where usage of 
computers, space surveillance and long-range precision missiles would facilitate the West in 
competing as well as, or better, against the East regarding conventional military capabilities 
(Chapman 2003). Nikolaj Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, was confident that America 
experienced early stages of an MTR during the beginning of the 1980s (Cohen 1996). Accordingly, 
                                                 
30 The size of Soviet military forces was about the double or triple, compared to those of NATO (Sloan 2008).  
31 More detailed elaborations noted below. 
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he favored an increase of the Soviet defense budget and buying technologically sophisticated 
equipment for keeping pace. Yet, rising economic troubles and the final collapse of the Soviet Union 
hindered these plans, proving it incapable of developing such weaponry and keep up in the arms 
race driven by the information technologies.32  
The MTR as a term gained foothold in the security environment, making its way into US 
defense policy circles. Andrew Marshall, a former Director of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) 
in the United States’ Department of Defense (US DoD), used the events of 1991 in his search for 
historical analogies regarding the potential impact of the MTR on the US military (Owens 2000). 
He traced it to the interwar period, when Germany combined new technologies that had surfaced 
during the end of World War I, with organizational and doctrinal modifications in order to produce 
its revolutionary Blitzkrieg warfare in World War II. Thus, Marshall argued that despite the military 
technological innovations emerging during the Gulf War turned out to be dramatic, it was necessary 
for the US military moving beyond the MTR and view supplementary organizational and doctrinal 
modifications in broader perspectives that could generate an RMA (Blaker 1997).   
 
3.1.2 Defining the American RMA: Areas of Focus 
Definitions of RMA are broad and numerous, varying from those capturing with easiness the basic 
nature of an RMA, such as Rogers (2000, 22) stating an RMA as “simply a revolutionary change in 
how wars are fought and won – a change that can often be recognized by the ease with which 
‘participating’ armed forces can defeat ‘non-participating’ ones”, to those highlighting defining 
attributes, e.g. Hundley (1999, 9) stressing “an RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and 
conduct of military operations which renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies 
of a dominant player” to those grasping specific bits and pieces by pointing to the perhaps most 
appraised one provided by former ONA Director Marshall (Lambeth 1997, 75) stressing RMA as 
“a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies 
which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational 
concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations”.33 
 These definitions all share, either implicitly or explicitly, the point that an RMA covers more 
than just technological advances. In fact, the main tenet of an RMA, described by most military and 
defense analysts, is that improvements and innovations in technology should lead to significant 
changes in the ways in which military forces are organized, trained and equipped for war, thus alter 
                                                 
32 It should be specified that this incapability concerns some, but certainly not all technological areas.  
33 This appeared after the influential Washington think tank, RAND, argued in 1993 that “the Military Technical Revolution…refers 
to many aspects of military force besides technology; in fact, it is a timely combination of innovative technologies, doctrines, and 
military organizations, that is reshaping the way in which wars are fought” (Mazarr, Shaffer and Ederington 1993, 1). Underlining 
this, Marshall’s office began to use RMA instead of the MTR terminology.  
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how wars are fought. The RMA terminology dominated the US military and defense policy circles 
throughout the mid and late 1990s, and to some extent in Europe. During this period, the ONA 
presented key documents reflecting the rational basis for Pentagon’s quest of the RMA.34 No real 
consensus was obtained, but as noted below, it is possible to identify some technological, doctrinal 
and organizational concepts that most often have been associated with the current RMA.
 The military technologies comprising the RMA include the ones first advanced as part of the 
US Cold War offset strategy, thereby making their campaign debut in the Gulf War. According to 
Admiral William Owens of the US Navy – now retired and former Vice CJCS – these kinds of 
military capability, labeled as “revolutionary” in the early 1990s, derived from operational 
approaches and systems designed and developed in the late 1970s through the late 1980s that made 
victory in the 1991 Gulf War “inevitable and our historically small loss of life probable” (Owens 
2000, 89).35 The offset strategy led to major enhancements of military capability, as was evident 
during the 1999 military intervention in and around Kosovo, the 2001-2002 war in Afghanistan, and 
the 2003 war in Iraq, and included advances in precision-guided munitions (PGMs), intelligence 
gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and command, control, computing and 
intelligence processing (C4I).36 These new advances intended to increase greater speed, range and 
accuracy (like PGMs), increase force-projection capabilities (like with low-observable or stealth 
technology), and increase battlespace awareness, meaning the ability to “see” over the next hill 
(Owens 2000; Smith 2006; Wong 2013). More than precision munitions, ISR technologies have 
potential to reduce “the fog of war” that have changed how wars are fought.37   
 Several military doctrines were released during the 1990s as part of the revolution in military 
affairs. Overarching in these doctrines remained the need for shifting the massive, heavy Cold War 
armies prepared for battle “in place”, in which they were located in Europe and fighting in Europe 
(Sloan 2008, 5). Instead, changing them into lighter, more deployable armies being expeditionary, 
meaning located in Europe or North America yet deployable to operational theatres around the 
world, seemed sensible (Boot 2003; Singer 2010). Due to the changing nature of the international 
security environment, meaning Europe were no longer challenged by one large threat, allies faced 
many smaller risks and threats that stemmed from several regions across the world, mostly 
                                                 
34 The first, The Military Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment was released in 1992, followed by Joint Vision 2010, 
outlining operational concepts the military services should attempt to achieve whilst integrating new technologies, and in 2000, Joint 
Vision 2020 (JV2020 2000) was published bringing on the ideas from Joint Vision 2010, yet simultaneously suggesting a more 
cautionary view of the possibilities of technology. 
35 Perry (1991, 69), former Secretary of Defense, notes that the offset strategy “sought to use technology as an equalizer or ‘force 
multiplier’” and were persistently pursued by five administrations prior to the Gulf War. Also, former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter (2001), claimed that after the dramatic demonstration of the offset strategy during Operation Desert Storm, its percepts 
became crucial to Washington’s way of waging war. 
36 The latter two are often combined as C4ISR (Singer 2010; Wong 2013). 
37 The term «fog of war» originally referred to as the vast clouds of smoke caused by musket fire that often masked what happened 
in battles. Today, it denotes all the confusion, mistakes, delays and misperceptions occurring in war due to difficulties in coordinating 
operations in an environment of fear and uncertainty, while adversaries are trying to dispatch you (Singer 2010, 185).   
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humanitarian crises. But the post-9/11 environment yielded greater concerns regarding the strategies 
that previously had been effective in responding to dangers, meaning deterrence and containment, 
which sustained inadequate in managing threats from nonstate actors.38 Thus, a core requirement 
has been facing the threat as far from homeland as possible. For this reason, expeditionary – and 
rapidly deployable – forces are a crucial.         
 A second key doctrinal RMA tenet has been mobility on the battlefield, because of 
immensely dispersed forces, wherein no front enemy line would be defied, ought to characterize 
current military operations. Several scholars and military analysts also highlight the importance of 
increased jointness as one of the most decisive tenets of the RMA, meaning the ability of the navy, 
army and air force to operate together (Boot 2003; Boyer 2000; Owens 2000). The RMA expected, 
as Sloan describes it, a “seamless battlefield” (2008, 6) in which all military services, including the 
Marine Corps in the US case, were intended to interoperate in the attainment of military objectives.39 
  Even so, a challenge has been to subjugate technological snags hindering different systems 
from operating together. During the 1990s, Admiral William Owens observed that every military 
division sought to enhance their capacity for using military force with more precision, less risk and 
greater effectiveness. However, they were being obstructed by what has been referred to as the three 
“stovepipes” of military technology, more specifically sensors or ISR, C4I and PGMs, which were 
developed individually and were not interoperable on the battlefield. He argued the requirement 
should be a “system of systems” wherein those providing battlespace awareness, battlespace control 
and precision force should use more compatible hardware and software, thus increasing their ability 
to function together (Owens 1996, 2). 
Furthermore, the US Navy also pursued a key doctrinal shift from platform-centric to 
network-centric warfare in this period (Adamsky 2008; Owens 2000). Originally, the idea behind 
network-centric warfare (NCW) was to give more importance to the ability of naval platforms in 
combining forces and communicating with each other, as opposed to pinpointing individual qualities 
of specific platforms (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998). Under this concept, the Navy pursued using 
compatible technology for networking numerous different and diffused sensors, shooters and 
deciders, previously incapable of interconnecting with one another. In the events of 9/11, and after, 
                                                 
38 Due to emerging powers advanced by new technologies and doctrines, and the rise of non-state actors, the classic works on 
deterrence, presented by amongst others Thomas Schelling (1960; 1966), could be questioned regarding new constellations in the 
post-Cold War international system. For example, in charging old notions of deterrence for being logically inconsistent and 
empirically inaccurate, Frank Zagare (2004) and other rational choice scholars argue in favor of perfect deterrence, stressing states’ 
differing internal characteristics especially regarding the credibility of their threats of retaliation. Moreover, veteran cold-war policy 
makers as Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Schultz and Sam Nunn have more recently reversed their previous positions, asserting 
that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons in particular have become a source of great risk. Their rationale was not based 
on a world with only few nuclear players, but on the instability of many states possessing new improved technologies and the lack of 
means to properly maintain and upgrade existing weapons (2007).  
39 Joint and combined operations have been a main concern for ensuring interoperability, defined as “the ability of systems, units, 
and forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use these services to enable them to 
operate effectively together” (Sloan 2002, 9). 
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network-centric warfare has been effected into land and air force doctrine.   
 The main organizational changes of the RMA involve formation of smaller units of more 
highly qualified, trained, and educated military personnel in all services. This is, however, not to 
say that the overall size of such forces is smaller. Instead, it means that forces would be divided into 
more mobile and agile units, tailored and assembled for special operations. They had to be as high-
tech savvy as the equipment they were to use, and able to be deployed across the world. Since 
enlisted armies could not operate on such terms, a key organizational change linked to the RMA has 
been the shift from conscript to all-volunteer, or professional, armies.  
 
3.1.3 Renewed Interest in the RMA: A Real Revolution?  
Perspectives on what comprises military transformation and spread of military power are diverse 
and many within the defense community, and whether explicitly or implicitly, they are ranging from 
narrow understandings on how technology has affected and shaped warfare, to more extensive views 
reflecting the need for merging together technological, doctrinal and organizational change, to even 
more wide-ranging ideas on the ways in which military transformation could help militaries adapt 
to recent and future security challenges – how military transformation diffuses. Such perspectives – 
the latter two in particular – confine the true meaning of transformation, which Sloan (2008, 1) 
defines as “a marked change in character or form, usually for the better”. In the security 
environment, military transformation is often discussed with regards to how modern and future wars 
diverge in terms of character and form from what the West had been preparing for – yet never fought 
– during the Cold War. Additionally, a transformed military is not surprisingly seen as a more 
advantageous tool for political performance by those supporting military transformation, than the 
means of the Cold War military machine (Boden 2006).   
The existence of the current RMA is often presumed when discussing more feasible and 
important matters deriving from it. However, it is valuable to discuss the nature of the phenomenon 
for a broader conceptualization and for acknowledging how national perspectives might differ in the 
geopolitical context. Revisiting the definition made by Andrew Marshall, fairly applauded for 
accentuating that military-technological innovation is not sufficient for creating an RMA – it also 
requires doctrinal and organizational innovations as well – could also be criticized for being vague. 
What really constitutes “a major change in the nature of warfare”?   
 For example, neo-Clausewitzian scholars would possibly argue that a major change has 
never been listed through our history, because war has always implicated the quest for political ends 
through violent military means, and no level of technological advancement can ever change that 
(Howard 1994). In contrast, others claim we are currently observing a real RMA, not with reference 
to information technologies or sophisticated conventional weaponry, but rather to the end of the 
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Clausewitzian era, meaning the time when nation-states pursued war for political reasons and a new 
mode of war emerged where war detached from raison d’État and a way of existence, instead of a 
political instrument (Keegan 1993; van Creveld 1991). 
 Whether current changes, and/or the changes during the past two decades, qualify as an RMA 
is thus depending on criterias used in determining what signifies “major” or “revolutionary” change, 
which differ among military analysts. First, Rogers perceives from changes in the 1990s an RMA 
that potentially might cause a military revolution, while Marsh firmly believes that an RMA has not 
yet occurred. Even though their accounts may seem contradictory, they really have more in common 
than first noted. Rogers points to a discrepancy between an RMA and military revolution as 
described by historians.40 Military revolutions involve transformations so intense that they go 
beyond the realm of warfare, influencing social, economic and political domestic structures, as well 
as international arrangements (Gongora and von Riekhoff 2000). RMAs that were not altering the 
balance between offense and defense failed in turning into military revolutions (Rogers 1995). 
Conversely, Marsh advocates that although information technologies are radically advancing 
military capabilities, these developments are essentially occurring within a traditional, doctrinal and 
intellectual framework, restraining further engagement.41 
This leads to the notion that a “true” revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred, or is 
unlikely to, since some of these developments are not new. Analysts such as Michael O’Hanlon and 
Frederick Kagan stress the fact that much of the technology and weapons systems credited to the 
current RMA existed prior to both the 1991 Gulf War and internet and information technology boom 
(Kagan and Kagan 2000; O’Hanlon 2011). Forerunners of the modern RMA can be traced back to 
military operations during the 1982 War in Lebanon (the Israeli air operations across the Bekaa 
Valley), the Vietnam War (the use of guided bombs) or even World War II (e.g., aircraft carrier 
operations in the Pacific). Perhaps even more idiosyncratic to the period after the Gulf War is that 
the information revolution is no longer restrained to air warfare and naval operations, but is 
progressively affecting land warfare, the area proven most challenging when it comes to command 
and control of forces, execution of complex tactics, recognition of friendly and enemy units, and fire 
precision (Freedman 1998, 12).42 
                                                 
40 Williamson Murray also makes this distinction and accentuates that a military revolution is a phenomenon of such an extent that 
militaries could not do much but to “hold on and adapt to trying and difficult times” (Murray 1997, 72). Furthermore, Metz and Kievit 
have also stressed the disparity between minor and major RMAs (in which the latter refers to military revolutions), and how major 
RMAs cannot be controlled; alternatively, they require a capacity for adaptation (Metz and Kievit 1995).   
41 Hence, while Rogers believe that the RMA could allow for sociopolitical change to cause a military revolution, Marsh reverses 
this causality by arguing that a real revolution will possibly rise from loss of sociopolitical order linked to state sovereignty because 
of increasing virtual communities (Gongora and von Riekhoff 2000).  
42 Because of increased digitization of military organization, the efforts of the US and its Western allies on the battlefield have become 
extremely efficient at remarkably low costs in human life, in which such gains in military productivity is what Western armed forces 
will try to achieve in the future despite their shrinking size (Cohen 2004). 
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3.2 ACT – Adoption Capacity Theory 
This section portrays “adoption capacity theory”, as expressed by Horowitz (2010, 30-42), arguing 
that levels of resource mobilization and types of organizational changes required for implementing 
an innovation – further called financial intensity and organizational capital – decide how an 
innovation will be adopted and spread throughout the international system, and also determine the 
way individual states will make strategic choices in response, all other things being equal.43 Thus, 
theoretical assumptions are made for both how military power should spread in the international 
system in general and the strategic choices particular states could make in the wake of the 
introduction of an MMI. In some way, it appears that the ACT could be considered as a subset of 
the RMA. Although the RMA theory and conceptualization will serve as a context for this study, it 
is important to underline ACT as the main theoretical account for further analysis. In this thesis, 
some of these theoretical expectations are associated with alternative theories, and how they might 
relate to diffusion of military power at both system- and state-level.  
  
3.2.1 System-Level Assumptions 
At the system level, the debut of a new military innovation in the international system will trigger 
other states’ strategic responses. Whereas the given international context in which an innovation 
develops is very important for how it is translated into international politics, as discussed above, the 
factors that best explain the way it is likely to diffuse in the international system are the relative 
levels of financial intensity and organizational capital required for adopting the innovation. 
 
A. Financial Intensity 
There is nothing new about the perception that resources matter in shaping the global power. In 
several theories of international relation, including neo-realism, a core belief is the assumption that 
material power, or capabilities, lays the foundation of the general relative balance of power in the 
international system. This motivates NATO, but also other states’ decision, through how it affects 
discussions between interest groups or within countries, or in other manners (Baldwin 1979; Waltz 
1979). Financial intensity implies the specific requirements of resource mobilization linked with 
efforts in adopting MMI, and thereby defined as the relative amount of resources – whether as a 
share of the total military spending or as a share of the overall GDP – which is required to accomplish 
a specific task along with how fast such resources need to be mobilized. Put differently, financial 
                                                 
43 This includes an assumption of a fairly normal distribution of capabilities in the international system, at the time the innovation is 
demonstrated. As different innovations have different requirements for adoption, a general understanding of for instance first mover 
advantages or latecomer benefits is naturally limited (Horowitz 2010).  
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intensity means the relative resource allocation required to buy and implement the technological end 
of an MMI.44 The higher the cost per unit of hardware connected with an innovation, and the more 
essential technologies are entirely military oriented, the higher the level of financial intensity is 
required to adopt the innovation. 
 It is important to stress the cost per unit of technologies. Lower costs per unit can permit a 
military organization to carry out more experimentation, and thus making it easier to run through 
new equipment and decide its feasibility for full deployment. For instance, the Industrial Revolution 
conveyed massive changes in production methods, and facilitated lowering of unit costs of weapons 
like the rifle, which had persisted through two hundred years before but never regularly appeared 
on the battlefield due to its earlier high costs per unit. Moreover, the production of one B-2 bomber, 
which on average costs between one and two billion dollars per plane, is so expensive that testing 
or experimentation is impossible at the same level (Pike 2005; U.S. Air Force 2006).45  
 The core technology fueling a military innovation can hold many forms. However, Horowitz 
(2010, 31) stresses that it for the most part is either an essential commercial technology or an 
essential military technology. This means that either private businesses have both economic and 
nondefense rationales for developing the technology or the technology was designed for military 
purposes and will provoke little interest from businesses outside of defense contractors. How these 
factors define the relative level of financial intensity required for adoption are demonstrated in table 
3.1 (Appendix A). In short, it is difficult to adopt MMIs that require high levels of financial intensity 
for implementation, whereas the unit cost is high, and the core technological foundation is military 
rather than civilian, than those requiring low levels of financial intensity. As a result, the first 
assumption asserts that the higher the level of financial intensity required for implementing an 
innovation is, the harder will it be for a state attempting to adopt it, thereby making it likely for a 
slow spread of innovation through the international system.46 
 
B. Organizational Capital 
As financial requirements for adopting innovations can differ, the organizational requirements for 
adopting innovations can also be different (Gilli and Gilli 2014; 2016). During the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth century, the British Navy faced two large innovations in naval warfare. The 
                                                 
44 It is debatable whether high levels of financial intensity could make innovation irrational. For instance, if nuclear weapons are so 
costly, why not build more tanks? In a reality where a nuclear weapon has the same price as one thousand tanks, but the latter do not 
assure states with coercive or actual military capabilities of a sole nuclear weapon, building nuclear weapons may in fact make more 
sense. 
45 This means that a type of experimentation that is more likely to happen when the unit cost is low, may also have noteworthy 
spillover effects on organizational capital. Meaning, experiments may facilitate adjusting military cultures to new technologies and 
organizational practices.  
46 See table 3.1 in Appendix A. 
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battlefleet warfare represented a peak of naval industrialization. Characterized by the Dreadnought, 
an all-big-gun battleship and first of its kind, battlefleet warfare altered transformations and required 
changes in the recruitment, education and training of naval personnel (Thomas and Patterson 
2000).47 Submarine warfare was the second innovation, epitomizing a more disruptive change. The 
looming shift in naval power away from gun and capital ships, and toward torpedoes and 
submarines, challenged centuries of assessing the production of naval power. Specifically, it 
confronted knowhow delineating the British naval dominance: gun battles between capital ships. 
Adding to changes in recruitment, education and training, the innovation required extensive shifts 
in the structure of force and plans for the use of force, making it a lot harder to implement, and is 
one of the reasons why Admiral John Fisher failed in trying to transition the British Navy away from 
the all-big-gun battleship and toward flotilla defense (Lambert 1995; 1999; Sumida 1995).  
Accordingly, insofar as the type and degree of transformation required, different military 
innovations can put various demands on organizations. Several scholars suggest that a firm’s 
organizational structure or capital can influence in substantial ways to a firm’s productivity. 
Organizational capital is an intangible asset allowing organizations to make changes in response to 
perceived shifts in the environment. It is arguably the most important value-contributing asset they 
have.48 But as with other intangible assets, there is no consensus definition of what organizational 
capital is, how to best measure it, or how to best quantify its contribution to output. For military 
organizations, Horowitz explains it as a “virtual stockpile of change assets” which is necessary for 
responding to changes in the nature of warfare (2010, 33).49 
 Accordingly, previous discussions induce a problem of measurement. In periods of 
uncertainty, the demands on military organizations for MMIs fluctuate in ways which could bear 
resemblance to inconsistency in the demands on firms through periods of rapid change. For 
measuring the level of organizational capital in a military organization and the reference level of 
organizational capital required to implement an MMI, useful alternate operationalizable indicators 
from this literature on business innovation can be helpful. The measures of levels of organizational 
capital in which military organizations have, as offered by Horowitz, are the critical task focus, 
experimentation resources and finally organizational age. 
                                                 
47 For example, because of improvements in the armament scheme, gunnery officers had to learn advanced math for plotting gun 
trajectories rather than training to climb the riggings. Also, they had to learn how to take apart and put together the engines instead 
of mastering sails. This made the innovation easier to implement organizationally. 
48 An asset that cannot easily be imitated by competitors, and consequently giving its owners sustained competitive advantage. 
49 New military technology does not produce value on its own. Technology has value for producing military force simply in 
combination with organizational processes. As follows, organizational capital is the nontechnological attribute of force development, 
confirmed through doctrine, education and training. Organizations with higher degrees of organizational capital are significantly more 
able to take advantage of new innovations and successfully transform for future occurrences, as opposed to organizations with lower 
degrees of organizational capital. 
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The critical task of an organization is usually measured by reports of intent and planning 
documents and is what an organization regards as its main “goal”. Thus, it refers to what an 
organization pursues to achieve. In the literature on integration of innovations and organizational 
effectiveness, this is not always referred to as critical task but the concept of it apprehends the chief 
principle of organizations.50 Comprising critical tasks make organizations able to frame and justify 
their actions and offering a pivotal premise for motivating personnel.51 Second, excessive overall 
investments in experimentation should make militaries more receptive to innovations. Experiments 
display an institutional willingness to process new ideas and to think outside the box, denoting that 
the organization develops the capacity to incorporate innovations.52  
Finally, independent of domestic politics and general political centralization, organizations 
obtain some level of inflexibility over periods of time which cause hindrance of transformation that 
undermine levels of organizational capital. Although research on business innovation shows 
identities of firms are not completely unchangeable, the conventional wisdom is that large 
organizations face difficulties with transformation when encountering new business challenges – 
especially when the challenge is disruptive to their underlying business model. In his research, Olson 
(1982) reveals that the age of an organization frequently predicts its productivity level. Older 
organizations often become more stagnant, thereby making them ill equipped to handle 
transformational changes. Also, Olson contends that incentives of collective action decrease as the 
group size increases, because benefits from collective actions are considerably more diffused, and 
makes it more difficult for larger groups to operate in the pursuit of common interests. Transferring 
this theoretically to the military realm makes it clearer. Often, well-define military service cultures 
militate against change, as service groups will uphold current distributional bargains related to the 
spending of defense capital against efforts to reallocate. Ultimately, the basic assumption is that with 
rising organizational age, the level of organizational capital will decline. 
In combination with general assessments, a given innovation could be measured as requiring 
a certain amount of organizational capital to adopt.53 In turn, the second assumption asserts that the 
                                                 
50 Clayton Christensen (1997, 168) notes that “Over time, however, the locus of the organization’s capabilities shifts toward its 
processes and values”. Critical task focus is the magnitude of which an organization achieves its goals through certain means, and 
how it blends with the goals themselves (Wilson 1989). 
51 Generally, organizations with relatively narrow critical tasks connect certain ways of doing business with the goal of the 
organization. However, organizations with broader critical tasks rather delink the organization’s goal from means used to achieve 
that goal. The broader the critical task focus, the easier it is to integrate new ways of attaining goals, meaning adopting an innovation, 
without coming across too many bureaucratic hurdles in implementing the change. The more specific a military organization manages 
to outline its critical task, the harder it would be for militaries to adopt an innovation. For further examinations on this matter, see the 
works of (Clark 1985) and (Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
52 Experimentation might be a better alternative than research and development. Organizations may add a lot of resources into research 
and development, but if they fail to invest in the right fields, they can end up boosting incremental improvements to the last great 
thing, instead of the next best thing (Christensen 1997).  
53 It is important to emphasize that using first mover as a model for the required level of organizational capital is flawed. However, 
it does contextualize the adoption requirements. Over time, it is possible that the required level of organizational capital to adopt 
particular innovations will decline. This is a key limitation to the first mover test. Still it is numerous of other ways to measure 
organizational capital. 
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larger the levels of organizational capital required to implement the innovation is, the slower will 
the innovation spread at the system-level, and the lower the likelihood of a state attempting to adopt 
the innovation will be.54 
 
3.2.2 State-Level Assumptions 
It is fair to say that moving from system-level prediction to those of individual states, hence state-
level predictions, requires conception of additional complexity. Important is whether knowledge 
about how to adopt has diffused to a certain state. Whereas the requirements of adoption capacity 
can predict how an innovation generally can be spread, forecasting individual states’ decisions also 
requires acknowledging their specific motivations. It is arguable that system-level predictions, when 
applied to selected states, are tautological since they predict that states with capacity to adopt will 
do so. However, threats and domestic politics may lead them toward choices for maximizing their 
utility due to reasons of inclination other than enlarging short-term military power. 
  
Strategic Choices 
States responding to a major military innovation will usually choose a dominant response strategy 
that is by and large time-consuming and stipulates effort from the variety of potential choices 
outlined in the previous chapter, although they might engage in selected different paths 
simultaneously. As Horowitz writes, the dominant strategy is “an attempt by a state to maximize its 
utility in response to a given innovation, though states can and do make bad choices” (2010, 40). 
The reward of adopting certain strategies is states being confident about the essentials of the 
innovation, depending on how effectively information about the innovation has spread, states’ 
interests in adopting based on their geopolitical position and arrangement of domestic politics, and 
its adaptation capacity, meaning the ability to adopt the innovation given their financial and 
organizational resources. There are other factors as well that could influence responses to 
innovations, though these factors are considered to be the most critical in general. 
 In his research of the European interwar period, Posen (1984) upholds that large-scale 
geopolitical threats could enhance the swiftness of states in responding to new military innovations. 
It is not necessarily a rule that threats will lead to adoption, however, it will lead to the optimization 
of response strategies. Contingent on its preinnovation formation of alliances and adoption capacity, 
the optimal response strategy of a state could be a dominant alliance strategy, an adoption strategy, 
or a shift toward neutrality (Elman 1999; Goldman and Eliason 2003a; Parker 1996).    
                                                 
54 See table 3.2 in Appendix A. 
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 Other factors may influence state decisions, like domestic political costs and benefits. As 
Herrera and Mahnken (2003) demonstrates, the failure of Archduke Charles to fully implement 
Napoleonic reforms in the Austro-Hungarian Army originated from domestic political havoc that 
blocked effective mobilization, inferring that regime stability would be threatened if mobilization 
actually did occur. Regardless of a strategic need and financial capacity to adopt, the absence of 
necessary organizational capital and domestic political constraints hindered an effective adoption.  
 When geopolitics and domestic politics can influence response strategies away from 
adoption, pursuing countering strategies as one alternative becomes more likely. Countering efforts 
attempt to offset the value of an innovation through low-cost alternatives or replacements of lacking 
capabilities and are overall easier to adopt (Goldman and Eliason 2003a). The perhaps inexpensive 
character of countering may serve as a particularly attractive solution for states that think they can 
compete and adopt the innovation over time but have to postpone in the short-term, or states lacking 
the capabilities to adopt in every reasonable time frame but are not willing to leave their current 
foreign policy through entering new alliances or a shift toward neutrality (Parker 1996).  
 
Success and Failure 
When determining the diffusion of military innovations, it is necessary to not just uncovering what 
a country will try to do but whether it in fact will work as well. In relation to possible external 
strategies in response to an innovation, predicting success and failure is not the most difficult thing 
to do – success or failure depends on states’ willingness to abandon foreign policy goals and who 
their friends or opponents are in the international system. Though, building on Goldman’s notion of 
capacity, the failure of states’ countering or adoption efforts are more fascinating. Requirements for 
implementing each innovation determine which states that are least likely to adopt and/or most likely 
to fail, and these differ greatly across innovations (Goldman 2007).55 
 The key determining factor of success for states attempting to adopt an innovation, is whether 
financial and organizational requirements for implementing it fits with the states’ capabilities when 
pursuing an adoption strategy.56 Allegations about success and failure could purpose in two different 
accounts: one is focusing on selection and the other is focusing on organizational shortsightedness. 
A selection argument may assume that a state attempts to adopt only if it is the best option, which 
implies that the state has the capacity to implement the innovation successfully.57 Conversely, as 
stated by Robert Jervis (1976, 189-91), slowly changing perceptions might trigger what he calls 
                                                 
55 This further distinguishes adoption capacity theory from realist perspectives, assumed that Resende-Santos (1997, 9-11) clearly 
remarks that neorealist theories, such as his own, cannot justify the strategies’ success or failure – only whether states will compete. 
56 In many cases, ACT is obviously endogenous to strategic choices. States with financial and organizational capabilities are in most 
cases more likely to attempt adoption – yet the British response to Napoleonic warfare demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. 
57 Also, it is also a rational possibility that efforts to adopt an innovation might be the strategy leaders prefer, even if they may think 
the attempts will fail. Efforts can signal a commitment internationally that affects allies and possible opponents.  
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“organizational myopia”, meaning when actors fail to accurately evaluate their own capabilities and 
situations they come across. 
 There is a specific type of state more prone to errors – such as states attempting to adopt 
when it is a mistake and states choosing not to when they should – when encountering a strategic 
choice in response to an innovation: major powers lacking the capacity to adopt the new major 
military innovation. When new military innovations necessitate high levels of organizational capital 
to implement, holding the ability to invest heavily and successfully in military capacities that 
increase combat effectiveness during a period may worsen a military organization’s capability to 
transform in dealing with the next period of military power.58   
 Certain major powers might consider the relative costs of an innovation, both material and 
political, and decide that it is necessary with an alternative strategy even though it undermines their 
relative status in the international system. On the other side, others may try to defend the status quo 
at all costs, which means that they are more likely to engage in a risky strategy and attempt to adopt 
the innovation. Avoiding becoming a “regular” state or a desire to bring back the former days of 
glory could lead to a form of recognition bias, where leaders of major powers that by logic seem 
incapable to effectively adopt an innovation try to do it anyway. Major powers with preinnovation 
structures will those with utmost capacity to attempt and fail in adopting new military innovations. 
 
3.3 Alternate Assumptions of Diffusion  
Despite discussions above, adoption capacity theory is not without limitations, and it is important to 
elaborate on some conceivable criticisms raised by it. A clear one is that the model only treats the 
supply-side of the relationship, by ignoring why states might be interested in adopting innovations. 
Yet, it is important to note that this thesis is based on the richness of existing works and 
simultaneously deals with a definite question. ACT begins when diffusion launches, after the point 
when the international system, in which norms and other factors, influence whether or not a state 
sees itself compelled responding to an innovation. It is the alteration in adoption requirements related 
to states’ capacity to adopt that decides the substance of state responses.59 
 Critics of the significance of organizational capital could question that rational national 
leaders should be recognizing their military organizations are inflexible and consequently attune 
national policy to improve the organizational capital of their military, providing them the capability 
to adopt essential innovations. Yet, domestic political constraints frequently avert leaders from 
                                                 
58 Despite the fact that this tradeoff may not be zero-sum, it is surely possible for states to have both great wealth and high levels of 
organizational capital – and it appears to happen more often than not. See Christensen’s (1997) research on firm failures, a parallel 
in which firms having greatest success in existing markets often fail when they face disruptive innovations. 
59 Notably, the geostrategic surroundings can make a country feel needed to respond to an innovation, but it is the states’ capacity to 
adopt that is critical for the nature of the response. This assessment can benefit states’ decisions whether adoption, using external 
alliances or shifting to neutrality, could be the best response. 
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imposing major changes on the military in the short-term. Rosen (1991) also stress that external 
pressure from politicians is often not enough to make militaries change their organizational system, 
particularly when it comes to war fighting-related pressure.60     
 A different critique relates to perceptions of innovation effectiveness. This, rather than 
capacity to adopt, is better at predicting the distribution of responses to innovations, as perceptions 
of effectiveness of innovations construct the framework in which diffusion happen or not (Garstka 
2009; Gilli and Gilli 2016; Grissom 2006). Strategic bombing for instance, is an innovation that did 
not diffuse partly because of perceptions of ineffectiveness. No theory could possibly explain 
everything. The point is that within the variety of innovations states could be interested in adopting, 
it is not enough to simply wanting to adopt when predicting distribution of responses or influence 
on international politics. 
 
3.3.1 Strategic Competition 
The model of diffusion related to strategic competition is basically a translation of the neorealist 
paradigm of international relations into the field of diffusion. States are primarily acting for 
maximizing their security for external threats and the most important determinant of this behavior 
is not domestic politics, but the international environment (Waltz 1979).61 In accordance to Waltz, 
states meet on similar behaviors that are appreciated by the international system. The ones failing at 
this are ultimately eliminated. When translating this general understanding to concerns of military 
technology, he views competition as creating similar processes for the competitors, “And so the 
weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look the same all over the world” 
(Waltz 1979, 127). Whereas he does not offer much time reflecting on issues of emulation, the theory 
Waltz presents rests on an implicit idea of strategic competition as driven by structural motivations, 
which makes diffusion an expected and relatively straightforward process.62  
Accordingly, the broadest narrative of this realist line of reasoning is that states take part in 
security maximization in response to military innovations, in which geopolitical pressure established 
under certain circumstances determines a states’ national response to an innovation. Therefore, 
systemic pressure is what determines the behavior of a country’s military in response to innovations 
                                                 
60 Some scholars associate the operational struggles of e.g. the US Army in the Vietnam War partially to its failure in reforming 
regardless of pressure from civilian leaders (Bacevich 1986). In the beginning of 1960s, the US Army received direct orders from 
President J. F. Kennedy to focus on and prepare for counterinsurgency warfare. In spite of high-level pressure, the army failed to 
make significant changes. Rather, the army decided to esthetically adjust the training programs and define counterinsurgency as less 
important hence easier form of conventional warfare. That is why the US Army entered the Vietnam War a lot less able to fight an 
insurgency than if external civilian pressure had been sufficient to cause change (Nagl 2005).  
61 Waltz claimed his theory as being systemic and unable to predict the actions of individual states. Since Waltz, most scholars have 
used neo-realism in making explicit predictions about decisions of nation-states (Buzan et al. 1993; Elman 1996; Waltz 1999). 
62 Elman (1999), disagreeing with Waltz, presents an alternative realist theory of emulation, and emphasizes that while strategic 
competition and geopolitical limitations trigger security maximization for nation-states, optimal responses to the introduction of 
innovations might involve offsetting or doing nothing besides adopting the innovation. This resembles the ACT in moving beyond a 
simple choice-set of adoption vs. non-adoption. Thus, ACT continues where Elman ends.  
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(Goldman and Eliason 2003b). While states might choose to adopt an innovation or choose to hold 
an alternate strategy such as offsetting an innovation, the choice would maximize national security 
because of structural constraints. In his research on South American militaries during the late 
nineteenth century, Resende-Santos (2007) highlights that the seriousness of external threats 
illustrates the magnitude of emulation and states attempting to imitate successful innovations in 
important areas of warfare. Hence, a state would attempt to adopt an innovation if the perceived risk 
from non-adoption is large enough.         
 The assumption of strategic competition is credible since events of military diffusion most 
likely have at least some strategic attributes at their core, either because of threat perceptions 
motivating interest groups to encourage certain types of modifications or international norms 
making interpretation of situations happen in certain manner in which particular innovations are 
more likely to diffuse than others. When applied to decisions of individual states, this theoretical 
framework similarly argues that a state’s geopolitical position is contributing in predicting its 
behavior, but still in a less mechanistic way. Even so, one must assume the perspective of strategic 
competition could be flawed when explaining diffusion of military power.63  
 
3.3.2 Domestic and International “Norms” 
A further perspective on diffusion of military power stresses that shared norms of appropriate 
behavior influence how countries respond in the international environment, and military affairs are 
no exception (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). When studying this in relation to military organizations, 
it is often referred to as “sociological institutionalism” (Hall and Taylor 1996). Applying 
sociological institutionalism to procurements of military technology in the developing world, Dana 
Eyre and Mark Suchman (1996) maintain that spread of military technology relies on minor powers’ 
perceptions of appropriateness in a greater sense than concerns of genuine security (Suchman and 
Eyre 1992; Wendt and Barnett 1993). Research by Theo Farrell (2005), who examines convergence 
because of norms, could also be added into this classification. His case studies of the Irish military 
during the inter-war period and NATO air operations in Kosovo in 1999, called Operation Allied 
Force, reveal that perceptions about “appropriate” types of military operations and organizations 
have a tendency to drive doctrine and the use of force.64 States impersonate leading actors not 
                                                 
63 First, the idea of financial and organizational capacity as highly influential in responses to innovations is left out of certain strict 
strategic competition approaches, especially in more recent works of Resende-Santos (2007). As explained above, and as the 
following empirical chapters will demonstrate, internal military organizational factors play critical roles in how militaries deal with 
war and organize themselves to fight. Many case studies, ranging from British strategy in the Boer War to U.S. naval progresses 
during the 1920s and throughout 1930s to Soviet military innovation after the World War II, illustrate the importance of internal 
factors in military organizations in processes of adopting innovations (Avant 1994; Farrell 1998; Rosen 1991; Zisk 1993). Secondly, 
strategic competition can predict which states might potentially consider adopting an innovation, but it struggles in predicting the 
ones who actually will succeed in adopting. Because it is unable to explain capacity, it can only predict interests and not outcomes.  
64 There are more alternatives in addition to the arguments described above, such as competitive isomorphism or mimicry because of 
competitive pressure, which further leads to predictions similar to realist assertions. Such approaches could be applied when 
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because of efficiency reasons, but for seeking status and legitimacy in the international system or 
internally in an alliance. The assumption in this case is therefore, despite lack of strategic 
motivations, states seeking status in the international system will make attempts to adopt new major 
military innovations.            
 In some respects, the norms alternative is not necessarily sustainable with the theoretical 
structure in this thesis, mostly because adoption capacity theory is not deterministic regarding 
reasons why states could attempt purchasing particular technologies. Because systems of fighting, 
or the organization of military forces for warfare, is the heart of this thesis, it is highly possible that 
weapons transfer or occur at least somewhat in parallel with predictions of this norms analysis. 
Although norms could have important influence in determining the extent and rate of diffusion, the 
norms perspective is also, not surprisingly, inadequate in explaining the adoption and spread of 
military innovations (Farrell 2001; 2005). Even if actors adopt organizational approaches because 
of the impact of international norms, these norms might exist as experiential, or heuristic, for 
maximizing efficiency for states in the international system. Nation-states might converge due to 
similar ways of producing military power, simply because they are the best practices and not because 
they want to imitate other countries for legitimizing their existence.65 
 
3.3.3 Military Culture   
In developing research from both inner and outer scholarly circles of international relations, 
Goldman (2006) argues that levels of cultural tolerance are important in explaining when states will 
make real attempts to adopt innovations from abroad. It is more likely for political systems which 
are more tolerant of external ideas to adopt innovations built abroad. This is because the public and 
the top leaders will not perceive an innovation as an actual threat. These assumptions could be drawn 
from the work of Michael Fischerkeller (1998), who gives similar explanation on the cultural 
foundations of military approaches.66 A state will attempt to adopt an innovation if it contains higher 
levels of cultural “openness” in the international system, especially in periods where there are 
perceptions of high external threats.        
 The cultural approach alone cannot give a sufficient explanation of the diffusion of major 
military innovations. First, the significance of survival motivations for defining military 
                                                 
predicting mimicry in regard to status seeking rather than competition. Farrell defines norms as “beliefs shared by a community about 
what action is appropriate in given situations” (Farrell 2005).  
65 It is crucial to note that even though a norms perspective can describe why actors are interested in choosing specific strategies, it 
fails to explain implementation success or failure. It could be important to include a more sophisticated and precise approach or an 
assessment where norms motivating states’ interests in adoption and the innovation implementation are fairly identical.  
66 Fischerkeller (1998) argues that the net assessments of militaries, like the British, Japanese, and the Italians before the World War 
II, had significant cultural prejudices that affected their decision-making in negative ways. Decisions of adoption, he highlights, might 
be influenced by cultural perceptions of possible opponents in addition to cultural perceptions of the first mover for a certain military 
innovation or even how potential military innovations could interact with a country’s prevailing culture. 
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organizational approaches should not be overlooked. Elites could potentially block organizational 
changes that challenge or undermine their power and influence, but the motivations for adopting 
efficient methods in producing military force will continue to be influential and will also often cause 
counteracting interest groups. Using a civil-military competition framework, Posen (1984) views 
military organizations resisting change by design. As rational, functional and specialized 
bureaucracies, militaries have institutionalized vested interests in preserving their autonomy, size 
and wealth while reducing operational insecurities. Therefore, military innovation might progress 
through direct combat experiences with new technologies, major failure on the battlefield and 
external civilian intervention forcing change in military decision-making processes, demonstrating 
how civilian intervention is conditioned by perpetual uncertainty and threat perceptions shaped by 
the international system.67 Threat levels that states or the essential relative power of interest groups 
encounter might be trickled out by cultural views, however, they may have autonomous power as 
well that affect how domestic actors see the need for change (Goldman 2006). 
 In addition, some scholars acknowledge the dynamicity of culture, meaning that culture is 
not static (Goldman 2007; Kier 1997), advocating that discussions over the implementation of 
specific military organizational assessments could result in minds being changed and the 
establishment of cultural norms. This is especially so if the approach is adopted in response to 
disruptions, or shocks, such as unexpected defeat in a war. Related to a school of thought in 
explaining sources of military innovation through differences in strategic and organizational 
cultures, Adamsky accentuates that “different cultures think differently about military innovation 
and produce various types of doctrinal outcomes from the same technological discontinuity” (2010, 
1). Accordingly, military innovation is conditioned by different national “cognitive” styles; meaning 
strategic preferences, perceptions, ideas and knowledge, techniques and personal attributes and 
habitual behavior developed through time within national strategic communities.68  
 
                                                 
67 Deriving from Posen’s framework, civilian leaders translate continuity and change in the security environment, and respond by 
modifying internal organizational, bureaucratic and military liabilities. Low threat perceptions imply that civilian intervention and 
military innovation are incremental. Conversely, high threat perceptions imply that civilian leaders have greater incentive to mediate 
and impose major changes on the military. Either direct or indirect, pathways for such intervention are guided through a connection 
between civilian leaders and elite maverick officers, providing the civilian leadership with their military expertise and thus stimulate 
innovation. In contrast, Rosen (1991) advocates an intra-service competition model, arguing that military innovation could be 
facilitated internally, meaning between branches of the same service, with no civilian interference. Innovation diffuses through 
internal structural changes, gradually or evolutionary, transforming the distribution of organizational power midst competing 
organizational factions or subgroups.   
68 Secondly, so-called cultural arguments could also be added into domestic political or organizational approaches, which indicates 
that determining causal precedence is a difficult thing to do. Goldman (2006) writes, for example, whereas elites intend to survive in 
their positions of authority and could potentially regard adoption of some specific military organizational approaches as threatening, 
the line between identifying that type of rigidity and power seeking a “cultural argument” as opposed to a “domestic politics 
argument”, is difficult to draw. 
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3.4 Implications for International Politics and the NATO Alliance 
Studying specific innovations and their contents, as well as how they affect international 
interactions, is important for revealing implications for international politics and the NATO alliance. 
For instance, the “modern system” taking advantage of transformations in firepower, transportations 
and communications resulted in considerable changes in force structure and combat planning that 
accelerated wars’ destructiveness (Biddle 2004; Smith 2005). However, this alone yields a narrow 
type of analysis, because it does not consider the relative implications of innovations for the 
international security environment. The content of some innovations obviously matters for altering 
the ways specific wars are fought, but it is the spread – or the lack of it – of such innovations that 
defines “winners and losers in international politics” (Horowitz 2010, 42).  
 While military power is built on the ability to adopt important military methods of a specific 
period, the making of military innovations and their different impact on various states in the system 
is just one of the ways in which extensive changes in the relative military balance of power happen. 
Power transitions – when some states arise while others decay – are key moments in time in 
international politics, since they might fuel major fires, meaning large-scale wars.69 Understanding 
how diffusion patterns of some dominant innovations in specific periods of time fits with adoption 
requirements to states’ capabilities is helpful in explaining power transitions. In his influential work, 
Robert Gilpin (1981, 161-62) argues, in contrast to his general argument about the inevitable decline 
of existing powers, that existing powers can rediscover themselves and thereby stay on top, by 
pointing to for example British and Chinese developments over time. However, he fails to explain 
why they can do this when facing certain challenges, and face what he calls “institutional rigidities” 
at other times that speed their decline.70  
 The theoretical basis as outlined above, could explain the mechanisms, in a narrow sense, by 
which these transitions occasionally happen. Diffusion of military innovation is part of the causal 
process determining power transitions.71 Assumptions about the way requirements for adoption and 
state responses will influence the spread of military innovations further ensue predictions about the 
importance of innovation diffusion for the international security environment. By differentiating 
between financial and organizational requirements for adopting innovations and implications for 
international politics, it can also clarify processes where new states get ahead in Gilpin’s account or 
how Powell views shifting costs of war.  
 Moreover, the theoretical basis makes it possible, in a broader sense, to explain why 
particular shifts in relative power arise and how. Certain new major military innovations represent 
                                                 
69 Power transition is a concept which could be used in describing increases and decreases in relative power, rather than the power 
transition “school” (Organski and Kugler 1980).  
70 This relates to the works of Olson (1982) and Gilpin (1981) concerning the rise and decline of existing powers. 
71 See the work of Goldman and Andres (1999) for a further discussion of the influence of innovation diffusion on power. 
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disruptions in international politics that could yield large power differences. First movers could gain 
significant advantages by innovating and creating new ways of producing military power. And by 
exploiting these advantages, they might be steered through power transitions that present status quo 
powers as “overmatched paper tigers” (Horowitz 2010, 43). Rising powers becoming first movers 
are most likely to experience large gains in relative power. Existing powers that are first movers or 
those rapidly emulating or generally adopting an MMI, can also make relative gains in power or 
hold back damaging power shifts. More generally, innovations trigger strategic responses with 
regard to the rest of the international system and within the Alliance, where success and failure of 
new innovations are defined by the combination of financial and organizational requirements for 
adoption and capabilities of states, adjusted by their alliance bearings and other options. 
 Being a first mover has certain advantages in terms of long-term returns and organizational 
sustainability.72 For example, patent law has been used to compare the military and business world, 
and is important in demonstrating how firms keep control and monopoly over the production 
knowledge and expand their first-mover advantage (Mykytyn et al. 2002). Patents are critical to the 
first-movers’ ability to maintain their advantages in the long run, especially when industries are 
depending on secrecy about production processes. As with businesses, first movers of MMIs have 
obvious reasons for holding secrecy about their new technological capabilities and organizational 
processes, because it involves the competence first movers wants to avoid from leaking. However, 
it is demanding to uphold secrecy when a demonstration first occurs, or enough information have 
spread, except for perhaps the most intricate innovations.73 
 There are several ways of how innovations matter for the security environment, and one 
approach in which these ways could be changed is when an innovation’s adoption requirements 
affect the length of asymmetrical advantages that adopters, especially first movers, receive. For 
instance, it is difficult for an actor to keep the first-mover advantage for the time needed to establish 
a significant monopoly if an innovation is fairly easy to adopt, making it uncomplicated for both 
early adopters and following actors to adopt as well. Hence, the duration of the first-mover 
advantage will decline and “the relative impact on the international balance of power will also be 
smaller” (Horowitz 2010, 49-50).74 Other states will imitate the first mover so quickly that many 
                                                 
72 Through decades, most notions of ostensible first movers have usually described their ability to launch new products into markets 
that will get sizeable market shares (Schumpeter 1942; Bain 1956). However, it is important to stress two focal parts of the first-
mover advantages. First, the technological advantage implies hardware, in which firms are ground-breaking in certain products, such 
as semiconductor improvements, or they introduce completely new products, like the personal computer. Second, the organizational 
advantage refers to firms having specific technologies that they figure out how to produce and market in such a way that it benefits 
the firms with advantages (for example the production line, which Henry Ford developed for the Model T).  
73 Regarding choices of research and development strategies, military organizations need to decide whether limited resources should 
be allocated toward competence reinforcement in current military areas, or toward new military technology or innovative 
organizational processes, making them a potential first mover (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). 
74 This relates to his explanations for why the duration of first-mover advantages for some innovations has impact on its consequences. 
A first-mover state should increase its relative power in relation to equal states quicker in its first-mover period, and the primary 
effect of a given innovation is also assumed to be particularly prominent for the first movers.  
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advantages of being first will be counteracted. Innovations that are harder to adopt, however, will, 
given the organizational requirements, give early adopters greater first-mover advantages, which in 
turn make it easier for them to attain increased international political dominance. 
 The diffusion pattern for MMIs could also affect many other related factors regarding how 
states choose to enter wars and engage in combat. Swift changes in military effectiveness can 
influence how military power is being utilized in general, as a means for achieving higher political 
goals. First, there is nothing new about the effect of geography on international interactions, and 
military interactions in particular (Vasquez 1991; 1995). Although most conflicts are between 
neighboring states in fighting over territorial control, it is crucial not to overlook technological 
aspects and assessments on how to use military force that supports military operations.75 
Furthermore, while specific innovations may not be directly linked with the technology that is 
spreading, MMIs could allow a state to steer its bearings into deadlier military interactions in a more 
extensive geographic scope. Because of MMIs’ ability to shift the geographic scope of the militarily 
possible, they will supposedly lead to increased systemic instability.  
 In order to explain diffusion of military innovations beyond the international system, more 
specifically in this case, investigating the adoption and spread of specific military innovations to a 
small state such as Norway, drawing from preexisting literature is necessary for conceptualizing the 
differing notions of “small states” and their geopolitical position in the international system. The 
magnitude of contending debates in the field of small states and international relations is wide and 
varied, because of fundamental conceptual tensions and difficulties in linking and defining the 
“shades of grey” of small states and their relative capabilities, relevance, policy preferences and 
behavioral patterns in the international system.  
Thus, in a broad perspective, the conception of small states will henceforth follow three core 
baseline indicators, notably their geostrategic constraints, relative capabilities and patterns of 
behavior. Small states in this thesis are conceived along the relational approach of Handel, portrayed 
in the dominant geostrategic dilemmas in their particular regional or geographic situation and 
alignments.76 Sharing a rudimentary sense of insecurity, in which drive their need for ensuring 
existence and survival, common characteristics determining their “smallness” such as relative 
asymmetries in territorial geography, size and location, societal and environmental constraints, 
dependence on external political and material assistance and protection, security uncertainties, and 
                                                 
75 Supposing the MMIs are successful, which is not always a given, diffusion of MMIs should change the geography of military 
events considerably, by opening the door for states undergoing MMIs to interrelate militarily with a wider geographic variety of 
states. According to Horowitz (2010, 51), the effect should be clearer after dyad states have faced an MMI, however it could be 
present in asymmetrical relationships as well. 
76 Underpinning this lies the neo-realist belief that states’ behavior in a geopolitical scheme is primarily determined by power relations 
and disparities among them (Handel 1990). 
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relations and positions between and to major powers, shape national security and military strategies 
of small states.77 
When pooled through the international system, how will different adoption requirements for 
innovations actually translate into changes in how an important innovation will affect the 
international security environment? There are primarily two key types of predictions relevant to the 
way diffusion of military power influences international security politics. First, through the 
consequences of system-level distribution of responses, which relates to the relative balance of 
power between states. And second, from first-mover advantages and power asymmetries for 
individual states, which relates to the implications for the relative timing, intensity and the 
geographic extent of warfare. Table 3.3 and table 3.4 (Appendix A), portrays the assumed 
distribution of strategic choices in response to MMIs and the assumed relationship between the 
spread of military power and the balance of power, which will be important for assessing the 
theoretical assumptions in the next chapters. Regardless of which theory one uses when studying 
changes in the balance of power, the discussion above illustrates that shifts in the capacity of 
producing power matter. Diffusion of military innovation signifies a causal process which controls 
the timing and nature of power shifts that previously have been explained by other factors. How 
leading countries take advantage of new practices of military power contributes to predict long-term 
trends related to the international balance of power. 
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter sets the theoretical and analytical framework for the next chapters in this thesis. By 
combining theoretical accounts on the revolution in military affairs and the adoption capacity theory 
– the former as a contextual basis and the latter being the main theory for the analysis – it represents 
a new approach of studying the spread of military innovations. It utilizes existing literature on 
military innovations and emulation for producing a structure to explain how certain military 
innovations, primarily modern warships related to network-centric warfare during the information 
age, spread throughout the international system as well as selected states after the Cold War. It also 
makes it possible to conceptually comprehend how the uneven speed of military innovation diffusion 
                                                 
77 Bearing this in mind, it is the international system that influences the behaviors of states, and vice versa. As Keohane notes, 
however, traditionally small states have not been able to radically change or affect system-level forces influencing them (1969, 291-
310). Still, not all states might have interest in pursuing military innovation by this perception. In addition to their motives or 
intentions, small states could instigate military advancement because of essential means and sophistication (Raska 2016). However, 
small states will not necessarily be synonymous with weak states. However, criticisms of this categorization have often included 
perceptions of its rigidity, and contestations as result of its arbitrary nature. In contrast, relational definitions describe smallness as 
lack of influence in the international system, high sensitivity to it, or lack of insusceptibility against influences from the environment, 
implying an idea of small states as weak states. According to David Vital (1967), considered as one of the scholars making up the 
foundation of small power research tradition in the heyday of non-alignment, claims that the size of human and material resources of 
a state determine its political options and viability in the international system. However, examining the internal as well as the external 
sources of states’ weaknesses or strengths embedded in the power constellations of the international system, is imperative. 
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works as one of the major driving mechanisms causing shifts in relative power (balance of power) 
and warfare. The next chapter forms the methodological framework for how this theory could be 
empirically tested on the case of modern warships in relation to sea power, and how a small navy as 
Norway fits into this account. 
 
 
4. Methodological Framework 
 
Historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the empirical 
sciences. This is particularly true of the art of war. 
(Karl von Clausewitz, in McNeil 2001, 7) 
This thesis uses one main method of research, namely qualitative comparative historical analysis 
(CHA), accompanied by qualitative case studies using historical explanations for revealing 
continuity and breaches in political-military mechanisms in the ways states are responding to new 
major military innovations. Consequently, assessing the diversity of strategic choices available to 
states is in theory comparable to studies of strategic choices under periods of uncertainty in the 
international security environment (Lake and Powell 1999; Schelling 1966). Yet, this could be a 
decision-theoretic way of thinking about the spread of military power. Theoretical assumptions 
derive from requirements for adopting the innovation and postulations around capability diffusion 
in the international system.78 Based on several possible options, the theory is further meant to assess 
strategic choices for individual states given the state capabilities, requirements for adopting an 
innovation and the structure of the international system.79 As such, the case study of sea power and 
warship innovations is essential as variations in how long innovations stay relevant, in addition to 
the chance of some innovations overlapping (for example land and sea, and air and sea), could make 
an all-embracing quantitative data approach flawed. Hence, other methods could provide alternative 
insights on processes of innovation diffusion yet they may have weaknesses in providing a complete 
delineation of the dynamics influencing the processes of innovation diffusion. On that note, this 
study is not without limitations, which will be presented further below. Still, the methodological 
framework discussed in this chapter his is imperative for answering the research question, and for 
demonstrating the temporality of diffusion of military innovations.  
                                                 
78 Even though these factors vary over time, being state capabilities or distribution of capabilities, they are adequately invariant for 
stable predictions in the short run. 
79 When thinking about the spread of military power, this seems significant because military organizations are not interminably 
flexible (especially over shorter periods of time). Although ACT deals with strategic choices, it does not cope with them in a game 
theoretic sense that tolerates mixed equilibriums. If the ACT of Horowitz is incorrect, military organizations would turn out to be 
much more elastic than predicted. In addition, it would suggest that future research will be more fruitful by focusing on this issue 
from a game theoretic point of view.  
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4.1 Choice of Method: Assessing with the Proper Tools 
The study of peace and war cuts across several disciplines and beyond theoretically and 
methodologically specified research communities within the scholarly field of political science. 
While academics from various research communities have tended to work separated from each 
other, scholars have gradually advocated knowledge cumulation by pursuing collaboration and 
inspiration from work conducted in other research communities. This is true for method as well as 
for theory, and for studies of international conflict and international relations in general there are 
increasingly more research built on multi-method research designs (Levy 2008, 1).80 However, 
research designs incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods have commonly harvested 
much criticism over the years, primarily because of its alleged disability in conducting research 
thoroughly enough in either techniques, denoting the pitfalls of combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Keman and Pennings 2014, 53-54).81 This is not to say that research built 
on merging statistical and qualitative data are unreliable or invalid. On the contrary, several studies 
with multi-method designs could indeed increase causal inference, which are essential to both 
scholars and policymakers.82          
 As the purpose of this thesis is twofold, the main intention is to investigate the influences on 
states’ capacity for innovation and the implications of adopting new military innovations for the 
NATO alliance. The second seeks to give some insights into the effect of adopting certain naval 
innovations of warships on the role of a small state navy, such as the Norwegian Navy, in the NATO 
alliance. The thesis attempts to contribute to the literature on diffusion of military power by 
examining this phenomenon in a particular setting, notably the post-Cold War era. In order to explain 
the dynamics as empirically correct as possible, the method used in this study is able to provide 
students of political science with the proper tools to guide their research. Hence, given the expansive 
literature on diffusion studies and limited space, it is profitable to center on qualitative comparative 
methods in this thesis, in conjunction with case study and historical explanation.  
 
                                                 
80 This is marked by the growing integration of formal and statistical approaches, and by a growing attraction of including case study 
analyses into such multi-method research models. For more detailed overviews of the differing types and combinations of such 
research designs, see the works of Goertz (2016), Goertz and Mahoney (2006), Collier and Elman (2008) and Berg-Schlosser (2012). 
81 Potential weaknesses related to the use of multi-method approaches could involve puzzling results due to different types of data 
and designs which might create unequal evidence. As Braun and Maggetti (2015) observe, there is no yardstick available to evaluate 
the range of how the different methods strengthen the analysis’ results with certainty. Therefore, for adopting such methods it is 
crucial to consider the risks involved with great caution (Creswell 2015).  
82 As Jason Seawright (2016, 42) asserts, if multi-method research should be “worth the effort”, the design must be made in such a 
way that supplementary methods test assumptions which are not usually tested in single-method research. If this is done well, multi-
method approaches could convert important issues of descriptive and causal inference from speculative claims into point of empirical 
debate – just like Horowitz has done with his studies of diffusion of military innovations. This point is relevant for the method used 
in this thesis. Although this study is not relying explicitly on the use of multi-method designs, but rather on a qualitative model of 
comparative analysis using historical explanation, case study and process tracing (as described in section 4.1.2), it has still been 
crucial in that parts of this thesis’ theoretical and analytical frameworks relies on the works of Michael Horowitz with his adoption-
capacity theory. If his methodological and theoretical work had been executed unsuccessfully, this would have major implications 
for the credibility of this thesis.  
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4.1.1 Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) 
In the field of security studies and political science, as well as perspectives on military strategy, 
there is solid evidence that existing quantitative measures and models of military innovation have, 
empirically, little or no explanatory or predicative value when actual wars, battles or conflicts are 
examined. In Biddle’s own words, it is “a literature built on weak foundations” (Biddle 2004, 14). 
Transformations in the conduct of warfare is difficult to explain without seeking to historic accounts 
and tracing the mechanisms in which the conduct of warfare has changed. 
This motivates the use of comparative historical analyses (CHA) in this thesis, which 
traditionally involves a deep commitment in providing historically rooted explanations with a robust 
apprehension for causal analysis while acknowledging the significance of temporal processes and 
utilizing systematic and contextual comparison (Mahoney 2003). This points towards the 
importance of causal arguments in CHA, as scholars treating this method in their works are primarily 
interested in explaining and identifying causal structures producing key outcomes. Moreover, 
equally important is the emphasis on historical aspects and sequences in elucidating processes over 
time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2009). In this thesis, adding context has been key in for 
increasing the understanding of the spread of military innovations, for demonstrating how certain 
events and processes are related to each other through special dynamics revealed over periods of 
time. In the words of Paul Pierson, “history matters” (Pierson 2004, 15).  
The contexts surrounding the emergence of naval innovations during the period around the 
Cold War’s end and the aftermath makes quantitative statistical tests difficult. First, although the 
innovations have been relevant for quite some time – from its initial debut during the World War II 
which has been viewed as the beginning phase of the information age innovations – it is far more 
parameters determining its diffusion patterns than quantitative measures could include.  
Furthermore, there are ongoing debates whether its diffusion has been completed and fully embraced 
in the international system, making it difficult to draw a specific period of time from which to draw 
observations for statistical analyses. Second, traditional datasets such as Militarized Interstate 
Disputes (MIDs) dataset and the Correlates of War (COW) dataset do not adequately illustrate the 
complex interactions endemic to conflicts and occurrences after the Cold War. This implies that 
testing hypotheses of military innovations requires more of an emphasis on process tracing. 
Fortunately, it is possible to examine an entire universe of cases, making it easier to select the 
particular case of modern warships related to the information age for a more in-depth study. 
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4.1.2 CHA, Single Case Study and Process Tracing 
When embarking on the literature on diffusion of military innovations, it has become clear that 
tracing the mechanisms in a military-strategic and historical perspective has been inherently crucial 
for the thesis’ research question. Because of its process-tracing approach, the concept of diffusion 
is able to explain how and why states choose to adopt or abstain from implementing an innovation. 
Much literature in the field of diffusion advocates the spread of innovations will not happen at a 
constant rate. As Santoro (2006, 18) points out, an innovation could generally be perceived as being 
costly, risky or inapt with the existing social practices, during the initial phases of diffusion. As 
innovations diffuse further, it could become easier – even safer – for potential adopters to overcome 
critical thresholds, even if some constraints seem to remain. That is part of the reason why the spread 
of certain innovations and technologies has been neither irreversible nor inevitable. Looking at 
various mechanisms at play for demonstrating influential relationships and impacts through process-
tracing will therefore be highly valuable. 
 As this thesis attempts to combine several variables with a single case could induce a “small-
N problem” – a common criticism of this method (Gerring 2007, 43). Investigating a small number 
of cases or merely a single case could potentially yield only one logical outcome, meaning 
generating assumptions that could be tested in other numerous cases. It could arguably imply the 
problem of lacking external validity, meaning the difficulty of using explanatory aspects based on 
the study of one or few cases in attempting to explain a wide-ranging phenomenon (Rueschemeyer 
2009; Collier, Brady and Seawright 2010). Moreover, Pierson (2004, 173) stresses the difficulties 
of “many variables, few cases”, in that they could escalate and be worsened by CHA’s temporal 
context. A reason for this is the combination of studying correlations among variables 
simultaneously with the series of change in variables over time. Accordingly, small-N analyses 
generally seek to generate theory, which requires testing in an increased number of cases.  
 Conversely, both Rueschemeyer (2009) and Ljiphart (1971) have argued that single case 
studies might be capable of offering more than just theory generating, as they also could facilitate 
theory testing and bring credible causal explanations. In this thesis, the case study has been 
imperative because it provide in-depth historical descriptions and discussions of sea power and 
innovation of warships, crucial in understanding what influences the spread of naval power and 
military transformation within states. It should be noted, however, that although the case of warship 
innovations indicates a sense of plurality, as it contains the vessels of both frigates, corvettes and 
submarines, they are comprised as a singular case of modern warships. This is for demonstrating the 
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interoperability of technologies applied to ships – or platforms – that several states within the NATO 
Alliance possess in their navies, making it easier to compare patterns of diffusion.83 
 
4.2 Validity and Reliability 
A great advantage with CHA and single case study, is the interchanging process between data 
collection, theory generation and theory testing at play throughout the research process (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994, 46). A descriptive in-depth approach should contribute to providing the 
analysis accurate empirical material when investigating the post-Cold War transformation and 
spread of military innovations in NATO. Accordingly, it could enrich both the testing of existing 
theories as well as theory building, facilitating a more robust theoretical and analytical framework 
in dealing with the phenomenon in a broader sense. Therefore, permitting the material to reform 
assumptions and guiding the procedure of this study throughout the data collection process is greatly 
beneficial when doing a case study like this.        
 As mentioned above, however, conducting this method often imply the priority of internal 
validity over external validity, meaning the problem of representativeness and external validity rise 
as detailed explanatory depth is given precedence to over explanatory power across cases (Ragin 
1987; 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Nonetheless, the findings and outcomes of the analysis are 
indeed relevant and replicable in other cases with similar diffusion patterns, as the technologies 
applicable to modern warships are also applicable to branches other than the sea domain. This is 
also why examples from other domains – land and air – are relevant. As military innovations consist 
of numerous components regarding transformations of technology and doctrine, for instance, there 
are microprocesses affecting all three services which makes it unwise to separate the case of sea 
power and modern warship innovations completely from transformation and innovations patterns in 
other domains. Hence, there is an unavoiding interplay between the land, air and sea domain, thereby 
evading the problem of cherry-picking, which could disturb the generalizability and make an 
incorrect picture of the empirical evidence (Roberts, Priest and Traynor 2013, 44).  
 Using multiple sources of evidence is also a great advantage when using this method. This 
improves the validity and reliability of the findings, as using several sources of empirical evidence 
fosters what Yin (2009, 114-115) identifies as “converging lines of inquiry”, denoting that several 
sources point the evidence in the same direction. Because the data collection of scientific research 
should be explicitly accounted for, in terms of replication of others, triangulation of both data 
                                                 
83 As such, it is crucial to identify platforms as any existing structure or system on which a weapon or technology could be mounted. 
For example, a fighter jet is a platform for amongst other missiles, bombs or autocannons. The term could also describe a naval vessel, 
which new communication or weapon technologies could be applied to, or other technologies related to the information age and RMA 
(Walls et al. 1999). Historically, attempts to mount weapons on platforms at sea have included catapults and later cannons on navies’ 
final form as ships of the line before the introduction of ironclad warships mounted turrets. This rationalizes the interchangeable use 
of platforms and vessels in the following chapters.  
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collection and methods strengthens the reliability of the study (Creswell and Miller 2010; Creswell 
2015; Bergman 2008). Relevant for this thesis is so-called within-method triangulation, frequently 
used data when the phenomenon under scrutiny is multidimensional (Duffy 1987, 131). By choosing 
one main method, several other strategies as outlined above are applied to examine the data, which 
as for this thesis derives from archive documents, peer-reviewed academic publications, citations 
from state officials, military leaders and scholars and reproduced quantitative data, in order to 
control the reliability of the data by contrasting and comparing the empirical material from the 
different sources.          
 Using case study in this thesis, high levels of conceptual validity are possible to achieve, as 
it could identify and measure the indicators that best characterize the selected theoretical concept. 
As several variables pose challenges to measurement, it is important to do contextualized 
comparison seeking to cope with issues of equivalence by searching for logically equivalent 
phenomena amongst different contexts. In contrast to quantitative analyses that risks conceptual 
stretching, case studies including few cases can accept conceptual improvements with higher levels 
of validity (George and Bennett 2005, 19).        
 
4.3 Scope of the Study 
The central analytical concern of this study is not how military innovations begin, but how they 
spread, in which who has the capacity to adopt and how quickly they are able to do it, and with what 
consequences for certain states in the NATO alliance – correspondingly, implications for 
international politics and the global balance of power. Thus, at the heart of the comparisons of 
historical and contemporary cases is a concern with understanding the dynamics of the diffusion 
process in the information age, meaning in the post-Cold War security environment.   
 Innovations partially happen by the means of an action-reaction process, as Horowitz so 
appropriately denotes in his research. New innovations can relocate, or even occur side by side with, 
the prevailing weaponry and strategies of earlier eras, meaning efforts to measure innovation 
diffusion are often viewed as “right censored” (Horowitz 2010, 60). It is difficult to screen the full 
reach of responses to an innovation over time, because new innovations develop as to supersede old 
ones, while states could attempt to build the capacity to adopt or advance a longstanding response 
strategy. In other instances, however, it is possible to consider the full reach, but the possibility for 
right censoring is making the assessment of the diffusion process complicated.   In this 
study, the unit of analysis is the innovation itself. By using process tracing (explained further below), 
it is possible to establish the existence of the innovation and assess the scope to which diffusion 
processes have governed certain strategic choices of key states through time. This combined with 
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case study and triangulation would increase the certainty in the correctness of the results by ensuring 
that both the system- and state-level are consistent with the theory.  
 
4.3.1 Case Selection 
In presenting the case of modern warship innovation and sea power, there are some specifications 
that must be addressed for the further analysis. First, as noted above, modern warships in this sense 
comprise primarily naval ships such as frigates, corvettes and submarines. This is crucial when 
explaining how states enhance their maritime power and naval power projection capabilities. Yet, it 
is meaningful turning to other aspects and domains of military power as well in demonstrating 
mechanisms at play and their effect on international politics. This will in turn construct a broader 
understanding on diffusion patterns of military innovation. Second, although sea power and modern 
warships are at the center of the case study, they are explored in the context of the American pursuit 
of the current revolution in military affairs, meaning in the age of information and network-centric 
warfare (NCW). However, these innovations were introduced in the event of the World War II. 
Therefore, it has been vital to explain their debut during this period as the modern warships after the 
Cold War have matured and developed from the ones during the World War II.   
 Hence, it is the modern warships after the Cold War that primarily are examined, and not 
those prior to the information age. Meaning, the post-Cold War warship innovations are essentially 
old platforms, but with application of new technologies of advanced weapon and communication 
systems, radars, sonars and low-observable technology. Still, some of them have faced radical and 
disruptive transformations, not only in relation to RMA-technologies, but also with regards to how 
they are built. This reflects the tenets of NCW and the current RMA – as outlined in table 4.1. In 
short, even if NCW is highlighted in the table below, it is the modern warships during this period 
where NCW has become a principal concept that is in focus.      
 
4.3.2 Limitations of the Study 
The scholarly field on diffusion studies and literature on military innovation is broad and extensive, 
and there are certainly several relevant aspects as to why and how to investigate transformation 
processes in NATO after the Cold War beyond those chosen in this study. As transformation 
processes reflects and influences strategy and strategic choices, it is certainly a process that both 
spring from and form strategic conditions. That is, those facts and ideas framing states’ strategic 
options. Strategic conditions are thus nothing but the sum of strategic dimensions such as national 
policies, foreign politics, command and control, geography, financing, logistics, preparations 
(administrative, recruiting, training and structure), operations, technology, information and 
intelligence, the enemy, friction, uncertainty and time (Gray, 1999; Howard, 1979).  
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 The thesis does not go into depth on each and every one of these factors, far from it. Keeping 
that in mind, the explanations those not allow for all possible, or even likely, explanations to what 
explains states’ capacity to adopt new military innovations are, nor should it. The aim has throughout 
to provide a comprehensive approach, not an all-encompassing approach. Therefore, the thesis could 
be expanded on. Further studies of its topic in width, breath and context could provide further details 
and a broader understanding but would also lead to an incompatible task where the main features 
drowse in detail and individual deviations. 
 Subsequently, the thesis should be seen and read as a comprehensive framework for 
clarification of its research question, and not as a theory that explains an individual state’s innovation 
approach and choices. Moreover, the research question points in a direction where a selection of 
factors are investigated for providing useful insights on the diffusion patterns of military innovations 
after the Cold War. However, in terms of testing the adoption capacity theory, parts of it seems to 
be applicable in explaining certain trends of diffusion – such as the relevance of international norms 
and culture, strategic choices and domestic politics, and strategic competition. Thus, states will have 
dissimilar reasons for why and how they choose to invest in and implement adoption of new military 
innovations. Hence, it might be difficult to encompass the ACT with all the diverging national 
outcomes in each of the twenty-nine-member states.      
 Lastly, there could be some risks of tautology, meaning using several literary terms for 
explaining the same things. For instance, in the cultural perspective, there is in some cases a risk of 
tautology since it is complicated to assess or measure variables like openness to cultural diversity 
without considering if particular states have actually adopted the innovations in question. Yet, the 
thesis’ theoretical foundation could potentially explain the situations in which cultural openness is 
likely to occur with regard to military organizations. 
 
 
5. Military Innovations and Capabilities in NATO: 
The Case of Modern Warships and Sea power 
 
Sea power affects international relations. Historically, it made the establishment and sustainment of 
overseas colonies possible for major powers and smaller European powers, leaving a clear mark in 
battles during the first half of the twentieth century, such as Jutland, Atlantic, Midway, Pearl Harbor 
and Leyte Gulf (Fuller 1997). More recently, naval power enabled Britain to regain the Falkland 
Islands in 1982. It also enabled the US to send and support large offensive forces to Iraq in 1990 
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and 2003 (Chrisher and Souva 2014). For projecting influence and protecting their interests across 
the oceans, states need a powerful and innovative navy whenever being challenged. 
 During the last few centuries, most of the world’s great naval powers have originated from 
the West, except for Japan in the first half of the twentieth century (Horowitz 2010). However, other 
nations from other parts of the world are increasingly allocating considerable resources in 
developing their navies, such as India, China and Brazil (Chrisher and Souva 2014). Also, Japan has 
again advanced one of the strongest navies in the world. Yet, while new naval powers are 
developing, traditional ones are still striving to improve their fighting forces. The focus in this 
chapter lies on the post-Cold War transformation of NATO, reflecting a shifting geostrategic 
environment through past decades, and longstanding innovation processes of both overall military 
as well as naval capabilities explicitly. By stressing essential changes of strategic concepts, doctrines 
and technology, it is possible to get a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of naval 
military transformation and states’ pursuit of maritime power in the international system. This 
understanding could further contribute in explaining the diffusion of modern warship innovations in 
not only great powers but also in small navies such as the Norwegian Navy, and especially related 
to the RMA and network-centric warfare by demonstrating linkages between innovation processes 
and alliance politics – crucial in debates concerning the political will, hegemonic power and threat 
perceptions of states.  
 
5.1 Sharing the Burden, Capabilities and Purpose of the Alliance 
Since its inception, many within the security environment have debated the burden-sharing and 
purpose of the Alliance, thus contributing to internal reform. These discussions have reflected 
emerging gaps ascended over time, affecting the ability to implement capability initiatives in NATO. 
When explaining transformation processes in NATO, it is vital to address existing gaps within the 
Alliance. First, since the beginning, the US have carried most of the burden, in which both the US 
and its allies have grown used to. Associated with this, European allied states have thereby been 
adapted to distinct roles and having disproportional weight with the continuing hegemonic power of 
the US. And third, NATO have faced discords concerning interoperability between the US and 
European allies, as the US have maintained its technological lead in certain areas since the 1990s. 
Accordingly, these gaps could explain states’ differing abilities to innovate, why the US stress the 
need for transformation in NATO, and the lack of unity about political and military willingness to 
meet the commitments outlined in capability initiatives.   
 The “transatlantic bargain”, or burden-sharing, balances US commitments against European 
contributions, and have endured since the beginning of NATO (Sloan 2002). In articulating disbelief 
in the reliability of US commitments, Europeans have been met with discontent regarding their 
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contributions by the Americans, reflecting the vagueness of the entire arrangement while indicating 
that failure to address this might undermine the very solidarity underpinning the Alliance. However, 
rising events would make this division between the US and the European allies, even clearer (Cooper 
and Zycher 1989, 2).  
  This debate, as well as other issues causing previous change, is still relevant for the current 
transformation processes in NATO, which escalated after the end of the Cold War. As NATO 
members awaited a “peace dividend”, most allies experienced severe cuts in armed forces and 
defense budgets during the 1990s (Rimanelli 2009, 476). From 1986 to 2016, US defense spending 
was reduced by half, denoting a decrease from 6.1 to 3.3 percent of GDP. The five main European 
allies – UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain – also suffered cuts in their defenses, ranging from 
4.5 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP during the same period (World Bank 2017). Correspondingly, the 
gap in defense spending within the Alliance declined. 
 Driven by the markedly new post-Cold War geostrategic environment, meaning Europe were 
no longer defied by one large threat, NATO began envisioning situations where it had to carry out 
military activities, inferring power projection as well as rapid reaction and mobile forces able to 
operate, outside NATO territory. Allies reducing their defense budget and forces is highly pertinent 
if NATO should uphold innovative skills and prepare for interventions abroad. Hence, the burden-
sharing debate will likely continue to reemerge, as with the 1990 US-led intervention in Iraq, which 
revealed a widened gap in military capabilities within the Alliance. Similarly, it became even more 
evident in the Balkan engagements, exposing shortcomings in European states as they were reliant 
on the diplomatic and military power (air and naval assets) of the US for resolving the crisis 
(Hallams and Schreer 2012; Kay 2013). 
 Discussions of how to share the burden within the Alliance also interact with debates on its 
political and military purpose, which could be traced to the 1967 Harmel Report on the Future Tasks 
of the Alliance, expressing the balance between the military and the political function of NATO 
(Locher and Nuenlist 2004). Often referred to as the magna carta of NATO, it represented first 
efforts of ripening a common political strategy and defining the political purpose of the Alliance, 
notably pursuing a policy of détente with seeking explicitly to deescalate the East-West rivalry 
(Østerud and Toje 2013, 76).84 
 By adopting the Harmel Report in 1967, the allies faced an imminent transformation of both 
the objective, appearance and future task of NATO. Combining defense and détente facilitated an 
                                                 
84 Furthering the vision of détente, it is important to note the §5, stating that balancing force would contribute to create a stable, secure 
and confident environment. The dual approach of credible collective defense, combined with coexistence, continued in the post-Cold 
War era. This is crucial. As NATO accepted a balance of military defense and deterrence by committing to political détente, the 
security of its member states was reassured. However, security guarantees in itself were not sufficient, directing the making of a 
collective foreign policy (Hill and Smith 2002).   
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intellectual and political framework for the Alliance, thereby accelerating the increasing divide 
between left and right. By uniting different perspectives on political-military issues, the report 
broadened, as Sloan argues, the potential auxiliary base for NATO. Furthermore, NATO could 
function as pivoting a balance of differing point of views regarding the requirements of Western 
security policy in Europe, rather than enabling further polarization among the Western politicians 
(Sloan 1985). Nevertheless, the above discussions demonstrate that the purpose of the Alliance has 
been contested over several decades, and still is. The overall rationale for NATO regarding 
transformation, though, is an entirely different debate, and is portrayed below.  
 
5.2 NATO’s Military Development 
5.2.1 Military Transformation Initiatives 
How NATO has altered its purpose and issues of burden-sharing, is important in discussing in what 
way transformation of its arrangement and the capabilities of allies, occurs. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Alliance was met by challenges in transforming its raison d’être, brought by the 
new security environment. Decisions on how to relate to former Soviet states posed one challenge, 
while another major challenge was redefining its Strategic Concept and altering its modus operandi. 
The reorientation of the NATO rationale from defense in place to managing threats outside Alliance 
borders, is deeply connected to – and influences – the content of NATO’s diverse military 
development initiatives. Developing rapidly deployable, combat capable expeditionary forces, 
which is an RMA constituent of military transformation, is echoed in the 1999 Defense Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI), the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), and more recently the 2011 
Smart Defense Initiative (SDI).  
 At the Washington Summit in 1999, the DCI was approved as a way of addressing the 
cumulative gap in military capabilities and technologies between the US and its allies. The summit 
occurred shortly after the NATO operation in and surrounding areas of Kosovo, thus unintentionally 
providing greater incentive for the need of increased allied interoperability and demonstrating 
deficiencies in military capabilities of allied states. Central areas of capabilities in the DCI 
comprised deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, effective 
engagement, and command and control and information systems, with intrinsic goals intended to be 
overseen, but NATO allies made no definite commitments (Sloan 2008, 78).  
 After three years with minor accomplishment, NATO heads and governments met at Prague 
in 2002, adopting a dissimilar approach from that of the DCI in efforts of improving its broadness 
and softness. Instead of completing all of the capability goals, the allies agreed under the PCC to 
upsurge their military capability in one of the following eight areas: Defense against weapons of 
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mass destruction (WMD); intelligence; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and 
communications; combat effectiveness (with precision-guided munitions); strategic airlift and 
sealift; aerial refuelling; and deployable combat support units (NATO 2002).  
In many of these areas, specific nations accepted to forge ahead in pushing capability 
forward. Spain agreed to lead a group of countries to lease air-to-air refuelling tankers. The 
Netherlands did the same for securing smarter weapons, Norway to develop sealift, and Germany to 
lease airlift (Sloan 2008). These groups were created in which states sought to increase their 
capabilities in specific areas. Accordingly, the overall line of the PCC was an attention to 
multinational teaming or pooling, crisis management, and to role sharing or specialization (Shimkus 
2005). Although allies made advancements in certain PCC capability areas, the capability gaps 
remained mostly the same four years after the plan’s adoption. This reflected the lacking political 
will to commit, and that actual implementation would continue to be a slow process, putting great 
emphasis on the funding by national governments (Ek 2007). 
 While the PCC seemed more adjustable than the DCI, the Smart Defense Initiative (SDI) is 
regarded as a way of getting “more bang for the buck”. The former Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen unveiled the initiative at the 2011 Wehrkunde Security conference in Munich, presenting 
it as a new means of “ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more 
flexibility” (NATO 2011). NATO leaders agreed to incorporate Smart Defense at the Chicago 
Summit in 2012, for making sure that the Alliance could develop, acquire and maintain the 
capabilities required to achieve goals for NATO Forces 2020, due to the continuing lack of 
interoperability and persistent capability shortfalls (Fiott 2017). Central for this is the Connected 
Forces Initiative (CFI), adding emphasis on supporting measures in the areas of education and 
training, exercises and technology (Desit and Perks 2012; Viereck 2013).  
 Because of pressing requirements for results, the SDI is different from the DCI and PCC. 
NATO have faced increasingly more complex and diverse challenges such as threats from nonstate 
actors, conflicts out of NATO territory and cyber-attacks (NATO 2010; NATO 2016). The revise 
of the Strategic Concept in 2010 not only strengthened the credible deterrence and Article V mission, 
but simultaneously included more tasks and challenges, such as ballistic missile defense, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and force 
preparation, effective engagement and force protection (NATO 2012). Adding to this complexity, 
these challenges needed to be met in a time of decreasing military expenditures and military 
structures of allied states.85 In dealing with this problem, SDI requires change in national along with 
the alliance’s culture of cooperation (NMoD 2012a).  
                                                 
85 See Figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for trends in NATO military expenditures in Appendix B. Figure 5.1 shows that the peace dividend, 
in terms of falling defense spending, following the end of the Cold War was short-lived for the world as a whole. The 2008 recession 
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5.2.2 Organizational Transformations 
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO began to adapt its multinational, joint military 
command structure to the new security environment, hence the release of the New Strategic Concept 
in 1991.86 What was referred to as the RMA during the 1990s, thus shaping the essence of military 
change, includes several concepts along technological, doctrinal and organizational lines, distinct 
but yet closely interrelated in that each facilitates the others. The most noteworthy advancements in 
NATO are related to organizational transformation, and explicitly the design of command and 
control structures concerning rapidly deployable force projection as the guiding doctrine for 
transforming their armed forces.  
Early in the 1990s, NATO formed the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC), a mobile army headquarters of around a thousand multinational military personnel, meant 
for conducting humanitarian and peacekeeping missions (Sloan 2002; 2008). Following this idea, 
the Alliance launched the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) shortly after, a concept for assisting 
allied forces in shifting from collective defense capabilities to those necessary in operating “out of 
area”.87 The concept would also reflect the readiness to make the alliance’s assets available for the 
members. Approved at the 1994 NATO Summit, the CJTF concept sought to create headquarter 
structures, enabling different allied forces and services to converge as a task force and carry out 
several types of operations outside NATO borders (Rynning 2005).  
Over the following years, the Alliance went through vast conceptual work in instituting 
command and control arrangements for many different operations, in addition to conducting 
exercises for assessing planned structures (NATO 1999a; 1999b; 2001). It was not until the Prague 
Summit in 2002 that ideas of the CJTF concept truly progressed. Whereas the PCC was one outcome 
of the summit, there were especially two decisions being more vital for organizational 
transformation, notably to radically reduce and streamline the entire NATO command structure – 
by forming a command purposely devoted to center on military change – and to establish a NATO 
Response Force (NRF), intended to serve as a catalyst for thrusting transformation in practice.  
                                                 
braked the increase rate in global military expenditure. After 2009, downturn in military expenditure was mostly because of the 
decline in US defense spending, as US budget deficit concerns resulted in large-scale cuts in government spending. In 2012, the US 
share of global military expenditure fell to less than 40 per cent for the first time since 1960. Figure 5.1 highlights the overall upward 
spending on global defense since 1960, while Figure 5.2 indicates that states are generally allocating less of their GDP to defense 
since the end of the Cold War. The latter tendency is true except for three major powers (i.e. the US, China and Russia) and countries 
where tensions are high (e.g., Greece and Turkey). Figure 5.3 displays distribution of military expenditures as NATO allies are 
grouped into four categories; the US, medium powers (France, Germany and the Britain), other allies (12 pre-1999 expansion allies) 
and the 12 expansion allies. Finally, Figure 5.4 demonstrates the military expenditure distributed among the major powers (Sandler 
and George 2016). 
86 The Strategic Concept fell short in providing detailed guidance for how to improve the NATO command and control structures. 
Rather, it called for creating flexible command and control arrangements that could enable crisis management and conflict prevention. 
This Strategic Concept and the following initiatives have led to substantial reorganization of alliance command and control 
arrangements (NATO 1991; Young 1997; Johnsen 1997). 
87 “Combined” in this concept refers to multinational forces, while “joint” comprises more than one military service, such as the navy, 
army, air force and marine corps (which is the case for the US and for Britain).  
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The Alliance’s new command structure now entailed one operational command, Allied 
Command Operations (ACO), which merged the former two operational commands – Allied 
Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic – enduring since the 1950s. Simultaneously, 
NATO created a nonoperational command, Allied Command Transformation, tasked with being 
“NATO’s forcing agent for change”, for evaluating strategic surroundings the Alliance encounters, 
identifying the need for new capabilities in adapting to these surroundings, and facilitating 
innovations of capability solutions (Velde 2006, 3).88 Essentially, it remains the long-term strategic 
branch of NATO, with joint force headquarters around the world. As Boland asserts, its creation 
“represents a transformation in NATO from being an entity that reacts to imminent threats to an 
organization that plans for future troop capabilities” (Boland 2006, 56).  
This organizational reform of the allied command structure also imposed great impacts on 
the maritime domain as well. Based on the decisions in Prague, the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon 
determined to create an even leaner and more effective command structure, by reducing the number 
of major headquarters from eleven to six which led directly to the deactivation of the Allied Maritime 
Command Naples in 2013 – leaving the newly named MARCOM as the sole maritime component 
of NATO (NATO 2014). For ensuring the interoperability and readiness of allied forces, MARCOM 
has been responsible for planning and conducting all maritime operations, in leading four standing 
maritime groups – two frigate groups and two countermeasures groups. Being multinational, the 
groups integrate maritime force composing vessels from allied countries, thereby providing NATO 
with continuous maritime capability. 
Finally, the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) was another crucial organizational 
undertaking at the Prague Summit, comprising about 25 000 personnel and combining land, sea, air 
and special operation forces (SOFs), capable of being deployed within a five-day notice and to 
sustain itself for thirty days or more if resupplied. Its tasks are to contain Article V collective 
defense, non-Article V crisis response (e.g. evacuations and disaster management), responding to 
humanitarian crises, counter-terrorism, and acting as an “initial entry force” for larger, subsequent 
forces (NATO 2006). Even if the NRF was declared fully operational in 2006, it has faced challenges 
in upholding necessary force strength. For example, allied states have ought to avert forces initially 
promised to the NRF, to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Kosovo, which urged NATO 
heads to question the NRF concept.    
The NRF is ideally a key operational instrument for addressing crises in the current security 
environment. When Secretary Rumsfeld presented the NRF in 2002, it was also with the intent of it 
being a practical force promoting transformation. As various allied forces rotated through the NRF, 
                                                 
88 Moreover, Allied Command Transformations arranges conferences, joint training and exercises to foster these processes 
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they would be trained to high standards and learn about new concepts and technologies, thus 
favoring military innovation. Also, the practice would be continuous. The NRF could be viewed as 
a perpetually ongoing allied military training exercise, applied for assessing new concepts and 
capability advancements. A past NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europa (SACEUR) argued 
that “for NATO, the operational path for transformation lies in the emergence of the NRF” (Jones 
2005, 16). Yet, struggles in realizing the NRF prophecy could question its ability to appear as a 
channel of promoting NATO transformation. In some way the missions themselves – to the extent 
NRF forces has been averted – have still adopted this role (Kington 2007).   
 
5.2.3 NATO Military Technology and Capabilities 
Despite half a century debating the problem of burden-sharing, NATO has proven incapable of 
generating equal sharing of the defense burden.89 As the discussion above comments, a growing gap 
in technology and military capabilities has limited the interoperability. However, despite this gap 
and moving beyond the organizational changes, the Alliance is still making advances in other areas 
associated with the RMA core of military innovation.  
 Early in the 2000s, NATO members agreed on a plan to pool military sealift capabilities, 
with the aim of amplifying the deployability of its military forces. Under the agreement’s conditions, 
which was the outcome of the strategic sealift group led by Norway after the Prague Summit, the 
Alliance has secured entry of numerous sealift vessels owned by allied states. For increasing rapid 
deployability, the Alliance agreed on an interim airlift solution, in which Germany was charged with 
the pilot role. Included in the contract, a Russian joint venture was expected to provide NATO with 
two AN-124 Antonov air transporters on full-time charter, along with two more on six days’ notice 
and two others on nine days’ notice – far less than the “up to 20 C-17 or An-124 airlifters” initially 
anticipated as part of the interim solution (Fiorenza 2002, 7). This deal was intended to supply 
NATO with airlift until European member states instigated receiving delivery of A400M airlifters.90 
 Yet, this raised two central concerns. Russian officials from the joint venture stated the 
aircrafts would only transport humanitarian cargo, and “If an airlift does not correspond with 
Russia’s interests, it will not take place” (Abdullaev 2006, 44), potentially impeding NATO forces 
in certain types of operations. Furthermore, it is arguable whether this type of A400 aircraft even fit 
within the category of “strategic airlift”, which represent a shortcoming for the Alliance. Since the 
aircraft is much smaller than the C-17 Globemaster air transporter, it is being considered by among 
                                                 
89 It should be noted, however, that the lowered defense budgets of most European states are primarily because of national interests, 
in addition to some NATO-led operations such as the “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan. The scope of the US contribution involves 
military power in parts of the world where Europe will not or do not have the interest of contributing. Therefore, it is arguable to 
what degree the burden-sharing of NATO really is uneven. 
90 In August 2013, however, the first A400M aircrafts were delivered to the French Air Force (Flight Global 2013). 
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others Australia as a replacement for their C-130 Hercules tactical airlifter. This might have laid the 
grounds for decisions at the Riga Summit, to promote a Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative, 
in which ten members have joined the airlift fleet.  
 There has been less progress in other areas. At the Prague Summit, NATO members reached 
agreement in increasing their capabilities regarding air-to-ground surveillance, notably the Allied 
Ground Surveillance (AGS) program – emerging since the 1990s. The intent was to highlight the 
shortcoming of NATO’s capability to monitor large tracks of land for movement, regardless of 
weather, over longer periods of time (Sloan 2008). For a long time, NATO had to rely on the US 
JSTARS aircraft for assuring this capability during operations, and also the British Airborne 
Standoff Radar (ASTOR) aircraft, reflecting the technological gap within the Alliance. Settlement 
among the prime allied – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the US – on the 
program involved concerns over funding, what should comprise the AGS capability and who should 
build the aircraft’s Synthetic Aperture Radar. The US first proposed that NATO should buy 
JSTARS, but Germany in particular, foresaw an unmanned future. Accordingly, the program 
launched in 2004 called for a mixed platform approach, comprising modified Airbus 321s, with 
multinational crews, and Global Hawk UAVs. Additionally, France have preferred a radar built in 
Europe, rather than an American type due to potential US controls or limitations. In 2006, NATO 
decided to discontinue the mixed-fleet solution, and instead moving forward with the AGS’ design 
and development phase. Although concerns were raised over achieving this capability goal, NATO 
signed a procurement contract for the AGS system in 2012, paving the way for delivering a vital 
capability to all member states (NATO 2017). 
 In other areas of C4ISR, NATO has had – since the 1980s – a fleet of committed AWACS 
aircraft for air-to-air surveillance. The AWACS, one of the few commonly funded military systems 
in NATO, have recently endured upgrades through modernization programs, and according to 
Boeing, the first modified E-3A aircrafts are expected to be completed by 2018 (Stevenson 2016). 
The Alliance also has common satellite communications capabilities for its forces. In 2005, NATO 
agreed under the Satcom Post-2000 program, with the British, French and Italian governments, to 
purchase UHF and SHF capacity – two each from British Skynet, French Syracuse and Italian 
SICRAL satellites.91 The program is also anticipating acquiring the Extremely High Frequency 
(EHF) band in the future, which have caused much controversy related to its scope of transmission 
(Wong 2013). For network-centric capability and interoperability among allied forces, key systems 
are Joint Tactical Information Systems (JTIDS) and Multifunctional Information Distribution 
System (MIDS) which has long been integrated in NATO forces. Based on tactical link-16 
                                                 
91 UHF indicates ultra high frequency, and SHF implies super high frequency. 
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technology, JTIDS/MIDS are integrated into their fighter jets, bombers, and sea, land and air 
command and control centers (Adams et al. 2004).  
 For the maritime domain specifically, allied states have sought to improve their navies by 
retaining a broad array of naval capabilities despite declining defense budgets yet resulting in 
smaller fleets. This is especially related to some states’ move away from deep-ocean operations and 
toward littoral warfare, meaning operations along coastal areas, due to changes in the post-Cold War 
security environment (Sloan 2008). But it also corresponds with increasing costs of new technology. 
Advanced computer systems, for example, modified for interoperability between various military 
platforms, is enormously expensive, causing major changes not only in the defense industry (more 
costly modes of production), but also costlier R&D programs. Important for NATO over the years 
has been a push for improving anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense systems, 
thereby enhancing overall maritime capability of allied forces. The AEGIS combat system has long 
been vital for command and control structures, and is incorporated into several allied navies, such 
as Norway and Spain, as part of NATO’s European missile defense system (NATO 2012). While 
the global trend is smaller and more technologically advanced navies, the allied forces differ in their 
capability improvements, with somewhat diverse approaches for balancing national and allied 
defense planning.  
 
5.3 Norwegian Military Development 
5.3.1 Military Transformation Initiatives 
The political backdrop and transformation of NATO is imperative in assessing the strategic and 
military change of selected allies, and in particular a small allied state such as Norway. Despite some 
national differences, major changes have occurred in the Scandinavian militaries. More specifically, 
the challenges NATO faced in the aftermath of the Cold War, were also inflicted on the way 
Norway’s military force transformed. Furthermore, the rethinking of NATO and the new 
geostrategic environment after the Cold War, causing a “nation-in-arms” to move away from 
territorial defense emphasizing the High North (which was unique for Norway), and towards 
operations “out of area”, are inextricably linked to several Norwegian development initiatives. The 
modifications of the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) into smaller, highly modernized, flexible 
forces capable of joining expeditionary operations abroad, as displayed in the Long-Term Plans for 
the NAF since the Cold War, demonstrates the importance of the alliance with the US and NATO 
as a tenacious cornerstone of Norwegian security policy.   
 In 1990, a Defense Commission was appointed, which submitted its findings from their 
transformation assessments later in 1992, articulating a wary conservatism. Despite the remarkable 
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changes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the commission chose to center on defense of 
northern Norway, due to improvements in southern Norway caused by alterations in Eastern Europe 
(Børresen 2012; Petersson and Saxi 2013). Instability in and conflict with Russia were perceived as 
the main security challenges. More importantly, the gap between NAF’s size and resources available 
to maintain and renew it, saw an increase.92 Therefore, the commission advocated a significant cut 
in the brigades of the planned wartime army, navy and coastal artillery fortresses, moving into the 
future with great caution.  
When NATO’s Strategic Concept was launched in 1991, the reorientation towards new tasks 
received positive response from the Norwegian government, but the shift towards international 
operations seemed to be a slow transformational process. While the new long-term plan commented 
regional and global political changes, the objectives and tasks of the Norwegian security policy 
stayed the same. Adjacent to one of the largest military concentrations in the world, guarding the 
northern Norway remained the primary task of the NAF (NMoD 1993, 8-14). Transformations in 
size and organization of the NAF were almost exclusively in response to absence of resources for 
sustaining the Cold War structure, rather than any desire to provide new tasks for the military 
(Ulriksen 2002a).   
Transformations of the Armed Forces, in terms of policies and conceptual tasks after the 
Cold War, must be understood in the correspondence with developments in international politics 
and specific events. The broad changes accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for 
a wave of UN operations across the world, which differed from the original Chapter VI UN 
peacekeeping missions (Mayall 2007). The 1991 Gulf War and 1991 Yugoslavian breakdown 
provided Norway an opportunity to adapt the NAF to the “novelty” of using armed forces as a tool 
for foreign policy. But the Norwegian contribution was not particularly groundbreaking, since 
Norwegian authorities deliberately decided not to send combat units, only support units along with 
humanitarian and economic aid (Børresen et al. 2004).  
During the mid-1990s, this changed, when the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) 
replaced the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia (Cox 2008). When IFOR 
became Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996, Norway’s role changed too as combat units were 
deployed in a peace enforcement operation for the first time. A mechanized infantry battalion was 
sent to Bosnia, anticipating it would be more visible, thereby facilitating increased political influence 
(Gjeseth 2008). Less visibly, however, were the Norwegian SOFs when deployed in the Balkans 
                                                 
92 This is rooted in the economic difficulties of NAF after the Cold War ended. The force structure established with allied assistance 
during the 1950s and 1960s was greater than Norway could fund for maintaining and renewing on its own. Key equipment groups 
were about to reach their end of life cycles, while the price of new military technology raised abruptly. For example, in 1985 the gap 
between procurement plans and actual investments reached the counterpart of the entire Navy’s worth of equipment (Johansen 2000, 
15).     
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from 1996. This reflected a new, robust capability, in addition to being one of the first deployments 
of standing, combat ready forces in international operations, hence making real contributions in 
improving NATO’s collective forces (Robertsen 2007). However, the contribution in the NATO-
led Kosovo Force (KFOR) demonstrated difficulties with the IRF reaction-time requirement, thus 
strengthening NATO’s argument for more regular, standing units with contracted personnel for 
enabling the European militaries to respond rapidly.  
When NATO again revised its Strategic Concept in 1999, moving towards further 
enlargement and out of area operations, Norwegian authorities leveled their skepticism in regard to 
new tasks, partly for tactical reasons – including the fear of being perceived as the last “Cold 
Warrior” within the Alliance (Saxi 2010; Tamnes 1997). The NAF should still be designed to meet 
invasion on Norwegian territory, however, they did not receive the resources needed to sustain the 
structure presented in the 1999-2002 Long Term Plan. A White Paper demonstrated the need for 
NAF to be designed for more relevant scenarios requiring better and more responsive units, meaning 
rapid deployment capabilities for operations at home and abroad (NMoD 1998). It proposed the 
concept of Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces (FIST), available for international operations, 
washing out the divide between NATO IRF and UN standby forces. For the first time, the NAF 
planned to deploy tanks and artillery in missions outside Norway (Petersson and Saxi 2013).  
The 2002-2005 Long Term Plan for the NAF was introduced in 2001, as the Government 
expressed concerns of the NAF’s critical state, which were “not up to the solving tasks of the future” 
(NMoD 2000, 6). Despite considerable resources and increasingly more highly qualified personnel, 
the NAF lacked the capabilities required by the government. The Armed Forces needed to proliferate 
their mobility and flexibility, shorten reaction time, and improve the readiness for domestic use as 
well as international operations. Even so, a form of brigade proved itself available for rapid 
deployments abroad, with robust forces expected to credibly participate in high-intensity warfare, 
representing a milestone in Norwegian willingness to conduct actual warfare (Saxi 2010).  
 Specifically, Norway’s strategic environment changed because of the deterioration of the 
Russian military and because of advances in military technology. When the 2005-2008 Long Term 
Plan was presented in 2004, it demonstrated the scope of changes in defense planning since the 
Kosovo War. The shift away from conscripted reserve units and towards more regular contracted 
units, mirrors the awareness of Russia’s continuance as a potential threat. Under these 
circumstances, Norway adopted a policy allowing a brigade-sized expeditionary force, in 
developing better and more mobile units with briefer reaction time (NMoD 2005). Crisis 
management replaced invasion-defense tasks for the Norwegian units, especially in the northern 
Norway (Saxi 2010). For the Navy, the primary tasks would center on national defense, though it 
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had improved sufficient capacity to contribute in international operations by taking part in and 
possibly leading NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic.  
 Based on the recommendations of the Defense Policy Committee, the 2009-2012 Long Term 
Plan introduced in 2008 basically preserved the overall structure of the NAF, although lowering the 
number of bases and units in facilitating organizational reform (NOU 2007). With a further increased 
attention regarding responsiveness, Norwegian authorities moved towards a new total-defense 
concept, aiming at – amongst other things – combating terrorism. Renewed cost-cutting and 
effectivization measures were forcefully implemented, and the defense budgets increased slightly, 
giving the impression of successful efforts (Åmot 2014, 3).  
After the shift in Government following the 2013 elections, these efforts were critized for 
being “rose-tinted” (Eriksen Søreide 2012). The following two long-term plans, respectively for the 
periods of 2013 to 2016 and of 2017 to 2020, encountered the problem concerning sustaining a 
balanced force, including heavily increased spending and renewed cuts (NCoD 2015). While this 
could “finally lie to rest of the main bones of contention” in Norwegian civil-military relations, the 
consequences remain to be seen (Bogen og Håkenstad 2017, 29). While it seems that nearly two 
decades of several measures in reducing costs and increasing efficiency have achieved certain 
notable successes, an enduring balance has yet to be reached. The problem of sustainability has been 
a major initial cause of reforms and continues to perhaps be the most important factor in explaining 
military change in Norway, reflecting a slow adaptation process and reluctant politicians in making 
radical transformations. 
 
5.3.2 Organizational Transformation 
During the Cold War, Norway was characterized by a territorial defense concept based on 
conscription and a large mobilization reserve. After the Cold War, the peacetime NAF were 
primarily a training establishment for the wartime forces; their equipment was old and insufficient, 
and the training standards were not specifically impressive in general. The Armed Forces were in 
serious financial difficulties, as the key problem was a large and increasing gap between 
organizational size and the resources available to maintain and renew it (Bogen and Håkenstad 2017; 
Johansen 2000). Service abroad was restricted to traditional UN peacekeeping, denoting a voluntary 
service with low prestige in the armed forces. The NAF were therefore ill-equipped when facing the 
new post-Cold War paradigm that called for more high-quality, rapidly projectable military forces. 
 In 1990, the Armed Forces commenced a relatively ambitious reform program (Børresen 
2012). As mentioned above, because the Defense Commission emphasized the defense of northern 
Norway, it endorsed a cut in the brigades of the planned wartime Army – from thirteen to six – and 
in the battalion – from twenty-eight to seventeen – leaving the reduced land forces being more 
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heavily mechanized than previously. The number of Missile Torpedo Boats (MTBs) in the naval 
forces were to be cut from thirty-six to twenty-two, and coastal artillery fortresses from twenty-nine 
to thirteen. The Air Force would retain its size. While rationalizing the NAF to open for investments 
in new equipment, the commission did not signal any radical changes in neither the organization nor 
the NAF (Saxi 2013).  
 In the early 1990s, the NAF adopted a new maneuver warfare doctrine, though avoiding 
provoking the organization internally in reducing the size or number of wartime brigades. A 
significant problem in this doctrine was how to fight a numerically superior enemy invading 
Norwegian territory (Sæveraas and Henriksen 2007). Through the early and mid-1990s, several 
modifications highlighted the importance of participating in international operations, however the 
alterations in the military structure were rather small and incremental (Neumann and Ulriksen 1997). 
For example, the Norwegian contribution to the NATO’s Immediate Response Force (IRF) 
comprised an infantry battalion, an F-16 squadron, a frigate and two mine clearing vessels, in 
addition a modest increase of troops from 1300 to 2000 (Saxi 2010, 33). This proves the Norwegian 
readiness for UN peacekeeping operations, in which forces were only trained, organized and 
equipped for classical UN operations – not warfighting.  
 From 2001 to 2010, several transformations of the NAF occurred which greatly affected the 
Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN). These involved rearrangements within the defense staff, ultimately 
causing the Chief of Navy to move from Oslo to Haakonsvern in Bergen. Second, the two Defense 
Commands North and South Norway were closed down, making the latter into a Joint Operational 
Headquarter (later replaced with a Joint Warfare Centre subordinated to NATO’s Allied Command 
Transformations) and the former reduced to a regional operational headquarters (HQ) which later 
was established a Norway’s sole operational HQ at Reitan outside Bodø. And third, efforts were 
made in reducing the administrative overhead and pooling overlapping capabilities, which resulted 
in a joint Defense Logistic Organization with total responsibility for all defense acquisitions, 
maintenance and logistical support – as well as controlling the bases, naval and air stations, and 
barracks. One purpose of this was to adapt command and control of the NAF both at strategic and 
operational level to the requirements generated by the changed geopolitical situation and the 
resulting new tasks for the NAF. Another reason was to adapt to decreasing budget levels, by 
attempting to minimize strategic overhead and adjust to a much-reduced force structure. 
 
5.3.3 Norwegian Military Technology and Capabilities 
Revisiting the issue of burden-sharing within NATO, and the emerging gaps in capabilities through 
time, it should be noted that the lowered defense budgets of most European states over the years 
have primarily occurred because of national interests, in addition to some NATO-led operations 
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such as the “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan. The scope of the US contribution involves military 
power in parts of the world where Europe will not or do not have the interest of contributing. As 
Norway has moved away from territorial defense and towards operations abroad as part of its liaison 
with the US and NATO, it is a vital national interest of Norway to maintain and develop capabilities 
for ensuring national security, considering the international situation, its geopolitical position and 
challenges stemming from the occasionally tense relations to Russia (Bekkevold et al. 2015, 266).   
 With this in mind, and despite decreasing military spending after the Cold War, the NAF is 
still making advances in areas related to both its geography and the RMA core of military innovation. 
Emphasizing the strategic importance of the northern region of Norway, meaning safeguarding 
Norwegian interests at sea by maintaining territorial waters and protecting Norwegian sovereign 
rights, have gained priority, and the ability to perform these tasks has become a vital part of 
Norwegian security and foreign policy. Not surprisingly, this would shape how the RNoN alter its 
naval capabilities. Adding to this, coastal defense is crucial in protecting the national interests, and 
acquiring naval innovations like warships with offense-defense capabilities adjusted to littoral 
waters has been imperative for increasing the NAF power projection capabilities. As such, the Coast 
Guard has attained a more prominent role about naval presence on the Norwegian coast as well as 
in sea areas adjacent to Norway, with various capabilities and more sea time (Børresen 2012, 157).  
Other warships, such as the multi-purpose Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, have replaced the 
older Oslo-class frigates, and from 2012 the five frigates were equipped with the surface-to-surface 
Naval Strike Missile (NSM) – produced by the Norwegian Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace (KDA) 
company – designed for both littoral waters and open sea, including the incorporation of Lockheed 
Martin’s AEGIS combat system, thereby increasing the Navy’s interoperability and force projection 
capabilities. The frigates are also supposed to operate new NH90 helicopters. The six stealthy 
Skjold-class corvettes are equipped with NSMs, and combined with their high speed and excellent 
maneuverability, they have been crucial for coastal defense in addition to being seaworthy – 
meaning they can operate in broader terms. Finally, the six Ula-class submarines were modernized 
in during 2006 and 2008, whereas the preceding Kobben-class were mainly being scrapped. Most 
notably, they were equipped with new communication systems, as Link 11, new electronic warfare 
support measures and a periscope upgrade, thereby increasing interoperability (NMoD 2005). For 
securing national interests and securing Norwegian influence in NATO, the corvettes are highly 
important for Norwegian military capabilities (Børresen 2012). However, they are planned to be 
out-phased, and the six submarines are intended to be replaced but with only four of the German 
HDW 212 in accordance to the latest Norwegian Long Term Plan (NMoD 2016), causing much 
debates in security policy circles and among military analysts. 
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 Norwegian frigates, corvettes and submarines are constructed and equipped with high-
technology weapon systems, thereby making the RNoN highly relevant and unique in the NATO 
arrangement due to its role as leading in sealift capabilities.93 Adding to the naval capabilities, the 
recent procurement of the stealthy multi-purpose F-35 Lightening II (formerly called Joint Strike 
Fighter) would apply major combat force to both the Norwegian Navy and the Norwegian Air Force 
(NMoD 2016). Packed with advanced interoperable computer systems, stealth and radar signatures, 
they are enormously innovative and complex to build, making them a high-cost premier surface-to-
air missile (SAM) capability uniquely equipped for missions with cutting-edge processing power, 
synthetic aperture radar integration techniques, and advanced target recognition. For the NAF, they 
are intended to replace the role of corvettes as they are being phased out in a few years. Nonetheless, 
the maritime capabilities of Norway are indisputably modernized, making its small navy way ahead 
of its numerous small power counterparts in various parts of the world. 
 
5.4 Sea Power: The Modern Warship Innovation 
When presenting the case of the modern warship innovation, it is crucial to emphasize “battlefleet 
warfare” as its predecessor as Horowitz entitles it, for an historical overview of its progress. It was 
introduced as a disruptive modernization after Admiral Nelson and his fleet wiped out the joint 
French and Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805 – steering naval superiority through decades. The 
British Admiralty later issued a regulation deterring expansions of steam-powered boats, as they 
realized that any naval technological innovation would threaten their naval predominance. These 
regulations persisted, keeping the British Navy nearly uninterrupted through the next three centuries, 
dominated by ships of the line. Conversely, the British changed their ship production quickly after 
the French introduced their great ironclad – La Gloire – in 1858, in addition to the 1862 US naval 
ironclad clash between the Monitor and the Merrimack, to iron and later steel warships propelled by 
steam replacing the sail. Yet, most other basics remained as it was, regarding doctrine, education, 
organizational structure, upgrades and training (Horowitz 2010, 134).  
 Just before the World War I, however, the leading naval power of the world improved 
everything from its doctrine and training to force structure (Falk 2000). Thrust by the introduction 
of the HMS Dreadnought in 1906, this alteration denotes one of few cases where a prevailing major 
power deliberately restructures its core competencies that had ensured success without ever losing 
a battle. Sometimes referred to as the Fisher Revolution, named after the First Sea Lord John 
“Jackie” Fisher (Farley 2016), this change of the battleship warfare helps determining why it is 
                                                 
93 It should be noticed, however, that the denotation of sealift in this sense implies capabilities of escort contributing to sealift, as the 
true meaning of sealift is the capability of moving large military forces – a capability in which most militaries do not have, except 
for the US.   
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important to understand the diffusion of military innovation for better comprehending the 
development, spread and use of military power in general, as well as for selected states. 
  Moreover, the launch of the Dreadnought, accompanied by the organizational changes 
following battlefleet warfare, urged considerable adjustments in how major naval powers designed 
and planned for warfare. Technologically, numerous navies halted their production plans while 
processing the impact of the all-big-gun Dreadnought on naval warfare. The rising cost per unit of 
this type of ships also implied a navy’s total amount of capital ships declined although the relative 
power of the navy increased, because of the ships’ greater capabilities. Thus, the British Navy saved 
large costs. But as their number of ships declined, however, other naval powers emerged, Germany 
specifically, challenging British control more effectively than before (O’Connell 1991).  
 While the British Navy maintained their power at sea, those requesting transformation had 
to overcome a bureaucratic struggle in order to control instead of the Admiralty, which ruled the 
money and decision-making. Eventually, organizational shifts initiated by the naval leadership 
allowed Britain to effectively harness the power of the technological innovations in armor, force and 
weaponry (Morgan-Owen 2015). Organizationally, however, as battlefleet warfare signified a 
continuance of navies’ critical tasks at that time – winning battles through gunnery – the core 
competencies of the average sailor changed extensively, thereby necessitating organizational 
changes crucial for benefiting from battlefleet warfare (Horowitz 2010). Even so, complexities in 
implementing shifts in recruiting, education and training that many navies experienced, as well as 
rising costs of ships, provided the British with a further competitive advantage the following years. 
 During the period between the Dreadnought launch and World War I, the British almost 
succeeded in advancing an even broader naval innovation, notably the flotilla system. The flotilla 
innovation was designed by Fisher with the intention of superseding the battleship by combining 
destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines, along with battle cruisers (Sumida 2006). This has been 
considered as a classic case of disruptive innovations. But implementation of transformational 
segments of this design faced difficulties, as it was hindered by bureaucratic politics and key 
organizational actors questioning its efficiency (Lambert 1999).94  
Another case of disruptive warship innovations was the carrier warfare from the World War 
II era, combining the use of fleet aircraft carriers and various logistical ships for pursuing strikes 
                                                 
94 On a further note, the storyline of British naval innovation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is important for 
studies of diffusion of military innovations, both in general but also especially related to the spread of sea power. The transformation 
from a navy originally attempting to pause the status quo in the post-Nelson era to a navy breaking grounds into the industrial age, 
have typically been viewed as incremental by scholars, since several of these technological developments have been founded in stages 
of the Industrial Revolution which have brought alterations in the construction, drive, armament and firepower of naval vessels 
(Herwig 2001). Transformations in strategy are perceived as the inevitable result of a changing political landscape and technological 
advancements. Instead of regarding the late nineteenth century as involving clear-cut technological developments unsurprisingly 
causing shifts in production of naval power, it might be more precise to view it as encompassing rapid improvement in naval strategy 
combining new technologies with organizational transformations to alter the former international agreement concerning naval 
warfare.      
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against enemy naval assets and sustaining sea control (Goldman 2003). Compared to battleships, 
carriers enmeshed new hardware, that is the carrier itself and the integration of technological 
advancements also used in other military areas. They radically increased the greatest distances 
possible in naval warfare, requiring massive changes in planning for naval engagements (battlefield 
strategy and doctrine), especially in radar surveillance requirements for detecting positions of enemy 
carriers and vessels, but also large-scale transformations in recruitment and training at all levels for 
learning how to launch and recover airplanes (Rosen 1991). Also, carrier warfare did not just mean 
operating only one ship; it involved a complex systems integration task, comprising air assets and 
reliance on logistical support ships as well as other carriers (Horowitz 2010, 68), indicating the 
decisiveness of aircraft in future battle.95 
Hence, World War II reoriented navies of the world into the next phase of war at sea, with 
the US in the lead. Adding to changes in the construction of naval vessels into more modernized 
warships, built for greater speed and easier maneuvering in blue waters as well as littoral zones, the 
pointy end of the spear became aircraft, guided weapons (missiles and torpedoes) and submarines – 
that is, not the guns aboard – thereby essentially ending the utility of battleships in open oceans 
(LaGrone 2014). The destroyer is generally viewed as the prevailing surface-combat vessel of most 
modern blue-water navies, by increasing force projection capabilities through low-observable 
technology – the most striking technological advancement in modern times.96 
Yet, the once distinct roles and developments of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes 
have blurred. In recent years, most vessels have come to be armed with a combination of anti-
surface, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft weapons, in which class labels no longer reliably indicate 
a displacement hierarchy, and the size of all vessel types has grown beyond the definitions used 
earlier in the twentieth century (Sloan 2008). With developments of precision-guided munitions and 
integrated weapon systems, delivering munitions on target has not only been a skill but also the 
critical task for most navies for increasing interoperability and real-time communication, thereby 
amplifying the organizational requirements in operating these new developments (Singer 2010). 
Another key difference between older and modern vessels is that all modern warships are “soft”, 
without thick armor and bulging anti-torpedo protection of World War II and older designs. 
Although making military forces more efficient, such changes have brought large increases in cost 
per unit, as result of advanced weapon systems and robotics (Freedberg Jr. 2017; Singer 2010).  
                                                 
95 Adam Stulberg (2005, 510) also makes an important point, citing another source of evidence for the development of carrier warfare 
arising from civilian collections of naval power before, during and after the World War II. Fred T. Jane started in 1898 with publishing 
Jane’s, a yearly catalog of international naval capabilities. This comprised an entry for each country with lists of its ships and their 
capabilities. After the World War II, the catalog started to put carriers first on its lists, which revealingly meant the end of a decade-
old system of battleships first in any entry (Jane’s Information Group 1950).   
96 Most recently, the futuristic Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer of the US Navy for example, with its twin 155mm naval guns 
able to launch a guided projectile more than four times the 20-mile range of the 16-inch guns of the old battleships, is 50 times harder 
to spot on radars than an ordinary destroyer (Kuehn 2013; Patterson and Lendon 2014). 
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Due to the major shift in naval warfare following the introduction of the aircraft carrier, 
warships have remained a military innovation, bringing a massive change in how large navies have 
sought to conduct what they have considered as their main mission: accumulating force to destroy 
enemy marines with gunfire, thus facilitating control of the seas. The technological components of 
the warship innovation stemming from innovations of battleships, in which steam turbines 
superseded the age of sail, have made substantial impact on the entire period of naval innovations. 
Comprising a range of varieties, such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, 
submarines and amphibious assault ships, modern warships leading up to and after the Cold War era 
generated large transformations in their design, organization and role, overriding the service of 
battleships. Only the deactivated Iowa-class battleships still exist as potential combatants, but 
battleships in general are unlikely to re-emerge as a ship class without redefinition (LaGrone 2014).  
 
5.4.1 The Maturation of Warship Innovations  
While Horowitz places the debut of battlefleet innovation to the launch of the HMS Dreadnought, 
a demonstration point at which other navies around the world recognized that the British had started 
doing something different, the introduction of modern warships and changes accompanying it 
occurred a bit later. Because the emphasis in this thesis is on the innovation of contemporary 
warships, and diffusion of sea power after the Cold War due to introductions of RMA-technologies, 
it is therefore natural to set the debut of the warship innovation to the World War II, which brought 
massive changes in the design and role of several types of warships, the first use of radar in combat 
and the decline of battleships.97 As discussed above, these changes were the forerunners of the 
developments of warships into the Cold War-era, and more importantly, the military transformations 
in the post-Cold War security environment.  
 Even prior to the World War II, one could observe developments from Fisher’s system of 
flotilla defense as leading to what has become the warship innovation of the post-Cold War era. 
However, it was not until the World War II that the major transformations of the warship innovation 
occurred, with the introduction of carrier warfare and the use of radars, altering the way of modern 
warfare (Horowitz 2010). For example, when the HMS Furious was first introduced, as a fully 
functional aircraft carrier in 1917, Britain leaped ahead the rest of the world, and both the US and 
Japan pursued to imitate the Royal Navy’s advances. The US received Britain’s plans for their new 
carriers, which came to be the basis of the first US-designed carriers (Hone, Friedman and Mandeles 
                                                 
97 Hence, it is important to note that even if the demonstration point of modern warships could be traced back to the World War II, it 
is though contemporary warship innovations of the information age – the post-Cold War period – that will be examined further. In 
avoiding further confusion regarding the demonstration point, this implies that as Britain is viewed as the first-mover of the modern 
warships in the World War II, the United States superseded the British lead during the War, making them the first-mover into the 
information age after the Cold War. 
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1999, 22). Later, the Japanese also came to learn about naval aviation from the Royal Navy, 
including extensive flight and air combat training, leaving the Royal Navy surpassed in the area of 
aviation by the mid-1930s (Peattie 2001, 19-21). 
 The following two decades after World War I, and almost six months of naval war in the 
Pacific theatre of World War II, carrier warfare matured in the Battle of Midway and its aftermath, 
because of the planning of the encounter – especially decisions about fleet compositions on both the 
US and Japanese side – and the organizational responses to the battle, making navies changing their 
force structure to assign task forces targeting the employment of aircraft carriers in combination 
with screening and logistical ships (Borneman 2012; Kernan 2005). The World War II was the only 
war through history in which battles occurred between groups of carriers. In more modern times, 
military encounters have often comprised smaller and more modernized warships, such as frigates, 
corvettes and submarines, which will comprise the case of modern warship innovation for further 
analysis of the spread of military power.   
 
5.4.2 The Power of Frigates and Corvettes 
As stated above, it is not an easy task to distinguish certain modern warships due to their coinciding 
roles and capabilities. Additionally, navies around the world tend to name their vessels differently 
although they might correspond. Still, some discrepancies are possible to detect – in size, 
displacement and armament – for assessing power projection capabilities. Furthermore, differing 
capabilities of power projection, in combination with improved technological developments, are 
crucial in attempting to predict the diffusion of these warships. 
Notably, modern frigates are only related to earlier designs by name with the term “frigate” 
being readopted during the World War II by the British Royal Navy to describe an anti-submarine 
escort vessel larger than a corvette, yet smaller than a destroyer (Britannica 2017). The first corvette, 
on the other hand, appeared as an easily built patrol and convoy escort vessel – such as the British 
Flower-class (Keegan 1989, 277). While equal in size and capability to the US destroyer escort, 
frigates have typically been less expensive to build and maintain (Price 2014). The frigate first 
introduced was meant to alleviate certain shortcomings inherent in the corvette design; limited 
armament, a hull structure incompatible with open-ocean work, a single shaft limiting speed and 
maneuverability, and a lack of range. It was first designed and built along similar construction 
standards as the corvette, leaving production by yards unused for warship constructions. Early 
frigates of the Royal Navy’s River-class were mostly two sets of corvette machinery in one larger 
hull, armed with the latest Hedgehog anti-submarine weapon (Macpherson 1989, 6-7).  
 During the World War II, the frigate held less offensive firepower and speed than a destroyer. 
However, such abilities were not necessarily required for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). 
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Submarines were relatively slow while submerged and sets of ASDIC – a sonar – could not operate 
effectively at speeds over 20 knots (Britannica 2017). Indeed, the frigate was austere and weatherly, 
suited for mass-construction and equipped with the latest innovations in ASW. Since the frigate was 
chiefly assigned for convoy tasks, and not deployment with the fleet, it held limited speed and range. 
The role and significance of corvettes during this period have also been vital for maritime history. 
Initially, they were developed for specifically fitting the need of allied powers to successfully 
combat the threat and attacks of German warships during the Battle of the Atlantic (Dunmore 1999). 
And while construction of corvettes was not resistant to German torpedoes, it laid the grounds for 
structures of modern corvette warships. 
 After the end of World War II, the introduction of surface-to-air missiles enabled frigates to 
also adopt an anti-aircraft role, thus adding surface-to-air missiles and radar to its ASW equipment. 
Moreover, several modern navies instigated during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
a tendency toward smaller and more maneuverable surface capability (NATO 2012). For the most 
part, they are armed with medium- and small-caliber guns, and combinations of surface-to-surface 
missiles, surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine weaponry. Some of them can even 
accommodate a small or medium sized ASW helicopters.  
In recent years, striking stealth technology has been introduced in contemporary frigate 
design by the French La Fayette-class, designed to offer a minimal radar cross section, which can 
allow camouflage amidst civilian ships, or that of a much less capable corvette, leading an enemy 
to miscalculate the ship’s capabilities (Potts 2017). Also, the first operational corvettes with stealth 
technology was the Swedish Navy’s Visby-class and Norwegian Navy’s high-speed Skjold-class, 
thereby improving their navies with far-reaching power projection capabilities. Moreover, 
advancements of such power projection capabilities, meaning developments of high-tech precision-
guided munitions, sensors, sonars, and other integrated weapon systems, have become more 
expensive in cost per unit through past decades, thereby making the R&D programs and new modes 
of production even costlier (Hove and Lillekvelland 2016).  
 
5.4.3 The Power of Submarines 
Before and during the World War II, the key role of the submarine was conducting anti-surface 
warfare (ASuW), meaning attacking either on the surface (using deck guns) or submerged (using 
torpedoes). They were remarkably effective in sinking Allied transatlantic shipping, and to disturb 
Japanese supply routes and naval operations in the Pacific theatre during the World War II (Blair 
1975; Williamson 2010). Submarines were also employed for inserting and removing covert agents 
and military forces, gathering intelligence and for rescue missions during air attacks. They could 
carry cargo through hostile waters or serve as supply vessels for other submarines (Morison 2001).  
  68 
 By and large, submarines could locate and attack other submarines only on the surface, even 
though the British Royal Navy’s HMS Venturer managed to sink the German Type IXD2 U-boat, 
“U-864”, using a four-torpedo spread while both were submerged (Polmar and Moore 2004). After 
the War, their submarines improved to be capable of hunting each other more effectively, as 
developments of the homing torpedo, better sonar systems and nuclear propulsion emerged. 
Moreover, progresses of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and submarine-launched 
cruise missile (SLCM) provided submarines with significant, long-ranged ability to attack both land 
and sea targets with different weapons comprising cluster bombs and nuclear weaponry.  
 The main defense of submarines encompasses its ability to remain hidden in the depths of 
oceans. Early submarines could be detected by their sounds (since water could carry sound far better 
than air), and due to improvements through time, they are capable of tracking and detecting 
comparatively loud surface ships from long distances. Modern submarines are constructed with an 
emphasis on stealth, advanced propeller designs, extensive sound-reducing insulation and special 
machinery, facilitating their low-observable presence in the ocean and making them difficult to 
detect (McHale 2008). It requires specialized technology to locate and attack them, such as passive 
and active sonars, inertial guidance system for navigation while submerged, life support systems 
based on nuclear power or air-independent propulsion, and offense capabilities such as ballistic 
missiles. For example, the US’ Virginia-class and Britain’s Astute-class submarines use high-tech 
photonic masts, instead of hull-penetrating optical periscopes, for being much harder to locate 
visually by radars. And in terms of offense abilities, the Germans have started installing a torpedo 
tube-launched short-range IDAS-missile on their Type 212-class, which could discharge ASW 
helicopters and operate in shallow waters (Roblin 2017). As with the technology applied on surface 
combatants, submarines and their technologies are increasingly expensive. Not surprisingly, this 
would affect how naval innovations spread through the international system (Kirkpatrick 2004).   
 
5.4.4 Expecting the Diffusion of Warships 
Adopting the warship innovation has required a large degree of financial resources, especially on 
the part of potential adopters. In Britain and the US, as well as in other countries, the relative cost 
per unit has encountered an ongoing increase ever since the World War II (RAND 2006). The River-
class frigates, for example, were expendable compared to the costly destroyer. But the cost per unit 
amplified the more technological advanced they became over the years (Kirkpatrick 2004; Arena 
2006).98 While the warships themselves might not be the most expensive of naval innovations, it is 
                                                 
98 The River-class is by some also classified as a patrol vessel (IISS 2015, 150). The Type 23 frigate, or Duke-class, was first 
commissioned in 1989 (and the last one in 2002) at a cost of about 180 million dollars (UK HoC 2001). The superseding Type 26 
frigate, or City-class, is currently in production (planned for service in 2021) at an estimated cost per unit of between 334-468 million 
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though the sensors, weapons and other systems required for surface combat being more specialized 
and interoperable, that are the primary factors of rising costs, and which also make up a substantial 
part of the total costs (Bangert, Davies and Watson 2017).99 This will boost the financial intensity 
required for implementation. As stated, these are not the most expensive warships of states’ naval 
fleets. Aircraft carriers are far more expensive than frigates and corvettes, facing even higher cost 
escalations. This is also true for the expenses of destroyers. Therefore, one must assume that 
increases in costs of wireless communications technology, training for personnel needed in 
engineering and operating warship innovations, and other technical specialists required for navies 
and naval industry since the World War II – as compared to predecessors and other types of warships 
– and the cost per unit required to implement the innovation have been medium.100   
 Regarding the underlying technologies of warship innovations, it would appear that they are 
a mix of those designed for commercial and military purposes. They could also contain dual-use 
technologies, meaning technology that has both military and commercial application (Stowsky 
2004). However, deciding this is not a clear-cut process. The core technologies applied to warships 
will vary, meaning some technologies will not necessarily have civilian spillovers. This is especially 
so for stealth technology, having very few, if any, significance for commercial applications (Alic 
1994). Still, innovations like wireless communications and gas turbines – as well as nuclear marine 
propulsion and electric engines – though heavily supported and subsidized by national militaries, 
have presented vibrant commercial opportunities. Conversely, armor and armaments have been 
entirely military. Consequently, the cost of each unit of power combined with the underlying 
technologies make the financial intensity rated as medium.  
 The organizational capital required to implement warship innovations, for potential 
emulators, might be higher than some have assumed. As previous discussions demonstrate, modern 
warship warfare has involved training to combat at much longer range and simultaneously managing 
complex tasks requiring new technical and operative skills than prior to the World War II. Given 
                                                 
dollars (Naval Technology 2018). The increase is caused by great advances in high-tech weapon systems (estimations of cost 
increases are made in 2018 US dollars).  
99 It should be specified that “sensors, weapons and other systems” is with reference to those of the current RMA, related to NCW. 
100 This requires a further assessment regarding the evaluation of the financial intensity requirement of modern warships. First, 
whether these advances of contemporary warships, meaning the application of RMA-technologies onto existing preinnovation 
platforms of warships, could properly be considered an MMI is debatable. However, as Britain’s technological lead was surpassed 
by the Americans long before the age of information, the early introduction of US precision-guided munitions during the Gulf War 
could have epitomized the start of a new “ticking innovation clock” (Horowitz 2010, 14) – much like when the British introduced its 
aircraft carriers or the tank in World War I – instead of representing a completed MMI (Welch 1999, 122). It is though linear advances 
in precision warfare and NCW that up until this day that have prolonged the US’ military edge in conventional operations. Second, 
operating this kind of innovation requires costly platforms (such as bombers or ships), denoting a high level of financial intensity to 
adopt. Often, application of RMA-technologies like precision warfare will continue to be expensive, even if dependence on major 
weapon platforms would decline. The required financial intensity for implementing anything like the US does today is so high that 
even a minor decrease in unit costs will not let many more states to aggressively seek military dominance. Also, given that core 
platforms for applying precision weapons are linked to those of today, recruiting, training and organizing modern armed forces will 
look the same. However, since this study looks at the diffusion of warship innovation altogether – meaning not just the RMA-
technologies in themselves – it seems more productive to assess the financial intensity as medium. This is especially so because the 
modern warships, or platforms in which RMA-technologies have been applied to, originate from Great Britain’s days of naval glory. 
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the advances in torpedoes and later missiles, propulsion and high-technological weaponry, the naval 
forces had to prepare for fighting over much longer distances (Horowitz 2010). Secondly, the 
development of wireless communication systems, and more recently, advanced computer systems 
improved for increasing interoperability between various military platforms, have necessitated 
military organizations to develop the capacity for managing larger amount of data and at the same 
time coordinate actions of different types of ships, leading to new demands on intelligence 
organizations along with certain shifts in the relationship between vessels at sea and naval 
bureaucracy at home (Singer 2010).  
   With consideration to navies critical task focus, organizational age and level of 
experimentation, the British Royal Navy in particular, viewed its critical tasks controlling the sea 
by defending homeland and national interests such as trade routes across the oceans and allied 
cooperation through the War, thus encouraging its ability to adopt new warship innovations. Harding 
(2005) sees the Royal Navy as being focused on its core functions, wasting few resources on 
speculative investments in new technology that do not shape up in early experimentation or that lack 
operational value. Still, they invested in research and attempted to maintain the ability to stay on the 
cutting edge of naval developments. However, and with reference to organizational age, Till (1996, 
198) observes that “in contrast to British policy, the Japanese and American, being newer in the 
business, were willing to make boulder departures”. This combined with changing operational 
requirements and financial limitations made the British lead superseded by the US during the War, 
and even more so into the age of information. All the same – with the United States as the first 
mover – marking the general level of required organizational capital for adopting the warship 
innovation, the above discussions suggest a medium level required for implementation.  
 
5.5. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has systematically reviewed the military changes and transformations within NATO, 
but also in Norway, in effort of revealing certain mechanisms driving innovation processes and 
requirements of adopting particular naval innovations. Capability gaps within the Alliance have 
emerged due to differing political strategies of member states in adapting to the shifting geostrategic 
environment after the end of the Cold War. What appears to be obvious, is that the political backdrop 
in post-Cold War era matters for how countries plan and structure their armed forces, both in terms 
of the political will to fulfil NATO commitments, threat perceptions and the preservation of national 
interests. This is crucial for grasping innovation processes of both overall military naval capabilities 
in states’ pursuit of maritime power in the international system. By demonstrating linkages between 
such processes of innovation and the relationship between national and alliance politics, it is possible 
to make predictions of how sea power – meaning warship innovations – diffuses through the 
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international system. The next chapter will demonstrate diffusion patterns in general, but also how 
selected states choose to adopt naval innovations.  
 
 
6. Post-Cold War Transformation and Diffusion of 
Military Power in NATO  
 
Whatever the doctrine the [British] Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. 
What matters is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. 
(Michael Howard in Ledwidge 2011, 266) 
Within the field of international relations, technology is highly relevant when studying matters of 
security and the spread of military power. During the Cold War, technology was essential in notions 
of the threat of war. Advances of nuclear weapons and missile technology were interpreted into fears 
of missile gaps and strategic thinking, contained within conceptions of nuclear rollback, mutually 
assured destruction, escalation of dominance, arms control and strategic defense (Rappert 2007). 
Longstanding debates regarding the relationship between offense and defense, meaning conducts of 
war, were altered by new technological opportunities (Lynn-Jones 1995; Kier 2006; Glaser and 
Kaufman 2012). Indeed, this is not to say that international security was driven by technology alone; 
the important thing was the way in which particular innovative skills were formed and understood. 
Strategy became key in political debates concerning technology and security, although it 
simultaneously created “experts” often accorded special status in deciding upon these belligerent 
political and principled issues (Dalby 1992, 95).       
 After the Cold War, notions of threats to security changed dramatically with the demise of 
the Soviet Union, thus changing the entire security environment regarding strategic thought and how 
states planned and transformed their militaries for future wars. Shaped by new sources of threats 
and the US’ pursuit of the information revolution in military affairs, the geopolitical and geostrategic 
landscape have changed considerably – imposing great implications on the capabilities and political 
will of NATO allies in how they should change their militaries (Matlary and Petersson 2013). In an 
ever-changing security environment, this is an ongoing challenge affecting international politics and 
the balance of power.          
 Much attention has been given to avert undesirable diffusion to potential adversaries. An 
equally central issue is ensuring that what the United States desires to diffuse in fact does spread. 
Currently, this poses a major challenge to NATO. Whilst the US maintains the pursuit of the 
information RMA, it must safeguard interface principles and interoperability with its allies. The 
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political backdrop is how the US has tried to ensure some level of interoperability within NATO by 
governing the diffusion process, which could be traced back to the Soviet's introduction of the MTR 
in the 1970s (Goldman and Eliason 2003a). For NATO, the issues at stake comprise the 
denationalization of European militaries and the organization of their defense industries (Matlary 
and Østerud 2016). Consequently, it could be expected that the Europeans have not fully embraced 
the information age RMA-technologies at the same rate that the US military has experienced. This 
holds for the case of sea power as well. This chapter begins with an effort to construct an overarching 
rationale for the diffusion of military power in the post-Cold War era, which demonstrates the 
importance of threat perceptions to security matters and its significance for military transformation. 
This lays the foundations for further examinations on what determines states’ interest in innovating 
their military naval establishments, state capacity to adopt warship innovations, other strategic 
choices for states facing innovations, and consequences for a small navy such as Norway in the 
NATO alliance due to shifts in adoption capacity requirements.  
 
6.1 Rationale for Diffusion of Military Power 
War, as well as peace, has several contexts. Gray argues, for example, the most prominently ones 
includes political, social, economic, cultural and technological (2005, 2). However, it would also be 
necessary to add the strategic environment. In discussions on how the conduct of war has changed, 
and thereby the spread of military power, it is crucial not to fall into the error of treating this issue 
as if it were an autonomous phenomenon.101 We see from the past chapters that some of the 
“grammar” of war has assuredly changed since the end of the Cold War, to put the matter in 
Clausewitzian terms, though not the dominance of the logic of policy.102 According to Gray, there 
is a perpetual pull towards a misunderstanding of recent and contemporary trends in the nature of 
warfare as indicators of certain momentous, radical shifts. On the contrary, he asserts, the character 
of warfare in a period is as often as not shaped – even driven – by political, social and strategic 
contexts in a greater scale than it is by changes integral to military science.   
 On that note, there is evidently more to war than warfare. The end of the Cold War, as stated 
above, imposed a new security environment on the international system of states, thus challenging 
how they should prepare their military forces for waging war. The demise of the Cold War bipolarity 
triggered the rise of new threats and challenges to international security and spread of globalization 
initiated a redistribution of power in the international system (Baylis and Smith 2007; Brown and 
Ainley 2009). Classic wars gradually shifted into modern wars, and security challenges 
                                                 
101 Gray (2005) treats this as one of four caveats in his research on military transformation of especially the US. The other caveats he 
makes includes defense establishments preparing for the problems they prefer to solve (rather than those of an astute enemy might 
pose), trend spotting as not necessarily a reliable guide to the future, and that surprises occur.  
102 For further accounts on this matter, see Clausewitz (1976).  
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characterizing this different geopolitical environment were no longer existent on a state-to-state 
level as sub-state actors became increasingly prominent, thereby affecting the changing perceptions 
of military force and capability, war and security (Kaldor 1999; Shaw 2005; Smith 2006).103  
 Therefore, in examinations of the spread of military power, it is crucial not to overlook the 
importance of changing threat perceptions regarding new security challenges, which could 
ultimately alter the entire international balance of power. This relates to notions on internal and 
external threats, in that states aim to balance each other’s military power and threats. Revisiting 
Waltz, it is the international environment that is the main driver for states’ seeking to maximize their 
security for external threats (Waltz 1979). Following this realist tradition, a paradox in core 
assumptions about each state focusing on survival and military means to this end, is the putative 
knowledge that European member states of NATO after the Cold War do not seem to upkeep their 
own security. For example, Blagden and Menon (2012, 3-4) stress that instead of suffering from 
strategic blindness, Europe continues to evaluate their own security in terms of national territorial 
defense. Thus, they are devoted to sustaining continental security, yet the focus of Europeans is 
merely misunderstood. Arising from this is the belief that states will focus on military capabilities 
wired for territorial defense the more exposed they are to external threats.  
 Claims of states’ security being a combination of relative geographical distance from a 
potential threat, physical barriers and the effectiveness of the military force available, could provide 
useful insights on choices of national military strategies in responding to threatening changes in the 
international system. Corresponding with notions on the balance of threat, the line of reasoning 
above contains that states will be more concerned for territorial security in periods of great 
vulnerability to external threats.104 Because of limited resources, this translates into a concern for 
territorial protection at the expense of out of area capabilities (Blagden and Menon 2012, 8-9). 
However, there might be periods where states perceive themselves to be so susceptible to threats 
that internal balancing seems impossible. Under such conditions, they could depend on external 
balancing in a greater extent. Accordingly, focusing on territorial defense would be replaced by a 
focus on expeditionary forces. Those states most vulnerable to a perceived threat will not be 
motivated in pursuing ambitions, or goals, outside their proximate region – yet, they will emphasis 
                                                 
103 The total war concept that dominated strategy during the Cold war has also changed into concepts promoting wars for limited 
strategic objectives. This is, to certain degree, a return to the cabinet wars of the 17th century or the wars of Bismarck between 1864 
and 1871. This development is a natural consequence of the nuclear annihilation threat, i.e. nuclear wars cannot be won, and the need 
to use all available means, hereunder military power, to promote strategic interest (stated by Tor Ivar Strømmen, commander and 
assistant professor at the Royal Naval Academy, in conversation at his office 6th of June 2018). 
104 The divide between external and internal balancing denoted the difference between forming an alliance with other states to counter 
a threat (external balancing) or domestically attempt to increase national power (internal balancing) (Levy and Thompson 2010, 23). 
Moreover, He (2012, 189-90) extends this notion by proposing a negative balancing model, in which the real reason for the US and 
the Soviet Union to actively engage small, “ignorable” states during the Cold War was not for pooling resources but to prevent these 
countries from falling under the influence of the other side. Put differently, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in a negative 
balancing competition through undermining each other’s’ power and influence in the periphery. 
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expeditionary forces on some level in aiding the major power, notably the US. States not susceptible 
to such threats will pursue non-local goals and thereby focus on deployable forces.  
 This dynamic is important for grasping influences on how states transform their military 
forces and incorporate new military innovations. The immediate consequences following the end of 
the Cold War, was that NATO found itself without the threat it had been created to deter (Wallander 
2000). As Jamie Shea, one of the leading thinkers of the Alliance, noted: 
 In the post-Cold War era security has become muffled. Although the classic threat has
 disappeared, new security threats and challenges have proliferated, and allies do not
 necessarily have the same perceptions as to what they are. The threats are today latent and
 whether or not to address them is voluntary as opposed to the imperatives of the Cold War
 threats exemplified by Soviet tanks on the inner-German border. 
        (Østerud and Toje 2013, 76) 
The Cold War’s end led to new security challenges, changing states’ notions of military force as 
new sources of security threat arose (Smith 2006; Shaw 2005), including regional conflicts and 
humanitarian crises during the 1990s and the increasing prominence of nonstate actors and cyber 
threats in the post-9/11 era. Moreover, in a geostrategic sense these threats include more precisely 
unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, terrorist actions, sabotages and 
hybrid warfare – imposing different challenges for how states prepare for war. Still, how states 
perceive these new security challenges fluctuate among nations, due to diverging national strategic 
interests and goals, governing how states innovate and why – meaning what capabilities they choose 
to invest in for altering their role and status in the international system. It also connects with the 
strategic interests of their alliance, in which mutual interests in deterring a common adversary create 
a form of security interdependence between allies (Matlary and Peterson 2013).  
 Evidently, threats are crucial for military transformation. For NATO, facing the new 
challenges in the security environment after the Cold War has involved expansion of membership 
states – incorporating most of its former adversaries in Eastern Europe – and crisis management 
beyond NATO’s border as well as internal transformations in addressing the capability gap, 
interoperability problems and adaptability to new threats and future operations. As the strategy of 
NATO has been revised several times since 1991, the organization has been transformed drastically 
and revealed increased internal disagreement and divergence among the allied states, thereby 
contesting NATO’s overall rationale (Østerud and Toje 2013, 77).105 This divergence, discussed 
                                                 
105 The new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 consequently recognized the replacement of the Soviet threat with a “new strategic 
environment”, in which risks to the Alliance’s security are “multi-faceted […] and multi-directional” (NATO 1991). Some 
components of NATO were still viewed as unchanging, meaning the Alliance endured as the main institution for transatlantic 
relations, it endured in promoting the strategic balance in Europe and it endured in deterring and defending against any threat of 
aggression against NATO members’ territorial ground. Similarly, NATO would continue to promote security through dialogue, 
cooperation, conflict prevention and crisis management, and initiate evaluations of force deployments, command structures and 
capability requirements – including a lessened reliance on nuclear weapons (Webber, Sperling and Smith 2012, 3). 
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closer further below, could also be viewed as an outcome of alliance expansion – hence, it is a two-
folded relationship complicating the process of how states (and in this sense NATO allies) transform 
and prepare for challenges to new international security issues.   
 Consequently, threatened states may respond by forming alliances, yet they may also respond 
internally by mobilizing military resources. This in turn could require military innovation (Farrell 
2008, 780). In fact, threatening developments could in itself be an adversary’s military innovation, 
meaning a new weapon or a way of war – demanding an innovative response (Zisk 1993). As one 
of NATO’s – and the US’ – main adversaries, Russia has felt compelled to counter their eastward 
expansionism in that NATO has been pushing towards the territorial borders of Russia (Kanet 2007). 
In response to fears of a NATO military build-up along its Western border, Moscow has developed 
new types of ballistic missiles, leading to NATO establishing a long-range ballistic missile defense 
in Europe (Hildreth 2008; NATO 2018). Moreover, states could be especially sensitive to external 
military threats in the shadow of a war, as a defeat or major setback can be a great inducement for 
military innovation (Posen 1984). Even militaries being victorious in war, although at a very large 
cost, could attempt to innovate for making future victory less costly. As French notes, the British 
General staff, alarmed by the human cost of the World War I, embraced new technologies during 
the interwar period with the purpose of winning next battles with “the maximum of machinery and 
minimum of manpower” (French 2000, 80).        
 As such, it might not be immediately obvious how threats have appeared after the Cold War. 
In relation to for example British military innovation, Britain has fought two large-scale 
conventional wars against Iraq (in 1991 and 2003), participated in numerous smaller-scale 
humanitarian conflicts (Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo), and joined simmering wars in Iraq (after 
2003) and in Afghanistan (after 2002). However, Farrell (2008) explains that in none of these 
conflicts has Britain faced a direct threat. Thus, these have been considered “wars of choice”, rather 
than previous “wars of necessity” like the world wars (Freedman 2005, 93-108). Nevertheless, 
realist approaches still have relevance in emphasizing the rationale imperative for military change: 
military organizations need to innovate for encountering new operational challenges, although such 
challenges are faced by states’ choices instead of strategic necessity (Avant 1994).106  
 However, one should not be too hasty claiming that threat perceptions are the sole 
international driver for military innovation. While it could be the main factor, emulation of foreign 
militaries is also important to highlight in this (Farrell 2008, 781). Generally, militaries mimic the 
military models and methods of major powers, especially those who have worked well in war 
(Resende-Santos 2007). Yet, the thrusting motive in this sense is not fear, meaning it is not about 
                                                 
106 Rationalist perspectives also outline that current campaigns might bring challenges from tactical losses and operational setbacks 
which demand innovative responses. 
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responding to a threat.107 Instead, it would concern imitating the powerful and successful, much like 
in the business world or other aspects of civilian life. Military emulation could be rational if the 
specific innovation has been through experimentations and tests by another first, and the emulating 
state has the resources required for the innovation (Goldman and Eliason 2003a). 
 Warfighting capabilities are effective in that they enable state leaders to impose their will on 
adversaries, existing or potential. The larger logical framework behind examinations of the diffusion 
of military power is closely related to studying national power, security and strategic orientations, 
which could be applied writ small to assessing how states’ military establishments generate effective 
military forces. Hence, key to the spread of military power is how successfully military 
organizations can be transformed into effective military power. While threat perceptions lie at the 
very heart in understanding global spread of military innovations and the balance of power – the 
latter comprising internal and external responses to threats – as being shaped by the geopolitical and 
strategic context, it is how states’ military organizations take raw technologies and use them that 
creates military strength and shapes diffusion patterns (Goldman and Eliason 2003a).  
 
6.2 Military Transformation and Alliance Adaptability    
Understood in realist terms, “alliances should not outlive the threats they were created to address” 
(Wallander 2000, 705).108 As the previous chapter discusses, NATO has made great efforts in 
adapting to both internal changes as in revisions of strategic concepts and to external changes in the 
security environment after the Cold War for improving its military forces and capabilities. Rather 
than retelling this story, this section will in a military-strategic sense chart the impact of the 
American-guided military transformation on NATO as a whole and on individual allies. Moreover, 
it examines Alliance adaptation relating to new missions and capabilities, and how this has brought 
difficulties NATO currently experienced in how to innovate. It explores the magnitude and variation 
in how the US’ military transformations are interpreted, or emulated, by some member states, and 
finally how this relates to their maritime strategies for enhancing military power.109  
 Much of the transformation in NATO has involved playing “catch-up” with the US ever 
since the World War II, with its worldwide military obligations and reach followed by the lead in 
                                                 
107 Commonly, responding to intimidating innovations of foreign militaries could take the form of emulation, as perhaps the most 
dramatic case in recent history being the Soviet atomic bomb built using a stolen US design (Horowitz 2010). However, the purpose 
of this external impetus is to emphasize non-realist reasons for military innovation.  
108 Several scholars have expected a dissolution of NATO after the Cold War, as the common threat from the Soviet Union was 
seemingly evaporating after its collapse. As Glenn Snyder has remarked, “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat 
to which they are a response” (Snyder 1997, 192). Even Kenneth Waltz expected in the early 1990s that NATO would dwindle at the 
Cold War’s end and ultimately disappear (Waltz 1999, 75-76). Yet, it sustained. This have caused vast discussions concerning 
NATO’s survival, and is of such character that it would be subject to another thesis, however, it is still relevant mentioning in that it 
connects with how NATO has been able to adapt to new issues of security, in improving military effectiveness. 
109 This is relevant, since transformation in strategic thinking and concepts is key for how states adapt their military organizations to 
external changes, by influencing their postures and abilities to advance their military capabilities. Thus, in this case, postures 
concerning commitment to contribute to NATO’s collective defense and capabilities.  
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transforming its military organization for the information age (Farrell and Rynning 2010, 674). 
Recalling that transformation after the Cold War has been directed at generating deployable forces 
capable of functioning alongside US military forces in carrying out NATO’s new security role and 
joint missions, NATO established Allied Command Transformation – aimed at escorting Alliance 
and member states’ military transformation and adaptability. Despite all the organizational and 
conceptual changes in advancing their military forces, the Europeans have simply not been able to 
match levels of US procurements of new military capabilities (Sloan 2002; 2008; Singer 2010; 
Matlary and Petersson 2013; Schilde 2017; Leonard 2005). Consequently, critics have for long 
emphasized a growing transformation gap between the US and its allies (Mitchell 2006).  
 Indeed, Farrell and Rynning (2010) accentuate that there is in fact two core transformation 
gaps. The first one represents, as noted earlier, a transatlantic gap in force development caused by 
disparities in European commitment to, and investment in, military transformation along US lines. 
The second is denoting a gap between the transformation programme itself and current operational 
challenges. Originally, transformation in the US military was designed to prepare its forces for 
potential conventional warfare – a design which essentially updated NATO’s transformation agenda 
as outlined in the PCC from 2002. However, the main challenges facing NATO during the latest 
years have appeared from low intensity conflicts, especially in conducting counterinsurgency and 
stabilization operations in Afghanistan. These two transformation gaps have threatened to disrupt 
Alliance adaptability and effectiveness. The buzzword seems to be commitment.    
 As NATO focused on the enlargement process and the fragile Euro-American balance during 
the 1990s, its multiple tasks created a form of “strategic ambiguity”, preventing the Alliance in 
reaching agreement upon systematic military reform (Farrell and Rynning 2010, 678). As new 
sources of threat emerged, notably challenges in the event of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, 
struggles with incorporating the American agenda into NATO have continued to persist until this 
day due to ongoing inadequacy in defining what transformation means for an alliance as opposed to 
for a single nation. A solution to this has been, as proposed by Secretary Rumsfeld in 2002, the 
introduction of a “transformation package” for NATO with essentially two linchpins – Allied 
Command Transformation and the NRF – for satisfying the European allies’ political and 
institutional concerns while endorsing NATO into the transformation agenda (Sloan 2008; Velde 
2006). Despite agreement, the political guidelines have been left vague as heads of states had 
disparate ideas of what transformation was, reflecting member states’ different military standards 
and national outlooks (Matlary and Petersson 2013).      
 Yet, transformation was more apparent after the 2004 Istanbul summit where NATO heads 
approved the Alliance’s version of effects-based operations (EBO), supporting a somewhat more 
specific transformation agenda, notably effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) which linked 
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anticipated effects to not merely joint and integrated military power but also the full spectrum of 
national security means.110 However, NATO’s political level deflected such transformation agendas 
by becoming entangled with high politics of NATO-EU-UN relations, in which advanced military 
planning endangers doing diplomatic damage. Put differently, NATO’s engine of transformation – 
the Allied Command Transformation – has turned up isolated and with a holistic agenda (Terriff 
2010). Neither is encouraging change, perhaps much less transformation. How well the Alliance 
encounter future challenges will be revealed in the years to come. Nevertheless, hasty incorporation 
of American transformation agenda has evidently set the footings for the Alliance predicaments, as 
echoed in de Hoop Scheffer’s call for fundamental strategic rethinking (NATO 2009).111 In this 
troubled organizational context, European allies embarked on transforming their military forces, 
which inevitably has facilitated different outcomes in relation to military innovation adoption.  
 Finally, the durability and adaptiveness of NATO tell us much about the US power and 
influence. The ability of the US to extend the life of, according to some, a declining arrangement of 
alliance neatly elucidates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger 
powers for serving perceived or misperceived interests (Wallander 2000). More specifically, it 
shows how the US has prompted military transformation for increasing military capabilities of the 
Alliance to meet new challenges in the post-Cold War security environment.  
 
6.2.1 Redefining Tasks and Differing Capabilities 
It is well-known that states through history have emulated innovations of the major powers, both 
because it assures increased military effectiveness and because it assures to bring legitimacy on the 
emulating state by upholding the professionalism of its military organization (Farrell 2005; Resende-
Santos 2007). Much quantitative research support global emulation of the US military model, 
meaning adopting comparable doctrinal concepts and investing in RMA-technologies for 
empowering their military forces (Demchak 2003; Goldman and Mahnken 2004). As part of this 
trend, European allies have emulated the Americans. They have merely done so to some extent, 
however, focusing on primarily the innovations connected to NCW and EBO, and thus shaping them 
to correspond with their national agendas (Farrell and Rynning 2010; Sloan 2008). Consequently, 
military transformation (although commonly accepted) loses clarity and impact.   
 As noted above, all NATO allies have committed to transform their militaries, and the 
majority has developed plans for networking their military forces with the induction of effects-based 
                                                 
110 Effect-based thinking pledged a more effective way of using military force and involved to some extent a paradigmatic shift in 
approach for military planners: Away from causing maximum damage to using force more precisely with the purpose of minimizing 
physical damage whilst still accomplishing the desired strategic effects (Lewis 2003, 505-6).  
111 Introductory remarks by former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Opening of the Strategic Concept Seminar 
in July 2009, stating “I believe strongly that the new Strategic Concept has to demystify this notion and state clearly where and how 
NATO needs to transform its forces”.  
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concepts and doctrines. For example, in Britain, the 2003 Defense White Paper (DWP) obligated 
the military forces to improve network-enabled capability (NEC) and effects-based planning and 
operations (Farrell 2008). These core innovations were crucial to the British military’s operational 
concepts in the future, further developed by all three services. Additionally, the Germans also 
adopted a transformation plan in 2004 in the same way, as did the French.    
 In fact, the European allies had throughout the 1990s been experimenting with digitization 
of their military forces. NATO’s Multinational Digitized Interoperability Exercises played an 
important part to this. Experiences from the Kosovo War in 1999 buttressed the assurance of 
network and effects-orientated forces, in addition to the need for advancing capabilities in order to 
fulfill this promise (Farrell and Terriff 2002). In 2002, discussions between US and European 
military leaders began for encouraging the NCW concept, and by the beginning of 2000, European 
militaries started to become familiar with the US ideas about NCW and EBO – especially those 
working with development of doctrine and force improvement (Farrell 2005).   
 While European allies recognized the main content of these concepts, they did not adopt the 
US idea of NCW. Instead, they started developing NEC, a far less impressive concept of networked 
operations which reflected allied inability to meet the level of US military investments as well as 
European caution concerning the operational effectiveness of a complete NCW approach to 
operations and missions (Adams and Ben-Ari 2006). The European allies also had a diverging 
perspective on effects-based doctrine. The US concepts and EBO doctrine focused on applying a 
system of systems evaluation. Early European engagement involving American concepts did try to 
introduce this approach and was centered on taking advantage of such enemy networks. However, 
British employments of the US approach in 2005 demonstrated that EBO was staff-heavy, semi-
scientific and essentially unfeasible. During the same period, the French also started advancing an 
approach resembling EBO, which they called “synergy of effects”, yet they remained profoundly 
doubtful of the effectiveness of the American version (Farrell and Rynning 2010, 685).  
 Despite diverging approaches among the European allies to the US-led transformation of 
military forces, Europe in general is evidently ripe for transformation. The US military, through its 
own transformation agenda, has offered the Europeans a model for emulation. Also, NATO has 
formally adopted concepts for network-enabled and effects-based operations. Nevertheless, the 
variation among the European allies in their commitment to developing doctrine and devoting 
significant financial resources in new technologies for advancing their military capabilities and 
power, remains substantial. This could primarily be explained by the consistent cuts in defense 
budgets and military expenditure following the Cold War’s end, but also by the domestic policies 
including strategies for preserving vital national interests of individual states. Correspondingly, this 
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is true for the maritime domain as well, not only military transformation in general.112  
 The above discussions demonstrate the indispensable role and significance of the strategic 
context in explaining how military power diffuses through the international system. Regarding the 
case of sea power, examining maritime strategies of both the Alliance as well as selected states is 
important for a better understanding of the determinants of states’ capacity to adopt and implement 
naval innovations for advancing their power projection capabilities at sea. This is especially so in 
an era of rapid technologic and organizational change, making it increasingly important to adapt in 
the ever-changing and complex security environment.   
 
6.2.2 NATO Maritime Strategy and Transformation 
Fundamentally, NATO is a political and military alliance, yet as it very name suggests, it is also a 
maritime alliance. The Alliance’s members and geographic areas of interest are accordingly linked 
by the sea (Horrell, Nordenman and Slocombe 2016). As its allies are the primary recipients of 
globalisation, they are dependent on accessible and open sea lanes of communication, in addition to 
– whenever needed – the ability to project power across the maritime domain (Alderwick and 
Giegerich 2010, 13). At a time when about 95 percent of global tradable goods and 80 percent of 
global hydrocarbons flows depend on shipment by sea, it is imperative for NATO to safeguard sea 
transit routes (Parry 2014).113 Thus, maritime forces have a inmitable and unmatched capacity to 
display global reach and flexibility and to establish continuing presence if necessary (NATO 2016).
 In a Cold War context, although the US and the Soviet Union were the prevailing naval 
powers for many years, they were not the only ones – indeed, the navies of the US’ larger NATO 
allies must be viewed as far from negligible. However, it was overwhelmingly their interests, fears 
and capabilities that defined the maritime environment during the Cold War era (Miller 1992, 112-
13). At base, US perceptions were embedded in a longstanding self-image as primarily a maritime 
power. In this traditional perspective, the US is essentially an “island nation” to whom the seas are 
immensely important for both political, economic and political reasons, and for whom naval power 
– even command of the seas – is consequently crucial if its overseas interests are to be safeguarded. 
Even though this view is cast in rather broad, and perhaps vague, terms and even though it might 
not lead directly to any particular naval policy or posture, it has nonetheless a powerful hold over 
                                                 
112 Figure 6.3 and 6.4 in Appendix B could demonstrate this. 
113 Additionally, with 95 percent of internet traffic and communications moving through more than 200 undersea cables, and about 
80 percent of marine traffic passing through critical “choke points” – notably the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Red Sea – it 
is vital for NATO to secure these SLOCs (NATO 2016, 2). The prompt increase in scope and scale of various forms of trafficking 
over sea routes by both adversary states and organized criminal networks also threatens the external and internal security interests of 
all Allied states. Especially concerning potential terrorist acts against Allied assets at sea and different actors using the international 
sea transit in proliferating WMD. 
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the majority of the US security elite (as well as the US naval establishment), and has heavily 
influenced US postures towards naval matters. 
 Moreover, this general impetus was translated into more definite interests and fears which 
continues to hold importance. Some concerns have been overriding in this sense. First, the US – and 
with it, NATO – was during the Cold War deeply fixated with the safety of the North Atlantic sea 
lines of communications (SLOCs). This is not only because of a generalized concern with protecting 
the maritime lifeline that connects the US to Europe, but even more because the military strategy of 
NATO in Europe has been founded on a mobilization arrangement that necessitated (and in fact 
depend on) sea-borne reinforcements and resupply from the US (Miller 1992). After the Cold War, 
and thus the absence of the Cold War threat altering the balance of power in Europe, NATO’s focus 
on the transatlantic SLOCs lessened. However, if this militarily critical sea lane could be 
disconnected or disrupted by an adversary such as Russia, the NATO’s prospects for a victory in a 
potentially large-scale conflict in Europe would be severely reduced. Accordingly, the US and 
NATO have been exceedingly sensitive to any potential threat to the SLOCs, thereby giving the 
preservation of SLOCs a high priority in shaping new naval doctrines and the maritime policy of the 
Alliance (NATO 2016). Therefore, they have justified a large portion of their naval acquisitions by 
reference to the need of protecting the sea lanes.      
 Hence, for preserving the vital SLOCs, command of the seas is therefore increasingly 
necessary for the Allied security as the post-Cold War environment has involved increasing strategic 
competition – not only amongst NATO member states but also from adversaries and competitors 
such as Russia and China. NATO’s strategic nuclear deterrence is ensured by its naval forces, 
playing a pivotal role in demonstrating NATO’s resolve regarding its “deterrence posture in the seas 
along its northern, eastern, southern flanks” (NATO 2016, 1).     
 Since 2008, debates in NATO regarding maritime security has been anchored in negotiations 
around the Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) approved in 2011 and a general Maritime Security 
Operations (MSO) concept, seeking to face and limit current and potential critical security 
challenges in more efficient ways (Alderwick and Giegerich 2010).114 In broad terms, an effective 
AMS need the principal capabilities of forward presence, manoeuvre and power projection.115 The 
advantages of these capabilities are not only clear-cut in protecting and projecting Allied interests, 
                                                 
114 The AMS was developed in full consistency with the overarching 2010 Strategic Concept announced at the Lisbon Summit that 
year, and affiliates broadly with its central tenets: deterrence and collective defense, crisis management; and cooperative security 
(Smith-Windsor 2013). Additionally, the AMS sets out a fourth area, notably maritime security (NATO 2016). The publication of 
the 2011 AMS was a momentous upgrade from the original strategy dating back to 1984. 
115 For maritime security, it is crucial having ships deployed and thereby communicating readiness which enables unrestricted usage 
of international SLOCs for trade and transit. The significance of naval manoeuvre at sea involves deployment of maritime assets 
whenever and wherever anticipated, in addition to rapidly redirecting assets to incipient crisis areas. Lastly, for protecting assets at 
sea and even influence the consequence of incidents on land, naval power projection is vital because it enables joint operations by 
putting assets from all domains – air, land and sea – into effect in conflicts. Along with accelerating combat, naval assets could also 
function as to denying competitors maritime access by providing mobile anti-access/area denial capabilities (NATO 2016). 
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but also in deterring potential enemies or competitors. At all levels, power at sea is elementary for 
NATO power. However, since 2011 much has changed in the security environment in which the 
2011 AMS does not reflect, such as Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, crises in the Middle East 
and piracy outside Africa, the increasing geopolitical importance of the European Arctic – or the 
High North – and climate challenges (Horrell, Nordenman and Slocombe 2016, 1). Consequently, 
the 2011 AMS appears to be outdated, by failing to address challenges and missions that have 
emerged during the intervening years.      
 Obviously, NATO needs a revised AMS that proves able to locate the policies, capabilities 
and operations that will protect the Alliance’s interests in the maritime domain within the context of 
current strategic realities, and most essentially, the irrefutable return of a potential confrontation 
with Russia’s aggression (Nordenman 2017). Moreover, the changing operational environment in 
the maritime realm, comprising state competition at sea, skilled nonstate actors, persistent capability 
gaps in the West and rapid technological change, should not be seen as momentary. It is the naval 
feature of the international security environment after the 2000s for which NATO should prepare 
itself so as to safeguard the Alliance’s interests at sea. For responding better to future operations, 
defense-capability planning has been crucial in preparing allied forces for being capable of facing a 
wide range of existing challenges scenarios within economic structures (Spiegeleire 2011). Future 
operations could require this as well, and most likely something different – denoting the continuing 
need to innovate collective as well as individual capabilities of allied states. 
 
6.2.3 Norwegian Maritime Strategy and Transformation 
The development and application of the Norwegian maritime strategy could in several respects 
correspond with that of NATO, as Norway ever since its inception has been an unrelenting ally, 
placing great emphasis on contributions to the Alliance’s collective defense and cooperation. Of 
course, the overall Norwegian defense and security policy after the World War II has for the most 
part been defined by membership of the Alliance. This membership endured after the end of the 
Cold War, and notions of the alliance were imperative in outlining Norwegian defense policy – both 
during the Cold War and after (Rottem 2007). As the end of the Cold war generated a new balance 
of power in the international system, it created an entirely different state of affairs which altered the 
challenges to states’ security and thus the military-strategic planning of their militaries for facing 
these new realities of security.        
 During the Cold War, Norway had upheld a substantial defense structure designed for 
territorial defense, based on male conscription and a pedantically planned total mobilization of all 
aspects in the society in case of war (Bogen and Håkenstad 2017). Norway perceived its security 
situation as being highly exposed militarily and geostrategically, as a small state next to the Soviet 
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Union and because of the proximity to its strategically important base complex at the Kola 
Peninsula. Having large sea territories – primarily in the North – Norway pursued offsetting of its 
disadvantages by extensive mobilizing efforts and a total defense concept within the framework of 
an integrated alliance (Håkenstad 2010; Matlary 2013). Membership in NATO, and especially the 
bilateral relationship to the US, has long been a true bedrock of Norwegian security policy (Tamnes 
1997). With this, the defense concept from the Cold War denoted complete dependence on allied 
support, meaning massive US and allied aid in armaments, infrastructure and funds, implying a 
strategy of withstanding for as long as possible (Børresen, Gjerseth and Tamnes 2004, 52-53).  
 In the post-Cold War era, much have changed – yet some things have remained the same. As 
challenges to Norwegian security derives from its geostrategic situation, maritime security and 
defense policy have therefore necessitated the capacity to provide a “threshold of resistance” to any 
incidental strikes, and “maintaining Norway’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom 
of action” which comprises a vital strategy to its national security (NMoD 2012b, 8). This reflects a 
traditional security and policy stance, where state integrity is key in protecting its border and deter 
against potential adversaries. Because of its vast sea areas, NATO membership has therefore 
remained crucial as a basis of deterrence (Matlary 2013, 281). As Norwegian economy and welfare 
hinge on maritime resources (oil, gas and fish), and advanced maritime industries and global 
shipping, having capabilities for securing SLOCs and vital strategic interests are imperative for 
controlling national sea territories (Ulriksen 2013).      
 However, the ability of managing future challenges to maritime security must be planned for 
being able to deal with these alone because of the absence of any invasion scenario in Europe. With 
the Cold War threat being diminished, NATO began in the early 1990s to center on other areas than 
the SLOCs and northern areas, leaving Norway in a “fear of abandonment”, as Glenn Snyder terms 
it (1984, 466-68). The fear of being downgraded in NATO and ignored by its key guarantor – the 
US – brought about a state of continuity which is fundamental to the Norwegian strategies 
throughout the post-Cold War era. As the historian Rolf Tamnes puts it: 
 “Among the enduring features are the primacy of the High North and transatlantic 
  dimensions, and the balancing act between internationalism and aloofness.”   
          (Tamnes 2014, 65) 
 Hence, the relationship with US and the Alliance remains key for the Norwegian maritime 
strategy and security to this very day. As an Atlantic coastal state with robust historical ties to the 
West, Norway has sought to the major powers within NATO – in previous times from Britain and 
later the US – for leadership and military assistance. Although the restructuring of Norwegian 
military into more flexible and expeditionary forces for meeting new security challenges took time, 
it did not change the relationships to NATO and the US (Græger and Lindgren 2017). Moreover, 
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the increasing activism of Russia in the High North during the recent years have necessitated the 
strengthening of NATO’s northern flank, which have encouraged enhanced Norwegian 
contributions in its priority of being “NATO in the High North” (NATO PA 2018).  
 
6.3 Diffusion Outcomes of the Modern Warship Innovations 
Although NATO has adopted its name from one of the greatest oceans in the world, the Alliance 
have traditionally been a military alliance primarily centered on both land and sea. While many 
allied nations have built and maintained outstanding navies, seapower has for the most part served 
as a flanking force for what was envisioned as the main Cold War battle on the central front. After 
the collapse of the USSR, land warfare continued to act as a key focus of the alliance – first in 
managing the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and then as NATO anticipated a key role in the Afghan 
War. Nevertheless, naval power has historically been a defining feature of the Alliance, in which 
the US have dominated with its technological advances since the World War II.   
 The US’ naval planning during this period have mainly focused on Russia as the most likely 
enemy of the United States (and NATO), while the rise of China’s naval power has proved itself to 
bring substantial competition to the US technological lead as well. While several allies, including 
Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy, have created fleets with increasing power projection, 
they struggle to pose notable competition to the American vanguard. However, despite diverging 
commitment and investments in new capabilities among the European allies, they have shown 
interest in pursuing transformation and improvement of their militaries with different outcomes, 
which could in certain areas compete with US capabilities. Others pursue niche capabilities to extend 
the striking power of larger fleets, such as the coastal naval powers of Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal, as they are largely organized around the focus on expeditionary forces 
for the purpose of fulfilling a role within NATO. This is so except for Norway, as its navy is 
structured for defending national coastlines as well. The major and smaller navies – such as the 
coastal ones – are the universe relevant for the next discussions. Table 6.1 in Appendix A 
demonstrates changes in the distribution of naval power from the Cold War’s end until present.
 After the US-led victory in the 1991 Gulf War, which initiated the information age RMA 
and new innovations associated with NCW, the construction programs of naval powers across the 
world have moved in different paces and directions in response to the technological lead of the 
United States. Many altered construction plans for already-planned warships and incorporated new 
advances of the RMA-technologies, attempting to follow in the US’ footsteps. Still, it is not just 
about playing catch-up in the pursuit of increased maritime power – the picture is a lot more 
complex. These advances are also being made in regards to national and alliance maritime courses 
of action, changes in strategic concepts and doctrines, and defense budgets, reflecting states’ 
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differing strategic interests and choices due to new threats and changes in the security environment. 
Consequently, the mesh of these factors inflict challenges in varying degrees on how states prepare 
their militaries for contemporary warfare.        
 For example, Germany faced great challenges in overcoming constitutional constraints, as 
the RMA remained a moot issue throughout most of the 1990s, thereby hindering the Germans in 
incorporating RMA tenets into its military doctrines and naval strategies (Sloan 2002, 72). It was 
not until 1994 that alterations began by deploying German forces beyond its borders, and by 1995 
they actually undertook such a deployment into Bosnia. Yet, the strategic and policy plans for 
transformation were not integrated until after the turn of the century.    
 Technologically, as Germany had engaged extensively in advanced intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance systems (especially related to UAVs), it had begun developing unmanned 
reconnaissance aircrafts, also for the maritime domain, for supporting surface warfare, electronic 
warfare, antiship missile defense, amphibious operations and antisubmarine warfare (Aguera 2000). 
Moreover, of the eighteen Type 205-class submarines built for the Bundesmarine (West German 
Navy) during the 1960s, twelve were modernized in the early 1990s, and redesignated as Type 
206A-class. A major mid-life modernization was conducted, with substantial upgrades involving 
the fitting of a new sonar, new periscopes and a new LEWA weapon control system. GPS navigation 
was installed, and the rebuilt submarines were armed with new Seeaal-torpedoes as well as having 
the propulsion system being comprehensively refurbished and other improvements being made to 
the accomodation (Jane’s Information Group 2003).   
Furthermore, Britain also started to make several improvements consistent with the 
information age RMA, centering on enhancing their ability to apply long-range precision force using 
precision-guided munitions (Sloan 2002; 2008). Alterations were made on the Type 22-class 
frigates, reflecting the lessons learned in the Falklands, changing the weapons fit in becoming more 
optmized for a general warfare role: the ships were fitted with improved guns, missile launchers and 
a greatly advanced weapon system. The mid-life refits of the succeeding Type 23-class frigates were 
massive, with refurbishments improving top speed and fuel consumption, sensors, missile system, 
and upgraded command and communications systems (Aquilina, Michell and Pearson 2010). For 
both Britain and Germany, these transformations required substantial financial resources and 
investments in R&D as some technologies were noncommercial, in addition to putting increased 
demands on shipyards building in fitting these new improvements. The introduction and integration 
of the RMA-technological upgrades also forced a range of naval policy changes, not only in Britain 
and Germany, but in other Western and non-Western states as well. 
The spread of the technological elements of the RMA-technologies applied to modern 
warships after the Cold War have occurred relatively more swiftly and thoroughly than the spread 
  86 
of the complete innovation of NCW. Given the medium levels of financial intensity and 
organizational capacity required to adopt, it could be asserted that the spread of modern warships 
has been relatively consistent after the Cold War, with the technologies related to the RMA and 
NCW spreading more quickly in some areas while somewhat slower in other, as demonstrated in 
the table above. However, it should be pointed out that “relatively consistent” in this sense refers to 
the United States still being in the technological lead ahead of both allied states and adversaries in 
most areas, whilst the discrepancies across Europe and among the US and its allies are still prevalent. 
Nevertheless, since the technological side of innovation should spread fairly quickly to those with 
financial capabilities, it is not surpising that the advantage for the first mover, the United States, 
would be shorter in this case than for technologies harder to adopt. Yet, on the organizational side, 
the lag between the innovation of modern warships and widespread adoption is longer.  
 
6.4 The Impact of Modern Warship Innovations 
Although few military innovations have had the same reach of impact on the security environment 
as the HMS Dreadnought had, the impact of modern warships during the information age have also 
been significant due to the application of high-technological weaponry and communication systems 
(Horowitz 2010). Led by Admiral Cebrowski, the US Navy attempted to maximize its first-mover 
advantage from developing modernized platforms incorporated with interoperable technologies by 
limiting the release of crucial information and intelligence. By purposefully shielding the results 
from sea trials that demonstrated faster propulsion and speed, and more accurate targeting at longer 
distances using precision-guided munitions, the general belief is that upholding secrecy will delay 
efforts of foreign navies to mimic, especially regarding adversaries, new technological innovations 
– helping the US in sustaining and widening its relative naval advantage (Carlisle 2015).116 
 The Americans have gained important advantages from their first-mover status, despite the 
lack of a comprehensive transformation strategy to guide their vision and future evolution in the 
1990s (Sloan 2002). After the success in the 1991 Gulf War, information technologies and network-
centric way of war seemed to indicate a revolutionary change, representing a new “gold standard” 
of military power as with the British HMS Dreadnought in 1904 and the German blitzkrieg in 1940 
(Singer 2010, 188). Modern warships would come to mean not merely the ships or vessel themselves 
but also the package of capabilities they contained. It was perhaps even more evident in the early 
stages of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, as it took half the time at 0.59 percent the cost 
                                                 
116 Still, joint intelligence and elaboration on military innovation have been crucial for the spread of new technologies among NATO 
allied member. Joint research programs and doctrines have been established in response to the RMA during the 1980s and the 1990s, 
allowing rapid dissemination of time-sensitive information to decision-makers and combat commanders, while allowing for the 
consolidation of intelligence resources in central locations (Carlisle 2015, 350). Nevertheless, states will always have an interest in 
holding back certain types of information in keeping their military edge, regardless of alliance politics.  
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compared to the occurrences during the Gulf War. Boot (2006b) has argued that the key was not 
only the US utilizing profoundly different weapons than previously, but that networking into 
information technology had proven “central to American military dominance”. The transformation 
movement guided by Cebrowski had ostensibly established a real revolution in war.  
 Although the United States are still the prevailing naval power, these advantages have in 
some respects been short-lived. Within a few years after the launch of RMA-technologies, several 
European allies begun modernizing their militaries, even if this must be comprehended in 
accordance to alliance politics for enhancing expeditionary defense capabilities, cooperative 
relations and interoperability in NATO (Farrell and Rynning 2010). However, the declining numbers 
of ships in the joint fleet, due to rising costs and budget cuts reducing the naval fleets of most 
individual allied states, could arguably have made it easier for other major navies like the Russians 
or the Chinese to gain on the US Navy, though the it has managed to stay ahead (NATO 2016). 
While the United States gained a large relative advantage in military power, the adoption 
requirements could have shortened the first-mover advantage sustained by the US Navy. 
 The implementation of RMA-related organizational changes, especially the streamlining of 
command and control structures, enlarged professionalism toward more rapidly deployable 
expeditionary forces and changes in battle practice, also increased the combat efficiency of the US 
Navy (Sloan 2008). For example, the incorporation of organizational RMA tenets into fleet 
redeployment facilitated elimination of outdated vessels and thus investing financial resources in 
faster warships that would more effectively allow for projection of power, sea control and sea 
command (anti-access/area denial capabilities). Maintenance of aging ships imposed large costs on 
military readiness, while the potential benefits of improving overseas force deployments became 
increasingly more important as new challenges in the security environment required new measures 
in confronting them (Button et al. 2015).         
 At the system level, it is arguable whether the impact of modern warships has been restricted 
to the interaction of major powers. Put crudely, Western austerity and global economic changes have 
generated higher levels of asymmetries between major powers and minor naval powers, several 
states – especially in the Western hemisphere – with middle and minor power have built and 
maintained impressive navies (Raska 2016). Nevertheless, as discussions above demonstrates, there 
are great differences in power and capabilities among both the European allies and the United States, 
and between the Alliance (and the US) and its adversaries. Modern warships with information age 
technologies have inflicted shifts in the speed of interactions along with expectations of the timing 
and outcome of operations, which had spillovers into broader strategic planning (Sloan 2002). 
Despite the overall shrinkage of naval fleets after the Cold War, the military build-up between the 
United States and Russia, in addition to the diverse types of conflicts over the years, could be well-
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established examples of incentives to transform the whole military establishment (NATO 2016). 
This includes defense-capability planning postulating the worst about adversaries leading to 
inevitable increased tensions and encouraging more flexibility of militaries in responding to new 
security threats and complex challenges in the ever-changing security environment (Fitzsimmons 
2006; Sloan 2008).          
 Additionally, with increased naval power accompanying the technological upgradings of 
individual ships as the cost per unit increased, the military cost of adversaries gaining advanced 
knowledge about such new technologies will increase as well. The growing complexity of naval 
operations have posed challenges to Allied naval interoperability (Farrel and Rynning 2010; Fiott 
2017). Horowitz (2010, 152) explains that battles in the age of sail, such as Navarino in 1827, 
demonstrated that even though collaboration between the British, French and Russian navies was 
tense, it correspondingly did not require massive preplanning. Battleships sailed into the battle space 
being visible to others, and consequently the likely disparities in tactics and external differences 
between the ships were fairly small. During the machine age, and more importantly the information 
age, all such factors have changed. There are large variations in strategies and ship capabilities, and 
the size and character of battle spaces have made it increasingly more difficult for navies to 
cooperate or interact in operations without extensive preplanning. Consequently, this will shape the 
different diffusion patterns of military innovation among NATO members as well as other 
competitors and adversaries in the international system.  
 
6.5 Responses to Modern Warship Innovations 
As stated above, the post-Cold War US defense establishment has been at the frontline of military 
transformation. Despite its unmistakable military advantage over adversaries and allies alike, US 
leaders intend to not only upkeep but also increase the nation’s military dominance (Dombrowski 
and Ross 2008, 13). The longstanding message to military competitors has been clear; challenging 
the United States proves ineffective.117 Yet, military change – or innovation – diffuses, whether 
slowly or rapidly. According to Goldman and Eliason (2003a), innovators such as the United States 
struggles in maintaining their competitive advantage, as allies and competitors – even adversaries 
like Russia and China – will emulate, adapt and improve as well as counter their innovations. 
 Hence, the spread of military innovations from the US to Asia, Europe and the Middle East 
has been apparent for some time. Into the first decade of the twenty-first century, transformation – 
as in military transformation – became a familiar buzzword among scholars of American and allied 
                                                 
117 In making the case for transformation, former Secretary Rumsfeld, the United States’ foremost civilian champion of transformation 
in the beginning of the 2000s, was truly explicit when he stated that “we must develop new assets, the mere possession of which 
discourages adversaries from competing.” (Rumsfeld 2002, 27). 
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militaries (Sloan 2002). Although the US was the first to set off military transformation by applying 
information age technology and developing new structures and concepts, it seems that almost all 
states began to embark on the transformation bandwagon (Terriff 2010). The NATO Alliance is no 
exception of this trend, yet there are diverging interpretations among the European allies as well as 
other competitors outside the Alliance. For example, China has during the last decade pursued 
military advancement through the taxonomy of “informatization”, a process much alike that of US 
transformation, emphasizing information intensive warfare (Cimbala 2016). As Richard Bitzinger 
has noted, China’s adoption of transformation depends on: 
[…] short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed and long-range attack, 
employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space and 
electromagnetic battlespace, and relying heavily upon extremely lethal high-technology weapons. 
(Bitzinger 2006, 2) 
 The sections reflecting alternative strategic choices above, validate assumptions of that given 
the medium levels of financial intensity and organizational capital required to adopt this innovation, 
states ought to engage in various internal and external response strategies to modern warships 
associated with the information age RMA and NCW. While the system-level outcomes offer support 
for the adoption capacity theory, this section provides a closer analysis of three allied states in 
attempting to seek out specific national impacts of modern warship innovations, notably Britain, 
Germany and Norway, as portrayed below. 
 
Country-Specific Responses of Allied States 
BRITAIN 
Britain started undertaking several initiatives consistent with the information age RMA and military 
transformation, driven by a desire of being capable in providing an effective contribution to US-led 
international security operations and thus remaining an important player and an esteemed ally in the 
international system (Sloan 2002). Numerous of ensuing decisions were not taken and advanced 
until the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was released in 1998. Still, claims have been made that 
of the European allies, Britain has been at the forefront of these efforts towards a network-enabled, 
effects-oriented and expeditionary force posture (Sloan 2008; Porter 2013).   
 The dynamics of British military transformation have involved innovation in military 
doctrine (EBAO), organizational concepts and technology (NEC).118 As driving forces of British 
military transformation largely are international, a main one has been the altered strategic landscape 
                                                 
118 It should be noted, however, that the term “military transformation” has faced difficulties taken roots in Britain (Farrell 2008, 
778). In 2004, the former Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), General Sir Michael Walker, explicitly spoke in his annual lecture of the 
transformation of the armed forces yet it is barely cited in the 2003 DWP. Notwithstanding, the DWP offer an influential policy 
direction for the British military transformation along US lines of change, making the EBAO a new paradigm for British force 
development and the conduct of operations. The 2003 DWP also clearly placed NEC at the heart of British transformation, integrating 
sensors, decision-makers, weapon systems and support capabilities in achieving the desired effect. 
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accompanying the post-Cold War security environment. The demise of the Soviet threat eliminated 
the core mission of British military, urging invention of and revision to meet new operational 
challenges. This inferred a return to – in a historical sense – traditional mission-sets of the British 
armed forces, notably expeditionary warfare (Farrell 2008). Another central international driving 
mechanism has been the transformation of the US military, both as an essential, in the constant 
interest of British armed forces being capable of combating alongside US forces, and as a source of 
ideas, principally concerning networking of forces and effects-based thinking (Demchak 2003).
 Simultaneously, Britain has not merely emulated their US ally. As previous discussions have 
shown, it has rather adapted American ideas for fitting them to British conditions and sensibilities 
(Farrell 2005; Adams and Ben-Ari 2006). There have been mainly three national forces influencing 
Britain’s capacity to adopt new innovations, namely resource constraints, military culture and 
domestic politics (Farrell 2008; Sloan 2002; 2008). It would be unrealistic of Britain to anticipate 
matching the level of US military transformation. Although the British had aspired it, it would be 
impossible to aim at a US-designed fully networked military force. Due to severe budget cuts during 
the 1990s and well into the 2000s, the British military proves unable to afford developing most 
advanced weapon systems dependent on next generation technologies, such as the US FCS (Farrell 
2008, 805). This have been reinforced by British military culture, such as the command culture 
(which sits agitatedly with complete network-centrism) and in terms of overall disbelief regarding 
the promises of new such technologies. Therefore, Britain planned to extend a NEC approach instead 
of NCW force structure, adopted EBAO thinking rather than warfare science and has been advancing 
new platforms incorporating new – still relatively mature – technologies.    
 On a further note, even though Britain has made significant efforts in improving its military 
in line with US transformations, declining defense budget combined with rising cost of ships after 
the Cold War’s end have placed constraints on the British Royal Navy.119 For example, from 2010 
to 2015, the Royal Navy experienced a thirty-three percent decline of the total of carrier and 
amphibious ships, a seventeen percent decline in submarines and an extra seventeen percent decline 
in destroyers and frigates, making its contemporary fleet smaller than the fleet challenged by the 
Falkland Islands War in the 1980s (Kuehn 2015; NATO 2016). Despite the shortfalls, they still have 
a large enough naval budget to build necessary NCW technologies into existing platforms, and as 
recent measures seem to have at least frozen cuts to the Royal Navy, there is a decisive impetus 
toward reinvesting (NATO 2016). The commitment to operate two new aircraft carriers and 
investments in the new Type 26-class frigates (also known as Global Combat Ship) will enhance 
British maritime power projection extensively, although placing enormous strains on funding of 
                                                 
119 See Figure 6.1 and 6.2 in Appendix B. 
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smaller escort vessels and substantial pressure on exercises, manning and skills.   
 Domestic politics have also played an important part in Britain’s capacity to innovate and 
transform its military, especially concerning shifting toward expeditionary capability. As the end of 
the Cold War eliminated the core mission of armed forces, however, it did not define what would 
replace it. The British government under the former Prime Minister Tony Blair determined to 
include an ethical dimension to Britain’s foreign policy in outlining the military’s new role, thus 
using military force for humanitarian purposes (Kampfner 2003). However, the events of 9/11 
underlined the need for countering terrorism abroad, thereby embracing effects-based thinking.120
 Nevertheless, as adoption capacity theory assumes, while modern warships have provided a 
noteworthy first-mover advantage for the United States in relation to the Royal Navy, Britain has 
had necessary financial intensity and organizational capital to adopt the innovation and starting to 
catch up. As an old naval power, the Royal Navy have commonly invested in important naval assets, 
but because of its budgetary constraints after the Cold War and old organizational age, it took some 
years for the British to incorporate information age technologies into its naval strategies and 
concepts. Yet, looking at commitments to the Alliance, the Anglo-American relationship and 
investments in new capabilities, Britain remains a crucial global player in international politics.121  
 
GERMANY 
Of the United States’ Western allies, Germany might be the one who has faced the greatest 
challenges in responding to new military innovation and the US’ transformation in the post-Cold 
War environment. Forty years of being a traditional land power in any potential Cold War battle, 
together with a post-World War II tradition of conscription for maintaining military ties to the 
civilian society, have implied that Germany had to undertake dramatic change in strategic thinking 
in responding to the American-led RMA transformations – notably a highly mobile expeditionary 
military capability (Sloan 2008, 70-1). The need for this capability was expressed already in the 
1994 Defense White Paper. However, even with several initiatives during the 1990s in addition to a 
staggering advice from a “Blue Ribbon” commission report in 2000, it was not until the events of 
9/11 that Germany’s policy starting to truly reflect the notion of state security as being beyond 
                                                 
120 Beyond the level of grand strategy, the US is central to how the British designs its own forces. Britain plans around the US-led 
coalitions, building it forces to be interoperable with those of the United States. Porter (2013, 129) argues that ever since the US-UK 
Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958, its nuclear deterrent has been reliant on the US for strategy and purpose, procurement, 
infrastructure and satellite guidance. Related to a logic of how to connect Britain’s power to its commitments, British strategy has by 
tradition not been categorized or embodied in formal committees or policies. Hence, a gap between theory and practice surface in an 
ironic way. In attempt of formulating a unique British world role, British strategic planners look to the US for inspiration, seeking 
largely institutional solutions to strategic problems.  
121 In comparison to the Dreadnought era, Britain was no longer a “Great Power” in a traditional sense after the World War II, or 
even after Cold War (Porter 2013, 122). Rather, it acted within the limiting parameters of the US grand strategy. In the World War 
II, the United States had entered the international system as both an ally and adversary, underwriting the British’ capabilities to fight 
but also dismantling their empire. Notions of a British autonomous grand strategy in recent years have been problematic surely 
because Britain became a constrained client in a world order dominated by the US after 1945. 
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territorial defense triggering participating in full spectrum operations abroad (Longhurst 2005). 
 This change in thought remained reflected in most recent policy documents, yet 
simultaneously, Germany sustained for a long time focused on conscription with the result being 
that although military transformation was underway, it was arguably advancing in a slower rate than 
in other allied states.122 As structural change of the armed forces has been central to German military 
transformation efforts, dramatic reductions and reforms have influenced its organizational capacity 
to innovate (Dyson 2006; Sloan 2008). Affected by declining defense budgets, cuts placed large 
pressure on Bundeswehr leadership in reducing manpower, which also resulted in downsizing the 
level of ambitions in terms of expeditionary forces and military capabilities (Schreer 2013, 173).123 
For instance, prior to the 2000s, Germany’s military force has been reduced from about 340 000 to 
around 182 000 by 2015 (IISS 2015, 97). Moreover, Germany maintained a capable fleet with clear 
strengths in some areas yet abandoned the idea of investing in full spectrum fleet due to rising costs 
of new technology and severe reduces in military expenditures (NATO 2016).   
 Albeit the enduring focus – in terms of personnel – on territorial defense, the Bundeswehr 
has though placed some noticeable importance on military transformation. For improving its 
operational capabilities, the emphasis has concerned developing capabilities in areas crucial to the 
Bundeswehr’s ability in pushing toward advances of NCW capabilities, although placing pressure 
on maintaining exercises, manning and skills (Sloan 2002). As with Britain, Germany have still 
managed to have a sizeable naval budget able of innovating in new naval capabilities. By committing 
to the procurement of new and costly K130 corvettes, or the Braunschweig-class – as well as 
developing improved tactical submarines and frigates – the Bundeswehr proves its capacity to 
improve and will enhance its maritime power projection significantly as these new ships are similar 
in function to the US Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – capable of competing with US precision target 
engagement ashore (Sloan 2008, 74). This is also closely tied to alliance politics, as a new batch of 
these ships were decided on in 2016 in response to NATO requirements expecting Germany to 
provide increased levels of readiness for littoral operations (Naval Technology 2018).  
 As with the case of Britain, domestic politics and military culture have been vital to the 
German military’s capacity to innovate and transform (Zapfe 2016). As Bundeswehr started taking 
steps in transforming into a more expeditionary force, Berlin decision-makers were at the same time 
assertive in deciding how to use force from a purely nationalist perspective, leading to its antagonism 
regarding the Iraq War and NATO’s Libya campaign (Schreer 2013, 174). While elements of a 
                                                 
122 In great contrast to France, for instance, Germany’s decision to maintain conscription has been under much debate as many would 
view these forces as ill-suited to the post-Cold War world, and undoubtedly to the ability of rapidly deploying military forces to 
operations across the world. Moreover, sustaining conscription could restrain advancements in capabilities in other forces because 
resources are committed to conscripts which could otherwise be allocated to new technology and equipment (Sloan 2008, 71). 
However, in 2010 new reforms made a switch to an all-volunteer force, thereby ending the old conscription model (IISS 2015). 
123 See Figure 6.1 and 6.2 in Appendix B which demonstrates overall declining military expenditures over the years by country. 
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culture of military restraint partially primed these decisions, they were also founded on beliefs that 
these operations were not in the best interests of Germany. Hence, Germany was skeptical about 
engaging in “wars of choice” outside NATO territory. Consequently, its military transformation 
process has been driven into only limited expeditionary capability, leaving Germany a selective, or 
even a reluctant, NATO ally (Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Keller 2012).    
  Nonetheless, despite organizational constraints facing Germany in incorporating 
information age technologies into its naval strategies and concepts, and moreover, into strategies 
and concepts of the overall military in the short-term, they eventually had the necessary financial 
intensity to adopt modernized warships due to considerable efforts in upgrading its power projection 
capabilities during the 2000s as it built organizational capacity over time. Thus, because of 
budgetary constraints after the Cold War, in addition to political and strategic reluctancy hindering 
new technologies in being adopted quickly, the pace of diffusion of modern warships in the 
Bundeswehr seems to be slower as compared to innovation patterns in the militaries of its European 
allies – leaving the US with a notable first-mover advantage in relation to Germany. Finally, 
consistent with the country-specific expectations, Germany bandwagoned with the US in attempting 
to remain an important naval power and NATO ally.       
 
NORWAY 
Deriving from the previous chapter and empirical literature, Norway seems to be an example in 
which the connection between system-level imperatives in the international security environment 
and state-level policy response has been hesitant and implicit (Dyson 2010, 122). Transformation of 
the Norwegian military and policies could in several ways follow what one might expect given the 
distribution of capabilities and military power in the international system. Conversely, the planning 
and complexity of restructurings have been deeply connected to changes in defense budgets, 
accentuating the importance of such domestic factors in explaining responses to and the pace of 
military transformation after the Cold War (Bogen and Håkenstad 2017).   
 Norway has, since the inception of NATO, upheld close ties to both the Alliance and the 
United States – thereby making significant transformational efforts in responding to the American 
transformation agenda by incorporating highly advanced information age technologies into its 
strategic concepts and doctrinal policies (Matlary 2013, 279). However, Norway was very slow to 
modernize in the first decade after the Cold War’s end. While acknowledging the US introduction 
of NCW-related capabilities in the beginning of the 1990s, it was not until the end of this decade, 
and more importantly, in the beginning of the 2000s that major and rapid transformation towards 
expeditionary forces began, as set out by a government White Paper released in 2000 (NMoD 2000, 
6). Arguably, there are much support for identifying factors as national security concerns, domestic 
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politics and financial constraints as the main drivers in shaping the dynamics of the Norwegian 
military transformation (Bogen and Håkenstad 2017).    
 Restructuring and advancing military capabilities in the NAF is essentially a reflection of 
Norway’s geopolitical situation of being a small state next to Russia and of having sea areas much 
larger than the land mass, mostly in the North (Bekkevold, Bowers and Raska 2015, 266).124 Yet, it 
could also echo Norwegian concerns of being “marginalized” in NATO, thus forgotten by its key 
ally and affiliate – the US (Heier 2006). This has resulted in what Rolf Tamnes (2014, 65) labels as 
deep continuity, which has been crucial to the Norwegian security policy after the Cold War. 
Consequently, the relationship with both the US and NATO alliance remains vital to the policy 
reforms shaping the military transformation of Norwegian naval capabilities.125     
 The onset of planning major transformations in capabilities coincided with the Bosnian and 
Kosovo operations, which brought great changes in strategic thinking regarding the importance of 
contributing to NATO efforts. However, it could rather have been a catalyst for transformation more 
than a root cause (Larsen 2011). Continuities in Norwegian policies were not only the outcome of 
dispassionate strategic assessments, as strategic thinking reflected the military and strategic culture. 
Denial of warfighting realities regarding international operations and deployment created a kind of 
“cognitive dissonance” in making reformers sceptic and reluctant of military modernization, thereby 
delaying the organizational capacity to innovate (Matlary 2013, 295).126 Yet, large contributions in 
the 2011 Libya campaign turned this around, placing Norway between the Germans and British in 
relation to the scope and swiftness of military change and use of force.     
 As with most European allies, the NAF was affected by heavy and enduring budget cuts 
through the 1990s and well into the 2000s. For Norway, the main reason was a large and increasing 
gap between organizational size and financial resources available in maintaining and renewing it 
(Gjeseth 2014, 70). Key capacities were near the end of their life cycles while the cost of new 
technology and ships was increasing abruptly, as revealed by gaps in procurement plans and actual 
investments (Johansen 2000, 15). Hence, cuts placed large pressure on the RNoN leadership in 
                                                 
124 This encompasses with the concept of “external balancing” of Walt (1985, 4-8), as Norway as a small state bordering a powerful 
neighbor appears especially relevant for the Norwegian case.  
125 It should be noticed, however, that balancing the Soviet or Russian threat by retaining guaranteed military assistance from the US 
and the Alliance has for long been the bedrock of Norwegian security policy (Tamnes 1997, 61-4). But it was not interpreted into 
Norwegian interests in restructuring or modernization at the end of the Cold War. Instead, Norway was centered on a residual threat 
from the former Soviet Union well into the 1990s, and viewed it as necessary to sustain core capabilities of the traditional Cold War 
defense structure (Saxi 2010; Græger 2007). Still, its efforts in convincing important allies to upkeep traditional tasks of the Alliance 
occurred while the US simultaneously pursued the American RMA and increasingly putting demands on European allies to move 
“out of area” (Børresen et al. 2004; Hilde and Widerberg 2010; Bogen and Håkenstad 2016).  
126 This occurred when Norwegian soldiers were fighting and suffering losses and injuries in especially the Kosovo campaign and in 
Afghanistan post-2001, as the communication about the security rationale of ISAF at home was absent in the political vocabulary 
because Norwegian politicians and public would rather speak of Norway as a nation promoting peace instead of war (Nordvik 2009; 
Winge 2009). However, this later changed, making the cognitive dissonance disappearing quickly. In the words of the former General 
Robert Mood; “It is a very good thing that they [Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan] succeed without losses and with minimal use of 
force. I know that they can be lethally effective when they have to” (Matlary 2013, 295).   
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reducing personnel, further resulting in downsizing expeditionary forces and military capabilities 
though not the quality of new capacities as naval budgets have been substantial enough to endorse 
the NCW innovations deriving from the US transformation agenda. Despite declining military 
expenditures – which have seen a fairly increase in recent years due to latest investments – the RNoN 
has grown into being one of the most up-to-date technological small navies worldwide with its 
Nansen-class frigates comprising upgraded combat systems and missile technology, the high-speed 
Skjold-class corvettes with remarkable stealth technology and maneuverability and submarines with 
improved sonars and maneuverability.127 These are all technologies greatly appreciated by NATO 
and the US ally in confronting new challenges in the post-Cold War security environment (Matlary 
2013; NMoD 2016).128 
On this note, Norway has been military able in transforming and modernizing its military – in 
all three services – although experiencing periods of political unwillingness and reluctant reformers 
stalling the pace of transformational processes and harnessing of new technological capabilities. 
Even with organizational and budgetary constraints, they ultimately had the necessary financial 
intensity to quickly adopt modernized warships due to considerable efforts in upgrading its power 
projection capabilities during the 2000s as it, like Germany, built organizational capacity over time. 
Because of this, the US maintained notable first-mover advantages over Norway, which has over 
the years struggled to meet the demands of sustaining and improving its capabilities in NATO.  Still, 
due to an integrated US-Norwegian relationship, and consistent with country-specific expectations, 
Norway has for a long time attempted to bandwagon with the US regarding military innovation. Due 
to its current level of capability, it remains a valued small navy and NATO ally.   
 
6.6 NATO’s Contested Mission and Differing Designs 
During the last two decades, NATO’s membership and mission have expanded, placing increased 
pressure on the need for transformation of the overall coalition and modernization of its capabilities 
due to shifts in the geostrategic landscape. As discussions above have shown, transformation of 
strategic concepts and strategic thinking has been vital for the adaptation of NATO allies in the 
changing security environment following the end of the Cold War. It obviously corresponds with 
the different ways states within the Alliance, and in the international system as a whole, make 
                                                 
127 Table 6.2 in Appendix B demonstrates this, meaning how the distribution of funds in naval capabilities in recent years has 
provided surface combatants and submarines with significant shares of financial resources. 
128 It is important to note, however, that the recent procurement of F-35 Lightening II fighter jets has had a contributing effect on the 
naval budgets the last years. While they arguably are a disruptive yet undeniably high-technological multirole capacity, which will 
have an immense impact on the Norwegian military power in the years to come, they have been of such an importance for strategic 
planners that the overall military expenditures has given priority to the air domain over the maritime domain, leading to cuts in the 
quantity of naval capabilities. The F-35 fighter jets are intended to overlap the capabilities of Skjold-class corvettes, which in turn are 
planned to be decommissioned in favor of these planes. Decisions like these influence investments in naval capabilities, and thereby 
the overall development of innovative capability adoption, and are likely to continue dominating budget discussions in the years 
ahead (NMoD 2016; Matlary 2013). See Figure 6.1 in Appendix B.  
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choices in how to transform and innovate their militaries to encounter these new challenges. 
However, initiatives to reform strategic concepts, reflecting the image, responsibilities and functions 
of the Alliance, could be observed as another burden to an already over-burdened alliance, as 
members evidently have different outlooks of what purpose NATO should have. As the numerous 
transformations and the constantly altering purpose are straining allies – requiring resources many 
of them are unable to offer – the political support suffer. Consequently, means-end assessments 
could lead to states to opt domestic strategies over collective action, as national forces also shape 
foreign policy decision-making and reform, determining limitations and form the rationality. 
Because the interests and motives of states influence their military commitment to NATO’s 
missions, national orientations were a priority, resulting in limited or slow transformation and 
innovation for many of the allies which further enlarge the capability gaps in the Alliance. 
 The implications of NATO’s changing purpose are leaving the Alliance in a continuing state 
of uncertainty. As Webber et al. (Webber, Sperling and Smith 2012, 10) argue, adaptation to face 
“new security challenges”, being the end of the Cold War, Bosnia, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan, Libya 
or Crimea, remains a persistent matter of debate within the Alliance. Although NATO apparently 
has surmounted such events that influences transformation and innovation patterns, it could be noted 
that the Alliance is permanently in a state of flux, denoting the increasing heterogeneity between 
allies with divergent strategic orientations and perceptions of NATO’s purpose as portrayed in 
discussions above (Yost 2000). Despite this continuation, the US remains interested in furthering 
the cooperative nature of the Alliance and encouraging its agenda of transformation for advancing 
the joint military capabilities of the alliance. Still, as the US’ notice of embarking on a Third Offset 
Strategy is intended to create a military-technological gap between the US and its adversaries, it 
might nonetheless lead to an even larger capability gap within NATO – unless NATO itself, as well 
as individual member states, also engages with the Third Offset Strategy (Fiott 2017; Marino 2017). 
 Hence, the country-specific responses to new military innovations within the Alliance have 
been of a mixed character. As states differ in their military organizations, policies and economy, 
they will have different incentives and abilities to adopt and implement new innovations and 
technologies. As noted, there are great variations across the international system regarding military 
strategies, strategic concepts and defense budgets which influence innovations patterns of how and 
why states transform their military forces. This has been reflected in some key areas: notably 
perception of security threats; definitions of main missions and tasks; the extent, structure and 
material of forces; modes of military recruitment; and image of military professional (Kriz 2015). 
 Nevertheless, NATO is in the need of reinventing itself. Its rationale from the Cold War is 
archaic. NATO, apart from the US, is not able to defend itself against a conventional confrontation. 
However, this threat is also gone. The Russian (and Chinese) military build-up enables the 
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possibilities of asymmetrical circumstances, which currently is the largest threat facing the US and 
the West. Currently, the reality is that navies of the Allies are increasing in capability yet decreasing 
in size. However capable a ship may be, it can only be in one place at a time. Further, the rise in 
costs and complexity encourage furthering of the capability gap. Very few countries, other than the 
US, maintain full spectrum capable navies in sufficient numbers for projecting power in multiple 
theatres of operation, while others have developed high-level capabilities in specific areas (NATO 
2016). Given the clear importance of maritime capabilities to national and, therefore, Alliance or 
system-level power, it is time for NATO member states to review investments in their navies at 
home as well as their alliance contributions more broadly. 
 
6.7 Chapter Conclusion 
Military innovation is highly paradoxical. If militaries are to stay ahead of the game, it is imperative 
to innovate (Farrell 2008, 779). Yet, from the discussions above some seem slow to innovate, as 
established organizations with deeply incorporated routines and standardized operating procedures, 
tend to be resistant to major change – and therein lies the paradox. Accordingly, most previous 
literature has generally targeted single, specific innovations such a new technology, a new doctrine 
or approach to operations, or a change in organizational structure. Moreover, the majority case 
studies have investigated military innovations from either the two world wars or the Cold War era.
 As such, it is important to emphasize the difference between earlier cases and the current 
processes of military change. Notably, they involve simultaneous innovations in technology, 
doctrine and organizational structure. Moreover, changing organizational, doctrinal and material set-
ups of states’ militaries is immensely challenging. In a multinational setting, as presented in this 
thesis, impediments to modernization are multiplied. In most outlines of international security and 
defense cooperation, at least those including democratic states (as the NATO allies), decision-
making is founded on tenets of state sovereignty and consensus (Bekkevold, Bowers and Raska 
2015). Combining this with differing threat perceptions, national interests and strategic orientations, 
potential outcomes are perpetually limited, thereby making innovation difficult. Still, like militaries 
of individual states, multinational military establishments such as NATO must adapt to altering 
requirements in order to stay relevant.       
 Nevertheless, previous literature on the spread of military innovation has facilitated this 
study in testing a set of theories and assumptions on the case of sea power and modern warships, in 
efforts of explaining contemporary military innovation in the post-Cold War NATO. Essentially, 
this study has demonstrated military innovation as a dynamic process comprising a mesh of 
international (system-level) and national (state-level) features influencing militaries to embark on 
major change and shape how they do so. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
The information-driven revolution and its associated technological innovations continue to 
transform several aspects of social life as well as warfare. As these innovations spread around the 
world, probing deeper into an ever-broadened circle of communities, they are similarly changing 
the way we interact. Hardly any organizations will be left unaffected by the impact of these 
innovations – and the military is certainly no exception. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq the 
past decades gave profusely demonstrations of the remarkable US military capabilities (Goldman 
and Eliason 2003a, 30). However, the United States should not presume to remain the sole power 
capable of congregating its current superior power. Potential adversaries are also likely to learn from 
encounters with top-notch military capacity, both in regard to technology and to organization. For 
example, NATO allies are planning for their own military transformation – thus partly because of 
US policy intended to secure its unremitting hegemonic role. Regardless of the comprehensive 
studies of diffusion in previous literature, the ways in which these changes will influence the 
international system and the global balance of power will be hard, impossible even, to predict with 
precision. Nevertheless, it seems convincing that a greater understanding of the range of variations 
in how military innovations have spread in the past – and the mechanisms that have facilitated or 
hampered their successful integration though the international system of states – will increase our 
preparedness to meet new security challenges in the future.       
     
7.1 Main Findings 
As the previous chapters demonstrate a capability gap within NATO, it has been apparent for some 
years that the disparities between the US and its European allies has been widened since the 1991 
Gulf War. The NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia highlighted the differences in force 
development of communications, intelligence and surveillance capabilities, while the Kosovo 
operation emphasized substantial shortfalls in PGMs and missiles, long-range bombers and stealth 
aircraft (Sloan 2002, 80). The widened gap is partly due to the markedly reduced defense budgets 
across Europe after the Cold War’s end, as noted earlier, in which budgetary constraints in turn have 
reduced the ability of European NATO members in procuring capacities such as attack and transport 
helicopters, air and sea lift assets and sufficient stocks of advanced precision munitions – all vital 
requirements to address challenges in the post-Cold War security environment (NATO 2016; 
Webber, Sperling and Smith 2012). This, in combination with increased cost per unit of information 
age technologies has delayed the ability of individual states to transform their military forces, 
thereby hampering the overall adaptiveness and military efficiency of NATO.  
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 The overarching narrative of most states’ military organizations, and defense policies in 
particular, is obviously the drive to transform – a process which remains inexorable. It is driven by 
cultural impulse, by technological opportunity, and by a narrow – yet comprehensible and 
praiseworthy – fortitude to perform more efficiently. Whether or not it is inspired by strategic need 
is another matter, though it is very much an imperative part of the way military organizations 
prepares for war and how they respond to innovations.      
 Deriving from the naval innovations introduced in the events of the World War II, the spread 
of certain modern warship innovations (hereunder frigates, corvettes and submarines) during the 
post-Cold War era have occurred relatively in line with the adoption capacity theory. Key financial 
and organizational constraints, combined with potential benefits from and commitment to alliance 
relationships, have anticipated the timing and pace of technological adoption and the scope of 
organizational adoption by different powers in the Alliance. With varying degrees of delay, 
European NATO members – as well as other states outside the Alliance – have adopted the 
innovation. However, as many of the technologies have spread further than the major powers, the 
European allies have experienced difficulties in being able to adopt the organizational framework 
of network-centric warfare. Moreover, the implications for the international balance of power have 
also acted as assumed. The asymmetrical relations between major and minor powers, and especially 
between the US and its European powers, have increased as the discussions regarding the capability 
gap have emphasized. This has left US as the first-mover a significant lead in naval dominance in 
the years after the Cold War’s end.         
 Nevertheless, even though asymmetries of the overall US-European relationship in NATO 
seems to grow bigger, there are momentous divergencies between the European allies in the country-
specific responses to the innovation and how each state transform their militaries. On the financial 
side, the general pattern explaining the financial constraint to adopt innovations is primarily because 
of substantial budget cuts in military expenditures as the cost of new technology rises 
simultaneously, while organizationally it is chiefly due to bureaucratic hurdles of democratic 
domestic politics and political reluctancy. Yet, the levels of these constraints vary across the 
international system, and they vary across time. From the analysis above, for example, Germany 
seems to be the most reluctant ally due to hesitant and antagonistic decision-making in facing new 
technologies and issues of contribution regarding allied operations. Still, they invest in top-notch 
naval innovations, such as the costly K130 corvettes. Britain has demonstrated great efforts in 
adopting new innovations of both technological and doctrinal character in remaining a prominent 
naval power and faced constraints of similar kind as the ones of Germany, yet their domestic policies 
and reasons for emulation differ. As with Germany and Britain, Norway has in similar ways faced 
financial and organizational limitations to its adoption capacity, but is the unique geostrategic 
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situation as a small state bordering Russia and relationships to both the US and NATO that 
assertively have shaped the NAF’s restructuring and capability improvements. Although national 
divergencies, common to all these countries regarding incentives for military transformation is the 
importance of safeguarding vital strategic national interests and their commitment to the 
transformation agenda and the burden-sharing in the Alliance.      
 In the end, the introduction of warships associated with the information age and NCW has 
influenced the global naval balance of power. The medium levels of both financial intensity and 
organizational capital required for adoption have brought distribution of technological elements of 
the innovation at a steady, yet somewhat slowly, pace. The adoption of the full innovation, the NCW, 
has lagged as it does for almost every innovation, leaving the European allies unable to match the 
adoption capacity of the US. But it has not lagged close to what is for innovations like carrier 
warfare, which requires massive organizational requirements overpowering most naval powers. 
While consequences for most states have been reduced fleet sizes because of financial constraints, 
it has not necessarily implied reduced quality of new investments, as most navies can compete with 
major powers in certain areas in addition to having own niche power projection capabilities to 
readily face new challenges to security in an ever-changing security environment. 
 
7.2 Implications for Norway in NATO 
This is where the thesis arrives at the second part of the puzzle the research question poses. From 
discussions in previous chapters, it has become evident that Norway has not always contributed 
militarily to the satisfaction of other allied states. Ever since Norway joined the Alliance in 1949, 
NATO has functioned as the state’s “insurance policy”, by becoming increasingly entangled within 
the alliance. However, Norwegian military ambitions could be viewed as rather vague (Rottem 2007, 
623). Efforts to stay a relevant and noticeable player within the Alliance politically, but “non-
committally” militarily, encompass with its general self-image – if not tradition – of being a peaceful 
nation (Leira 2005). And while NATO has adapted to the new security environment, despite allies’ 
diverging efforts, and shifted focus away from the Northern flank, Norway has sought to remain a 
loyal ally regardless of shortcomings in the military domain.     
 Moreover, the balance of and interaction between military forces moving “out of area” and 
homeland defense has remained extremely important, as Norway has continued to sustain stability 
in the High North, providing the NAF with tasks requiring vital capabilities important to the 
collective defense of the Alliance. As some of the overall priorities of the Norwegian defense 
policies are to strengthen the national defense, NATO’s ability for collective defense and 
contributing to international crisis management, transforming its Armed Forces into a smaller, 
deployable and advanced force with essential equipment and training needed to address changing 
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challenges both at home and abroad, has been exceedingly important for increasing their overall 
capabilities and contributions to NATO operations.       
 Through the last decade, Norway has made significant investments in new maritime 
capabilities, such as the Nansen-class frigates with improved combat systems and missile 
technology, and the Skjold-class corvettes with outstanding stealth technology and maneuverability, 
making the Norwegian Navy one of the best equipped in NATO (Matlary 2013). Adding to this, 
investments are made in new submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and new F-35 fighter jets, which 
also will favor the maritime domain in providing Northern Europe with increased maritime security. 
The contributions and capabilities are integral to NATO’s collective defense and situational 
awareness in the North Atlantic – a region which is of growing importance for the Euro-Atlantic 
area – and reflect a leadership role in advancing transformational efforts for strengthening the 
Alliance’s maritime posture and capabilities.       
 In contrast however, some of the policies advanced by the Norwegian government in 
especially the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, could seem counter-productive. Most notably, the last 
Long Term Plan foresaw the disbanding of the Coastal Range Commando – a force optimal in facing 
Russian infiltration – and the decommissioning of the corvettes, determinations expected to set back 
not only national capabilities but also those collective of NATO (NMoD 2016). Despite these 
decisions, Norway has historically been a pragmatic ally, which never seeks antagonizing an 
adversary like Russia without utmost necessity, the state remains a considerable source of stability 
in Northern Europe and a valued ally of the entire NATO establishment. 
 
7.3 The Way Ahead: The Future of Warfare 
It is impossible to escape the central role of the US in discussing national perspectives on military 
transformation. However, the changing debate has propelled a variety of opposing perspectives in 
the US strategic thought, shaping divergent views and beliefs regarding the use of military power in 
the twenty-first century. Consequently, because of the intellectual push for a debate centering on the 
US and great powers, the scholarly field on the spread of military power lacks considerable research 
on diffusion paths and patterns in differing strategic settings, and especially concerning its impact 
on military innovation adoption in smaller and middle powers. This is key when discussing the 
spread of military power through the international system, thus attempting to add to the academic 
and policy-oriented literature in strategic studies and political science by also addressing the large 
puzzle on the diffusion of RMA-related military innovation. This means how processes of global 
transmission, communication and interaction of RMA-oriented military concepts, organizations and 
technologies, has influenced the responses, strategies and extent of military innovation in the 
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European states, including small states such as Norway.      
 A fundamental point must be reiterated regarding this thesis’ analysis of diffusion of military 
power after the Cold War. In general, the spread of military innovations in the information age, 
accordingly the revolution in military affairs, is pungently shaped by the United States. Defense 
expenditures and R&D efforts of the Americans outshine those of all other great powers – in fact, it 
outshines everyone. Indeed, we might not even have talked about an RMA if it were not for the US 
trying to outrun its own capacity for maintaining the qualitative edge it experienced during the 1990s 
and up until the present. As a definite phenomenon, and not only technological potentialities, the 
RMA is consequently heavily influenced by the US strategic context. Meaning, the need for 
developing a blueprint for power projection that could operate under more complex circumstances 
than the one during the 1991 Gulf War.          
 As explained in the first chapter, discussions in the various defense communities continue to 
involve how the character of future warfare could evolve along with implications for the 
international security environment. After hard-learned lessons about counterinsurgency warfare in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq, crucial debates have concerned those regarding future warfare as most 
likely being characterized by irregular military operations versus those favoring a focus on 
conventional military operations (Mazarr 2008; Nagl 2009). While terms as MTR, RMA, NCW and 
transformation has shifted in the years after the Cold War, how information age could impact 
conceptions and uses of military power is still relevant (Krepinevich 2002). Arguably, technologies 
such as deep-strike weapons, PGMs, GPS surveillance and other innovations of electronics could, 
or even have to some extent, initiate an incremental shift away from “direct ground combat” that 
occurred during the past two centuries and toward stand-off, long-distance warfare. Moreover, 
information technology could open even further non-dynamic areas of warfare (Horowitz 2010).
 In determining how the current information age truly represents a revolutionary change, one 
has to consider how “revolutionary” is defined, in addition to which level one is studying.  From a 
broad strategic level, encompassing fundamentals, the current changes might be – using the analogy 
by Gongora and von Riekhoff (2000, 5) – a “ripple on a calm sea”, meaning the new operational art 
enabled by the RMA could be coherent even for military intellectuals such as Napoleon and 
Clausewitz. However, developments at the level of personnel and organizations responsible for 
transforming the technological potential of RMA into new weapons, information systems, doctrines 
and organizational arrangements, are undoubtedly eligible as a “sea change”.  
 Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the information age RMA are shaping history, although 
it often takes a while to bear fruit, as demonstrated in this thesis. But the pace and duration of these 
transitions appear to happen at a faster rate than those occurring ages ago. Transformations generated 
by gunpowder played out through centuries, those of steam engines, telegraphs and railroads 
  103 
(notable the first industrial RMA) transpired over a century, and changes of internal combustion 
engines, radio and flight (the second industrial RMA) surfaced over a few decades (Singer 2010). 
Further, this is why the emergence of hybrid technologies provide a reliable indication of the current 
RMA. While there are always early and late adaptors of any given technology, hybrids want it both 
ways – by layering new technologies onto old platforms. For example, steam-powered warships in 
the British Navy still mounted sails until 1880, demonstrating the symptom of an older RMA. Boot 
(2003, 175) describes such a hybrid “the military equivalent of a duck-billed platypus”; while 
marginally better than the old ones, they are far less effective than technologies fully transitioned to 
the new RMA. Indeed, although old technologies remain persistent, it does not imply that a 
revolution has not occurred or will do so in the future.     
 Admiral Cebrowski could seem like a fortuneteller of a new era, yet seemingly he turned out 
to be inaccurate. War is still far from perfect, nor are the networks that supposedly would rise as the 
most revolutionary or historic. It could be argued that information technologies such as robotics and 
interoperable systems of command and communications are revolutionary in that they have changed 
war as we once knew it. However, the fog of war is still apparent, just as it has been in every previous 
revolution in military history (Singer 2010, 203). More broadly, the current RMA will be like the 
ones before it, meaning it will continue to create variations of new questions, dilemmas and concerns 
that move beyond the boundaries of the battlefield. For example, when President Roosevelt agreed 
to develop of the atomic bomb in the beginning stages of the World War II, it was possible to 
anticipate how it could be a powerful weapon – even perhaps potent enough to end the war (Gosling 
1999). It was harder, though, to anticipate how this new technology would provoke second-rate 
effects like a new form of cold war, or even third-rate effects of a space race. Hence, RMAs are not 
simple pebbles thrown into the pond of history, but boulders. And the information age revolution 
could potentially be the same, yet in a whole new way. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Underlying Forces of Financial Intensity 
  
Underlying Basis of Technology 
Civilian  Military 
Cost per Unit 
Low 
Low Financial 
Intensity 
Medium Financial 
Intensity 
High 
Medium Financial 
Intensity 
High Financial 
Intensity 
 
              Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Diffusion Assumption at the System-Level 
 
Level of Organizational Capital Required 
to Implement MMI 
Low  High 
Level of 
Financial 
Intensity 
Required to 
Implement MMI 
Low Rate/extent fast Rate/extent medium 
High Rate/extent medium  Rate/extent slow 
              
            Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 40). 
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Table 3.3 Assumptions of Strategic Choices and Adoption Success in Response to MMIs. 
 
Level of Organizational Capital Required to Implement MMIs 
Low  High 
Level of 
Financial 
Intensity 
Required to 
Implement 
MMIs 
Low 
• More attempted adoptions 
• More successful adoptions 
• Faster underlying 
diffusion rate 
• Medium attempted 
adoptions  
• Relative success for 
minor powers in adoption  
• Medium underlying 
diffusion rate 
High 
• Medium attempted 
adoptions  
• Relative success for major 
powers in adoption  
• Medium underlying 
diffusion rate 
• Few attempted adoptions  
• More successful 
adoptions  
• Slow underlying 
diffusion rate 
 
Source: The author’s own. Based on the adoption capacity theory of Horowitz (2010, 30-60). 
 
 
Table 3.4 Assumed Relationship between the Spread of Military Power and the Balance of Power 
 
Level of Organizational Capital Required to Implement 
MMIs 
Low  High 
Level of 
Financial 
Intensity 
Required to 
Implement 
MMIs 
Low 
• Rapid diffusion 
• Short-term impact, and not 
likely to be structurally 
important 
• Relatively smaller first-mover 
advantage 
• Example: chemical warfare 
• Medium diffusion  
• Risks moving global power 
balance in ways likely to 
threaten existing powers 
• Fairly larger first-mover 
advantage 
• Examples: suicide terrorism, 
Napoleonic warfare, 
blitzkrieg (combined arms 
warfare) 
High 
• Medium diffusion  
• Risks bolstering existing global 
power balance 
• Fairly smaller first-mover 
advantage (ex. extreme cases) 
• Fairly positive for existing 
powers 
• Example: nuclear weapons 
• Slow diffusion 
• Likely to have considerable 
and long-term disruptive 
impact on balance of power  
• Relatively larger first-mover 
advantage 
• Example: carrier warfare 
 
 Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 49). 
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   Table 4.1 Case Selection of Possible MMIs, 1800-Present. 
Timing Revolution 
Nineteenth century Napoleonic revolution/levée en masse 
Nineteenth century Strategic communications/mobility 
Nineteenth century Professional staff personnel and procedures 
Nineteenth century Prussian open-order tactics: Railroads/rifles/telegraph 
Early twentieth century Battlefleet warfare 
Nineteenth to twenieth 
centuries Tactical fires (machine gun and artillery) 
Nineteenth to twenieth 
centuries Medical 
Nineteenth to twenieth 
centuries Fortifications (trenches) 
Twentieth century Chemical weapons 
Twentieth century "The modern system" 
Twentieth century Total industrialized war 
Twentieth century Blitzkrieg 
Twentieth century Carrier warfare 
Twentieth century Tactical air attack 
Twentieth century Air warfare (bombing) 
Twentieth century Submarine warfare 
Twentieth century Nuclear weapons 
Twentieth century Mao Tse-Tung's "people's war" 
Twentieth century Unconventional war/suicide terrorism 
Twentieth century Microelectronics/genetics engineering 
Late twentieth century Information war/network-centric warfare 
Late twentieth century Fourth-generation warfare 
 
    Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 61). 
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                        Table 6.1 Estimated Distribution of Maritime Power, 1990-2017 
 
 
Country (1990) Frigates  
Corvettes or 
Patrol 
Combatants Submarines 
United States 100 - 127 
Britain 35 5 32 
France 35 22 20 
Germany 8 5 24 
Soviet Union 148 70 323 
China 90 37 93 
Norway 5 2 12 
      
Country (2003) Frigates  
Corvettes or 
Patrol 
Combatants Submarines 
United States 30 - 72 
Britain 20 21 15 
France 20 1 10 
Germany 12 10 12 
Russia 10 23 53 
China 42 108 69 
Norway 3 12 6 
      
Country (2017) Frigates  
Corvettes or 
Patrol 
Combatants Submarines 
United States 8 - 68 
Britain 13 3 11 
France 11 10 10 
Germany 3 5 6 
Russia 12 48 62 
China 57 27 57 
Norway 5 6 6 
  
 
                     Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships (1991) and IISS (1991; 2004; 2017). 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Potential state responses to MMIs 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 27). 
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 Figure 2.2. “Ideal” state response to demonstration of MMIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduction of Horowitz (Horowitz 2010, 29). 
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Figure 5.1 Total Military Expenditure, 1960–2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
Source: Sandler and George (2016). 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 5.2 Median Share of GDP Devoted to Defense, 1960–2014. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
Source: Sandler and George (2016). 
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  Figure 5.3 NATO Allies’ Shares of Alliance Expenditure, 1960–2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sandler and George (2016). 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 5.4 Major Power Military Expenditure, 1960–2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sandler and George (2016). 
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Figure 6.1 Annual Allocation of Funds (NOK mill.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: NMoD (2012). 
 
 
 
   Figure 6.2 Allocation of Funds Per Main Category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NMoD (2012). 
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 Figure 6.3 Military Expenditure by Country.  
 (Adjusted for Inflation and expressed in 2000 US Dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities (v0.4) + Measuring Worth. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Military Expenditure as Share of GDP.  
(Military expenditure, given as the percentage of each country's gross domestic product 
(GDP)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities (v0.4) + Measuring Worth. 
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Figure 6.3 Annual Allocation of Funds (NOK mill.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NMoD (2012). 
 
 
 
